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ZAPPENDIX A
RELIABILITY VERSUS WEIGHT TRADEOFF METHODS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Voyager 197l mission specification allows spacecraft weight
reserves to be allocated to extend launch periods, provide more favor-
able trajectories, increase performance margins, employ redundancy, and
increase instrumentation, to improve the probability of mission success._
This appendix is directed at reliability improvements to improve the prob-
ability of mission success. A meanirgfu! approach to the allocation of
weight reserves for this purpose requires:
• Recognizing and analyzing all potential areas in
which weight reserve can be used to improve
reliability
• Proposing detailed alternatives for implementation
• Applying a rational alternative selection procedure
to allow the maximization of reliability within the
weight reserve allocated for this purpose.
This Appendix provides a brief outline of the basic muthods used for
weight-reliability tradeoff in the Voyager Phase IA study.
Z. BASIC APPROACH
Before any weight allocation procedure can be applied, the quanti-
tative relationship between probability of success and weight must be
established for all items for which a feasible tradeoff exists. This con-
stitutes the preponderance of effort required for the allocation procedure.
It requires a thorough reliability analysis, weight analysis, trajectory
analysis, and other system and subsystem analyses of the spacecraft
design. The accuracy of any allocation procedure used is heavily de-
pending upon the accuracy of the reliability and weight estimates of the
nominal configuration and the alternate configurations being considered.
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It must be recognized that weight is not the only constraint which
exists. Many proposed usages of reserve weight {either individually or
in certain combinations) will bE rejected because of limitations on: ::
• Space or dimensional constraint within the nose fairing
or spacecraft
• Available projected area for spacecraft electrical power.
(In the process under discussion, an improvement alter-
native which demands more power is charged with the
weight required to provide that power. It is desirable,
however, to limit the total power to that which can be
supplied by a fixed array. )
• Practical limits to implementing commands and switching
• Time available for development and test of complex options
Thus, it is seen at the outset that realistic options capable of utilizing
weight to improve reliability must be invented within the other physical
constraints of the Voyager design.
When it is assured that "probability of mission success" has been
clearly defined and constraints other than weight have already been im-
posed, many optional weight allocations are valid provided they do not,
in the aggregate, exceed the available weight reserve.
By definition mission success requires the successful performance
of each subsystem required in each phase of the mission sequence, e.g.,
launch, cruise, lander s_paration, and retropropulsion. Thus the prob-
ability of mission success may be written
n
P = I] P. (A-I)
i=l x
where P. is the probability of success or reliability associated with the1
subsystems within their operational phases, i_
All subsystems and phases must be evaluated on an equitable basis ,_i,• ';tC
This basis is the measure of improvement in the individual reliability,
Pi' corresponding to the utilization of a certain amount of the available _/
r_
!!i_',
j_
] 9660] ] 762-007
Dweight reserve. Thus, there is some direct function expressing weight
increase to implement the improvement. In some instances this functional
relationship is essentially continuous (for example, the probability that the
structure withstands the micrometeoroid environment versus the structural
weight}. In others it is composed of discrete options and as isolated inven-
tions (viz., for the use of redundancy} which are subject to the ingenuity of
the subsystem designer. In the latter case, some options are discarded
when others exhibit greater reliability for less weight.
In order to compare all spacecraft subsystems and their elements
in the same tradeoff they can be combined directly on the ..,Lame plot when
they are critical to the mission and are independent sources of failure
potential. Independence (as expressed in Equation A-i) provides that a
relative increase in reliability for any subsystem (expressed as the ratio
of its improved reliability to the original reliability) achieves the same
relative improvement for the combined total system. The successive
analysis of subsystem reliability improvements, therefore, is tantamount
to the successive analysis of system reliability improvements.
Generally co._ffining weight limitations will force an optimization of
reliability/weight conditions for all subsystems. Thus, there is a combina-
tion of subsystem reliability objectives for which the limited weight reserve
is best utilized for total system reliability. For larger weight reserve
conditions, however, it may be possible to invoke all manageable levels of
equipment redundancy without the necessity for a more refined subsystem
competition for weight.
In the general case, for each subsystem or phase
Pi = fIWi) (A-z)
where W. is the amount of weight reserve devoted to the ith subsystem.x
The function is either continuous or quasi-continuous.
Subject to the constraint
._W i _- WR (A-3)
1
3
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where W R is the total available weight reserve, the allocation must deter-
mine the values of W. so as to maximize P. This is done by maximizingi
the function
In P = _ In Pi (A-4)
The derivatives of (A-4) are given by
o'lnP _ _'In P. d inP.I 1
= = (A-5)
I 1 I
The condition for maximizing P is that
dlnP.
5P = 6 In P =Z 3 in P i 6W. = 0 (A-6)
_W. 6Wi =_ dW.- I
I 1
for any set of differential weights sati-.,fyingthe cc_nstraint
_.6W i = 0 (A-7}
This condition is met if
d inPl dlnPz d In P3 d inP :n
dW. - "6q_. = 'cl'W = "'" = -'-d-_-- :"<'; (A-8)
I 2 3 n
L
3. WEIGHT ALLOCATION 9:XAMPLE
Figure A-I illustrates the application of this,_!i,:_ationprocedure to
4.
a hypothetical example in which a spacecraft rnissiu:, is comprised of only _:
three subsystems and one sensitive phase, i._., launch ueriod extension. _
An assumed reserve of 350 pounds is available, t!ii
The weight-probability data from the example cases of Table A-I are
plotted in the top of Figure A-i subsystem against a logarithmic P scale.
Straight-line segments connect the topmost points, ignoring, for the time,
,_ points which would cause a decrease in slope, i:[ connected. The'_e curves
are the embodiment of Equation (A-Z).
The upper curves are dif,erentiated (as illustrated in the lower portion
, of Figure A-I), and the slopes, d In Pi/dW i, are the step-like functions
beneath. Equation (A-8) is indicated by the horizontal line (lower part of
4
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Figure A-I. Example o_ Subsystem and Phase
Weight- Probability Functions
Figure A-Z) showing the summation of subsystem weight increases, Wi,
corresponding to C. The summing of d in Pi/d Wi curves effects a ranking
of the possible configuration changes. For, as C is reduced bv lowering
the horizontal line, each stepwise increase in the utili_.e¢1 weight _eserve,
E wi, is identified with a specific change in a specific subsystem. And of
all possible changes not yet implemented, this specific change is associated
with the maximum _In Pi/AWi; that is, it will increase mission reliabiE_.y
more (per pound) ther any other unreali_.ed change in the entire spacecraft
system.
5
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M_XIMIZED P VS _W I
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Figure A-2. Probability of Mission Success Versus '_
Weight Re se rye Utilized !i-
:_._.
¢,q,,
The C versus W. curve may be integrated to determine P, the ,Y
maximized mission probability of success as shown in the upper part of '_."
Figure A-Z. This integration satisfies the following: ::_i:
lnP = lnP +A :,.
0 _':
K_
= lnP  A.);_,.0 1 ,:,
x,, = In Po +E/ppi. d In Pi
Ol
: EmPoi + E InP"-E inP1 oi
= in P (A-g)
6
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where
Po = _ poi = Probability of mission success, no
weight reserve utilized
Poi = Reliability of ith subsystem for a
weight increase, W. = 0
1
A = [A i = Indicated area under C versus _, W.
curve (Figure A-Z) 1
A.1 = Indicated area under subsystem
slope curve (Figure A-I)
The solution of the example is indicated by the tabular data of
Figure A-Z. Using the topmost points of each subsystem, 3Z5 pounds of
the available 350 pounds are used to achieve a 0. 870 probability of mission
success. The next major change would be to change transmitter configura-
tion from L to N (see Table A-i). This would raise the probability from
0. 870 to 0. 888, but would exceed the permitted weight reserve. As the
remainin£ weight reserve of Z5 pounds is insufficient for any further
changes of the topmost points, it is noted that changing the transmitter
configuration from L to ]V[,one of the previously ignored points, uses
16.4 pounds to raise the probability of mission success to 0. 875, the
maximum pos sible.
The previous discusslon gives t;leresults of four examples of
weight-probability tradeoffs which have been illustrated in some detail.
In each case, weight additions consist not only of redundant hardware but
also additional retropropellant weight, electrical power supply weight_ and
other weight increases caused by each design change. In some cases, the
base reliabilityD corresponding to a nonredundant design--is lower than
that considered acceptable. This is intentional, as it serves to preclude
starting from a design which might not be justified, and thereby removes
any requirement to backtrack.
4. CONCLUSION
An orderly procedure is developed whereby spacecraft system
alternates can be based upon the combined advantages of high velocity and
low spacecraft weight. It is noted that this procedure requires input data
which are the results of detailed engineering descriptions of subsystem
!
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designs for redundancy, reliability, and weight utilization. This is
appropriate, since there are z.o o_h_r b_i_ _,i_e_ia on which a weight
allocation procedure (for maximum probability of mission success) can
rationally be implemented. By specific examples the applicability of the
developed methods is demonstrated to be readily applied to weight-
reliability tradeoff analyses. This is the process invoked for Voyager in
Volume 4, Section III. 4.
8
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ITable A-t. Example Weight Utilization Options and Their
Corresponding Reliability Improvements
(I) Spacecraft Propulsion System
Weight
Configuration Reliability Increase
P I . W3(ib)
A Nominal 0. 9403 0
B Change i 0. 9564 36
C Change 2 0.94!5 16
D Changes I and Z 0. 9586 5Z
E Change 3 0. 9430 113 (Discard)
F Changes !,Z and 3 0.9614 165 (Discard)
G Change 4 0. 9877 121
H Changes 2 and 4 0. 9891 137
I Changes Z, 3 and 4 0.99i9 Z50
Change I Quad solenoid valves on thrust chamber
Change 2 Redundant propellant isolation valves
Change 3 Redundant Pressurization system
Change 4 Redundant thrust chambers
(2) Launch Period Extension
Probability
Length of Being
of Able to Weight
Launch Launch Re serye
Period Within Utilized
(days) Period Wz(Ib)
I r.
! O. 170 0
5 O. 606 i4
8 O. 775 27
i 0 O. 845 5Z
15 O. 940 150
i6 O. 949 ! 80
i 7 O. 958 230
i8 O. 965 305
ZO O. 976 525
30 O. 996 i280
9
1966011762-014
Table A-t. Example Weight Utilization Options and Their
Co r re sponding Reliability Improvements
(Continued)
(3) Transmitter Subsystem
Weight
Configuration Reliability IncreaseP
3 W3(Ib)
A Nominal 0. 636 0
B Change i 0. 825 12.2
C Chan_es I and 2 0. 674 3.4
D Changes I and 2 0.873 i5.6
E Change 3 0. 658 2.6
F Changes i, Z and 3 0. 903 i8. Z
G Change 4 0.884 ?-3.3 (Discard)
H Changes 2 and 4 0. 936 Z6.7
I Changes 3 and 4 0.9i5 ZS. 9
J Changes Z, 3 and 4 0.969 Z9.3
K Change 5 0. 879 i6.4
L Change 6 0. 978 32. Z
M Change 7 0. 983 48.6
N Change 8 0. 9975 81.4
Change I One standby redundant power amplifier and converter
Change 2 One standby redundant modulator
Change 3 One standby mode selector and baseband assembly
Change 4 Two standby redundant power amplifiers and converters
Change 5 One standby redundant nominal circuit
Change 6 Two standby redundant nominal circuits
Change 7 Two configurations K in parallel
Change 8 Two configurations L in parallel
(4) Up Link Command Subsystem
Weight
Configuration Reliability Increase
P4 W3(Ib)
A Nominal 0. 598 0
B Change i 0,758 7.6
C Change 2 0. 705 14. 6 (Discard)
D Changes I and 2 0. 893 Z2.2
E Change 3 0. 837 2i. 6
F Change 4 0. 932 4Z. 6
" G Change 5 0. 969 64. 8
H Change 6 0. 990 I06.8
Change i One standby redundant decoder
Change Z One standby redundant command receiver
Change 3 One standby redundant decoder/receiver circuit
Change 4 Two standby redundant decoder/receiver circuits
Change 5 Two configurations E in parallel
Change 6 Two configurations F in parallel
10 i
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APPENDIX B
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF SUBSYSTEM ELEMENTS
This appendix presents the data established in the course of the
analyses completed in support of the reliability conclusions presented in
Volume 4, Section 4.
After listing the parts failure rates used in the reliability analyses,
the appendix presents the reliability assessment work sheets for electrical
equipment, the models and computations applied in the evaluation of
redundancy options for electrical equipment, and finally the studies of
mechanical equipment. For ease of reference the following list of th_
contents is provided:
1. Part Failure Rates
2. Reliability Assessment Work Sheets, Electrical Equipment
2. 1 S-Band Receiver, Command Detector
2. Z S-Band Receiver Selector
Z. 3 S-Band Receiver
2.4 Modulator Exciter
2.5 Power Amplifier
Z. 6 Transmitter Selector
2.7 Bulk Data Storage
2.8 Digital Telemetry Unit
2.9 VHF Preamplifier
2. 10 VHF Receiver
Z. 11 VHF Demodulator
Z. 12 CS&C Input Decoder
Z. 13 CS&C (Centralized Memory) Command Decoder
2. 14 CS&C (Centralized Memory) Sequencer
Z. 15 CS&C (Centralized Memory) Power Converter
2. 16 CS&C (Distributed Memory) Co:_amand Decoder
Z. 17 CS&C (Distributed Memory) Sequence Decoder, IC
2.18 CS&C (Distributed Memory) Sequence Decoder, Core
il
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2. 19 CS&C (Distributed Memory) Clock
2.20 CS&C (Distributed Memory) Power Converter
2.21 Battery Regulator
2. 22 Battery
2.23 Inverters
2.24 Power Control Unit
2.25 Command Distribution Unit and Cabling
2. 26 Alternate CDU and Cabling
2.27 Third Alternate CDU and Cabling
2.28 POP, Two-Gimba!
2.29 POP, One-Gimbal
2.30 OSE Command Encoder
2.31 OSE Computer Buffer
2.32 OSE Telemetry Detector
2.33 Solar Array
3. Reliability Models and Computations for Redundancy Options,
Electrical Equipment
3. 1 Data Handling Unit
3.2 VHF Receiver
3.3 S-Band Receiver and transmitter
3.4 CS&C
3.5 Power Subsystem
4. Mechanical Equipment Assessments
4, 1 Separation and Destruct Subsystem
4. 2 Baseline Propellant Feed Systems
4.3 Selected Propellant Feed System
4. 4 Low-Gain Antenna Deployment
4, 5 Explosive Bolts and Shaped Charges
4. 6 Structure
4. 7 Solar Panel Deployment
4.8 Solid Propellant Engine
4, 9 Bipropellant Engine
.,¢
In support of the reliability data in the main text
i,
1966011762-017
4.10 Thermal Louvers
4.1i Strip Heaters
4.12 Magnetometer Booms
4.13 Stabilization and Control
4.14 Propellant Feed Configurations
Frequently in this appendix the convention is used whereby the
number of 9's in a calculated probability is designated by an exponent.
Thus
0.9(5)42 - 0. 9999942
1. PART FAILURE RATES
Failure Rate (X)
Part Generic Class and Type Parts in 109 Hours
1. Diode, Silicon, General Purpose 15
2. Diode, Silicon, Digital 6
3. Diode, Germanium 100
4. Diode, Zener 40
5. Varactor 50
6. Microwave Mixer 1200
7. Transistor, Silicon, General Purpose 50
8. Transistor, Silicon, Digital 20
9. Transistor, Silicon, Power 130
10. Transistor, Germanium 300
11. Capacitor, Fixed, Ceramic 15
12. Capacitor, Fixed, Glass 3
13. Capacitor, Fixed, Mica, Dipped 5
14. Capacitor, Tantalum, Solid 20
15. Capacitor, Paper, Mylar 30
16. Capacitor, Variable 50
17. Resistor, Fixed, Composition, General 8
Purpose
13
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Failure Rate (k)
Part Generic Class and Type Parts in 109 Hours
18. Resistor, Fixed, Composition, Digital Z
19. Resistor, Fixed, M_tal Film 10
20. Resistor, Fixed, Wire Wound, Precision 80
21. Resistor, Fixed, Wire Wound Power 100
ZZ, Resistor, Variable, Composition 80
23. Resistor, Variable, Wire Wound 1Z0
24. Transformer, One Winding 60
25. Transformer, Two Winding 90
26. Transformer, Three Winding 120
27. Inductor 30
28. Relay (Z contact sets) 480
29. Relay, Magnetic Latching 680
30. Connector Pins (normal usage) 10
31. Connector Pins (quie scent ambient) 5
3Z. Connection, Solder or Weld (normally 0.5
with parts)
33. Gyro Z0,000
34. Filter, R. F.I. 35
35. Filter, Crystal 150
36. Crystal, Quartz 75
37. Attenuator 15
38. Circulator Switch 250
39. Diplexer Z50
40. Four- Port Z50
41. Traveling Wave Tube 10,000
4Z. Cores, Memory (per cove) 0.01
43. Ther mi stor 150
44. Battery Cells (per cetl) 400
_. 45. Integrated Circuits, Generic Digital Types 35
46. Integrated Circuits, Operational Amplifier 80
I
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Failure Rate (X)
Part Generic Class and .Type Parts in 109 Hours
47. Integrated Circuits, Digital Specific Types_
47.1 Integrated CircL*it (Type A) Dual Gate 16.3
47. Z Integrated Circuit (Type B) Flip-Flop ZZ. 0
47.3 Integrated Circuit (Type C) Diode Gate 15.0
47.4 Integrated Circuit (Type D) Memory 15.0
Isolation
Z. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT WORK SHEETS, ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT
(Giving estimated equipment failure rates calculated from part
populations and part estimated failure rates)
SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications, S-Band Receiver
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Command Detector
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Known (or Assumed) Packaging Technique: Cordwood & Integrated Circuits
Class of Usage: Digital, Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 40% Analog, 10_/0 Digital
$Integra_ed circuit failure-rate objectives are established by summing
failure rates for a set of discrete parts (capable of achieving an identical
circuit function) and dividing by 13, with no resulting value adopted below
15 parts in 10 9 hours. All part failure rates to be used subsequently for
detailed design assessments will be subject to coordination with JPL to
assure a maximum overall confidence in Voyager mission success
predictions.
15
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Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 39 I0 390
Transistor, Silicon 38 50 1900
Resistor, Comp. 85 5 4Z5
Capacitor, Ceramic 30 15 450
Capacitor, Tantalum 69 Z0 1380
T ran sformer s 4 1Z0 480
Integrated Circuits (digital) 11 35 385
Total Failure Rate 541Z bits
SUBbYSTEM: Telecommunications, S-Band Receiver
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Receiver Selector
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Known (or Assumed) Packaging Technique: Cordwood and Integrated
Circuit
Class of Usage: Digital, Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 40% Analog, 10% Digital
Parts Population Analysis
F ailur e C ate go ry
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 7 15 105
Transistor, Silicon 6 50 300
Resistor, Comp. 18 8 124
Capacitor, Tantalum I Z0 Z0
Transforrr:er (Z winding) I I00 I00
-%
Integrated Circuits (digital) 16 35 560
Total Failure F.ate IZ09 bits
16 ,_
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SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications, S-Band Receiver
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Receiver Component
Class of Usage: Analog
Part s Population Analy sis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 28 15 420
Diode, Zener 8 40 320
Transistor, Silicon 41 50 2050
Resistor, Comp. 111 8 888
Resistor, Metal Film 32 10 320
Capacitor, Ceramic 105 15 1575
Capacitor, Glass 80 3 240
Capacitor, Paper, Mylar 29 30 870
Capacitor, Tantalum 19 Z0 380
Inductors, R_" (Transformers) 16 120 1920
Connector Pins 33 10 330
Crystal, Quartz 3 75 225
Mixer Diodes 6 1200 7200
Transformers, Po'_,er 2 120 240
Varactor _ 5 50 250
Total Failure Rate 17,228 bits
i7
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SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications, Transmitter
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Modulator Exciter
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 40_0 of Rated
/
Parts Population Anal 7sis
Failure C ate go ry
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 25 15 375
Diode, Zener 7 40 Z80
Transistor, Silicon 16 50 800
Resistor, Comp. 50 8 400
Resistor, Metal Film 9 I0 90
Resistor, W.W Prec. 1 80 80
Capacitor, Ceramic 33 15 495
Capacitor, Mica 7 5 35
Capacitor, (]lass 17 3 51
Capacitor, Variable 14 50 700
Inductors, I<F (Transformer) 3 IZ0 360
Inductor s, FF Z5 30 750
Crystal, Quartz 1 75 75
Varactor 6 50 300
, RFI Filter 7 35 Z45
Total Failure Rate 5034 bits
18 L
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SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications, Transmitter
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Power Amplifier
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50 °C
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 40_0 of Rated
Parts Population Analysis
F ailure C ate go ry
Quantity Rate / Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 6 15 90
Transistor, Silicon 8 50 400
Resistor, Comp. 16 8 128
Resistor, Metal Film Z0 10 Z00
Resistor, Variable 1 lZ0 lZ0
Resistor, Power 1 10 10
Capacitor, Ceramic 17 15 Z55
Capacitor, Variable 10 50 500
Capacitor, Paper, Mylar 5 30 150
Capacitor, Tantalum Z3 Z0 460
Inductors, RF (Transformers) 4 lZ0 480
Connector Pins (8 Connectors) 16 I0 160
Tube, TWT 1 I0,000 I0,000
Isolator I Z, 000 Z, 000
Transformers, Power Z IZ0 Z40
Inductor, Power 1 lZ0 lZ0
Total Failure Rate 15,313 bits
19
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SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications, Transmitter Selector
Class of Usage: Digital, Analog
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon, Analog 20 15 300
Transistor, Silicon, Analog 18 50 900
Resistor, Comp. Analog 3Z 8 256
Resistor, Metal Film, Dig. 6 I0 60
Capacitor, Tantalum 8 Z0 160
Transformer, Power, 1 90 90
Z Winding
Integrated Flip/Ftop 8 35 Z80
Integrated Dual Gate Z5 35 875
Total Failure Rate Z9Zl bits
SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Bulk Data Storage
Known (or Assuaged) Environments: 50°C
Known (or Assumed) Packaging Technique: Cordwood Electronics
%
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 10g0 of Rated
Z0
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Parts Population Analysis
F ailure C ate go ry
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 3Z 6 19Z
Transistor, Silicon 132 20 264
Resistor, Metal Film Z85 10 2850
Capacitor, Ceramic 32 15 480
Capacitor, Mica 43 5 215
Capacitor, Tantalum ZZ Z0 440
Inductor s 2 10 Z0
Relays (redundantly used) 7 50 350
Connector Pins 80 10 800
Transformers, Signal 4 Z5 100
Electronics 5711
Mechanical Devices 24 100 Z400
Total Failure Rate 8111 bits
SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications
Equipment and/or Function: Data Handling Unit, Digital Telemetry Unit
Known {or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Known {or Assumed) Packaging Technique: Integrated Circuits
Parts Population Analysis
Integrated Total
Circuits Per Integrated
Functional Element Quantity Element Cir cuits
Command, Control & Logic I Z0 Z0
Bit Rate Selection I 15 15
PN Generation 1 18 18
M.C. Word Selection 1 18 18
Zi
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Integrated Total
Circuits Per Integrated
Functional Element Quantity Element Circuits
Synch. Frame Mod 1 5 5
Capsule Buffer Memory 1 74 74
M.C. Bi-Level Multi 1 3 3
M.C. Analog Multi 1 54 54
SC Analog Multi 4 69 276
SC Bi-Level Multi 1 35 35
Elapsed Time 1 5 5
A/D Conversion I 22 22
Combiner 1 6 6
Data Selection Control 1 7 7
Data PN Mod & Mixer 1 12 12
570
k/Integrated Circuit = 35 x 10 -9 failures/hour
-9
Series Failure Rate _'t = 575 x 35 = 19,900 x 10
R4280 = . 91480 for no functional redundancy
An estimated threefold functional redundancy exists within the DTU
functional complex. As a conservative (exponential) estimate of this upon
equivalent failure rate (k e ).
1 = 6630 x 10 "9 failures/hour for a single DTUk e = _k t
component
R4280 = . 97161 for effective functional redundancy
SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunication
_. Equipment and/or Function: VHF Capsule Preamp
Class of Usage: Analog
22 '('
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Part s Population Analysis
F ailur e C _te go r 7
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 4 15 60
Transistor, Silicon Z 50 I00
Resistor, Comp. 10 8 80
Capacitor, Mica 8 5 40
Inductor s Z 30 60
Total Failure Rate 340 bits
SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications
Equipment and/or Function: VHF Capsule Receiver
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Population An._lysis
Failu_ _. C ate go ry
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 6 15 90
Transistor, Silicon I I 50 550
Resistor, Cornp. 60 8 480
Capacitor, Mica 30 5 150
Capacitor, Tantalum Z Z0 40
Inductor s 11 30 330
Transformer 1 120 120
Total Failure Rate 1760 bits
Z3
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SUBSYSTEM: Telecommunications
Equipment and/or Function: VHF Capsule Demodulator
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 6 15 90
Transistor, Silicon I0 50 500
Resistor, Comp. 55 8 440
Capacitor, Mica 30 5 150
Inductors 10 30 300
Total Failure Rate 1480 bits
SUBSYSTEM: CS&C
Equipment and/or Function: Input Decoder (1) and (5)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure C ate go ry
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 8 6 48
Transistor, Silicon 12 20 240
Resistor, Metal Film 12 10 120
Capacitor, Glass 4 3 12
I.C. Type A 40 16.3 652
I.C. Type B 25 22.0 550
,%
Total Failure Rate 1622 bits
F
Z4 ,_
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SUBSYSTEM: CS&C Centralized Memory Type
Equipment and/or Function: Command Decoder (2)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure C ategory
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Transistor, Silicon 384 20 7680
Resistor, Metal Film 521 10 5210
I.C. Type A 16 16.3 260
I.C. Type B 10 22.0 220
Total Failure Rate 13,370 bits
SUBSYSTEM: CS&C (Centralized Memory Type)
Equipment and/or Function: Sequencer (3)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 16 6 96
Transistor, Silicon 210 20 4200
Resistor, Metal Film 100 10 1000
Capacitor, Glass 20 3 60
Inductors 1 30 30
Crystal I 75 75
Cores 4148 .01 41
I.C. Type A l.'_0 16.3 2119
I.C. Type B 150 22.0 3300
I.C. Type C 32 15.0 480
I.C. Type D 24 15.0 360
Total Failure Rate 11,761 bits
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SUBSYSTEM: CS&C (Centralized Memory Type)
Equipment and/or Function: Power Converter (4)
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 50 6 300
(digital)
Diode, Zener 10 t0 400
Transistor, Silicon 40 50 2000
Resistor, Metal Film 120 10 1200
Capacitor, Glass 55 3 165
Capacitor, Tantalum 29 20 580
Induc to r s 6 30 180
Transformer s 16 90 1440
Total Failure Rate 6265 bits
SUBSYSTEM: CS_C (Distributed Memory Type)
Equipment and/or Function: Command Decoder (6)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Transistor, Silicon 384 Z0 7680
Resistor, Metal Film 512 10 51Z0
I.C. Type A 16 16.3 260
I.C. Type B I0 22.0 ZZ0
Total Failure Rate 13,280 bits
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SUBSYSTEM: CS&C (Distributed Memory)
Equipment and/or Function: Sequence Decoder, I.C. Type (YX)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
TransiRtor, Silicon 96 20 1920
Resistor, Metal Film 128 10 1280
I.C. Type A 440 16.3 7172
I.C. Type B 870 2_. 0 19140
Total Failure Rate 29,512 bits
SUBSYSTEM: CS&C (Distributed Memory)
Equipment and/or Function: Sequence Decoder {Core Type) (YY)
C!ass of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 900 6 5400
Diode, Zener 60 40 2400
Transistor, Silicon 360 20 7200
Resistor, Metal Film 1250 10 12500
Resistor, W.W Prec. 50 80 4000
Capacitor, Tantalum 80 20 1600
Capacitor, Glass 270 3 810
Cores 700 .01 7
Tran sformer s 4 120 480
I.C. Type A 42 16.3 684
I.C. Type B 40 22.0 880
Total Failure Rate 35,961
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SUBSYSTEM: CS&C (Distributed Memory Type)
Equipment and/or Function: Clock (8)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 10 6 60
Transistor, Silicon 10 20 Z00
Resistor, Metal Film 20 10 Z00
Capacitor, Glass 4 3 12
Crystal 1 75 75
I.C. Type A 20 16.3 326
I.C. Type B 40 2Z. 0 880
Total Failure Rate 1753 bits
SUBSYSTEM: CS&C (Distributed Memory Type)
Equipment and/or Function: Power Converter (9)
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 30 6 180
(digital)
Diode, Zener 6 40 Z40
Transistor, Silicon 25 50 1250
Resistor, Metal Film 80 10 800
Capacitor, Tantalum 20 20 400
Capacitor. Glass 40 3 120
-_ Inductor s 4 30 120
T ran sfo r me r 10 90 900
Total Failure Rate 4010 bits
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SUBSYSTEM" Power
Equipment and/or Function: Battery Regulator
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 7 15 105
Diode, Zener 8 40 370
Transistor, Silicon 18 50 900
Resistor, Comp. 15 8 120
Resistor, W.W Prec. 25 80 2000
Capacitor, Paper 2 30 60
Capacitor, Paper Tantalum 13 20 260
Inductor s 2 30 60
Transformers 4 120 480
Thermistors 2 150 300
Total Failure Rate 4605 bits
SUBS_ STEM: Power
Equipment and/or Function: Battery
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Ag - CD Battery Cells 18 400 7200
Total Failure Rate ?200 bits
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%SUBSYSTEM: Power
Equipment and/or Functior_: Inverters (3)
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 6 15 90
Diode. Zener 1 40 40
Transistor, Silicon 15 50 750
/ Resistor, Comp. 36 8 Z88
Capacitor, Paper 9 30 Z70
Capacitor, Tantalum 13 Z0 260
Inductor s 6 30 180
Connector Pins 4 I0 40
Transformer s 14 IZ0 1680
Thermistors 3 150 450
Total Failure Rate 4048 bits
SUBSYSTEM: Power
Equipment and/or Function: Power Control Unit
Class of Usage: An&log
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 48 15 720
Diode, Zener 8 40 320
Transistor, Silicon 40 50 Z000
Resistor, Comp. 35 8 Z80
Resistor, W.W Prec. 96 80 7680
> Capacitor, Tantalum 15 Z0 300
Capacitor, Paper 49 30 1470
Transformer 5 IZ0 600
Thermistor 1 150 150
\ Total Failur R_te 13, 5Z0 bits
3O
i
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SUBSYSTEM: Electrical Distribution
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference, Option #2
Equipment and/or Function: Command Distribution Unit and Cables/
Connector s
Known (or As_,amed) Environments: 50°C
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 25% CDU Criticality, 20% Connector
Criticality
Parts Population Analysis
F ailur e Cate go ry
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 100 15 1500
Transistor, Silicon 100 50 5000
Resistor, Comp. 200 8 1600
Relays {contacts quad 100 12.5 1250
connected)
CDU for 100% critical
command s 9350
Connector Pins* Z700 1 2700
CDU for 25% critical
command s 2340
Total Failure Rate 5040 bits
SUBSYSTEM: Electrical Distribution
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference, Option #1
Equipment and/or Function: Command Distribution Unit and
Cables/Connector s
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 25% CDU Criticality, 20% Connection
Criticality
*All critical pins paralleled at the connector.
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Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon I00 15 1500
Transistor, Silicon i00 50 5000
Resistor, Comp. 200 8 1600
Relays (contacts quad I00 12.5 1250
connected)
CDU for 100% critical 9350
commands
Connector Pins* 2700 5 13500
CDU for 25% critical P340
commands
Total Failure Rate 15,840 bits
SUBSYSTEM: Electrical Distribution
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference, Option 0
Equipment and/or Function: Command Distribution Unit and Cables/
Connector s
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 25% CDU Criticality, 20% Connection
Criticality
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 100 15 1500
Transistor, Silicon 100 50 5000
Resistor, Comp. 200 8 1600
Relays 50 400 20000
CDU for 100% critical 28100
command s
*With an estimated 450 connectors w_th ]0 pins each and ZO% of them
critical
3Z
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,dB
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Connector Pins* 2700 5 13500
_.DU for Z5% critical 7030
commands
Total Failure Rate 20,530 bits
SUBSYSTEM: Science Support, Configurations A & B
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment a_ o.;_r Function: Planet Oriented Package, Z Gimbal
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Known (or Assumed) Packaging Technique: Cordwood Electronics
Class of Usage: Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 40%
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 10 15 150
Transistor, Silicon 16 50 800
Resistor, Comp. 45 8 360
Capacitor, Ceramic lZ 15 180
Capacitor, Paper 6 30 180
Relays 1 480 480
Connector Pins 40 10 400
Gimbal Assembly 2 500 1000
Pick-Off Assembly Z 50 100
Motor 2 240 48 0
Total Failure Rate: 4130 bits
With an estimated 450 connectors with 30 pins each and 20% of them
critical.
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SUBSYSTEM: Science Support, Configuration C
Tradeoff Study: Baseline to Reference
Equipment and/or Function: Planet Oriented Package, 1 Gimbal
Known (or Assumed) Environments: 50°C
Known (or Assumed) Packaging Technique: Cordwood Electronics
Class of Usage; Analog
Parts Stress Derating Policy: 40% Rated
/ Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 5 15 75
Transistor, Silicon 8 50 400
Resistor, Comp. 20 8 160
Capacitor, Ceramic 6 15 90
Capacitor, Paper 4 30 120
Relays 1 480 480
Connector Pins 30 10 300
Gimbal Assembly 1 500 500
Pick-Off Assembly 1 50 50
Motor 1 Z40 Z40
Total Failure Rate 2415 bits
SUBSYSTEM: OSE, MDE in the DSIF
Equipment and/or Function: Command Encoder
Class of Usage: Digital
34
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Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 1856 6 11136
Transistor, Silicon 409 20 8180
Resistor, Comp. ].671 2 3342
Resistor, Metal Film 119 i0 1190
Capacitor, Ceramic 5 15 75
Capacitor, Mica 21] 5 1055
Capacitor, Paper, Metalized 8 30 240
Capacitor, Tantalum Zl 3 Z0 4260
Relays 5 480 2400
T ran sformer s 4 1Z0 4£ 0
Potentiometer 2 80 160
Oscillator 1 250 250
Total Failure Rate 32,768 bits
MTF = 30,517
SUBSYSTEM: OSE, MDE in the DSIF
Equipment and/or Function: Computer Buffer
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 1051 6 6306
Diode, Zener 18 40 720
Transistor, Silicon 277 Z0 5540
Resistor, Comp. 1093 2 2186
Resistor, Metal Film 9 10 90
Resistor, W.W Prec. 30 80 2400
35
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Failure Category
_Quantit/r Rate/Part Failure Rate
Capacitor, Mica ll0 5 550
Capacitor, Paper Mylar 17 30 510
Capacitor, Tantalum 130 20 2600
Relays 3 480 1440
Connector Pins 2200 I0 22000
Capacitor, Trimmer 6 50 300
Diode, Tunnel 6 I00 600
Transformers 3 Ig0 360
Total Failure Rate 45,602 bits
MTF = 21,929
SUBSYSTEM: OSE, MDE in the DSIF
Equipment and/or Function: Telemetry Detector (_.._i<swith Computer
Buffe r)
Class of Usage: Digital
Parts Population Analysis
Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Diode, Silicon 1256 6 7536
Diode, Zener 6 40 240
Transistor, Silicon 268 20 5360
Resistor, Comp. 1097 Z 2194
Resistor, Metal Film 103 10 1030
Resistor, W.W Prec. 46 80 3680
Capacitor, Ceramic Z 15 30
Capacitor, Mica 210 5 1050
.. Capacitor, Paper, Mylar 4 30 120
Capacitor, Tantalum 136 20 2720
Inductors, Transformers 13 90 1170
36 i_
f,
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Failure Category
Quantity Rate/Part Failure Rate
Relays 5 480 2400
Connector Pins 2500 10 25000
Capacitor, Alu. Elect. 3 150 450
Capacitors, Glass 5 3 15
Resistors, Variable 6 120 720
Total Failure Rate 53,715 bits
MTF = 18,617
SUBSYSTEM: Solar Array
The array is 36 x 116. module matrix. Essential spacecraft power
requirements at encounter plus one month dictate that at least 24 (or the
equivalent power of 24) strings remain operable. This level embraces all
worst case conditions including that of a earth-equivalent radiation m,. !el.
A simplified analysis demonstrates the array has a negligibly small
probabilit! of not being able to support the spacecraft power demands at
encounter plus one mon*h, This analysis is worst case becuase it assumes
that when the minimum number of cell failures occur, they occur in the
worst failure pattern.
The estimates are as follows:
Number of Cell Failures Probability of Occurrence
0 0. 5072
1 0. 3446
2 O.1171
3 O. 0265
4 0. 0045
10 0. 0001
The probability of eight or ten cell failures is << 0. 0001. This
number of cells failing in the worst failure pattern would cause the loss
oi one string out of 36. Thus the probability of losing 12 strings, (36 - 24)
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is negligibly small. The probability of the array supporting essential
spacecraft power demands at encounter plus one month is >>> 0.99.
Encounter plus six months requires operation of 34 of the 36
strings to satisfy essential spacecraft power requirements. If we assume
no failures, as an extreme case, complete reliability is based upon the
risk of all 38976 cells in series. The probability of the array satisfying
this requirement for a six month period is 0. Z04, pr, dicated on the
temperature cyclic and non-cyclic failure rates of 1 x 10-8 failure per
hour cell and 3 x 10 -9 failure per hour per cell, respectively. On the
/ basis of power reduction over a non-failed array, the power loss is less
than i_0. Since the power margin is in excess of 5g0 the reliability will
greatly exceed 0. 204.
With an expected mean cell loss of less than 3 for the 36 string
configuration, increasing the array string configuration to 39, stilldoes
not increase the expected mean cell loss to more than 3, since the nearest
whole number of cells is 3 in both instances. Where the 36 string config-
uration may not hypothetically afford a single cell failure, the 33 string
configuration could support the mission with as many cell failures as are
in three strings. However, the discrete strings are not expected to fail.
Instead, as few as 30 cell failures may in the worst failure pattern, have
the same effect. Thus, determing the probability of not more than 30
cell failures occurring, which is more than ten times the mean, yields
a preliminary estimate for 36 string array reliability.
The solar array reliability assessment has indicated a high
pro__oility, 99.9g0, that the array will support spacecraft power demands
at encounter plus one month. At six months after encounter, the array
has a lower probability of supporting the spacecraft loads (99_/0)due to an
increasing array peak power profile demand.
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3. RELIABILITY MODELS AND COMPUTATIONS FOR
REDUNDANCY OPTIONS, ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
Final Assessment (4280 Hours) Telecommunications,
Data Handling Unit
OPTION #0
11//
Q BULK DATASTORAGE R= 0.93789
DIGITAL I
TELEMETRY W = 26.0
UNIT ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL
A. = 5711 A. = 2400 AW = 0A. = 6633
III
0.97161 0.96529
OPTION //I
R = 0.96451
W = 37.0//
AW = 11.0//
OPTION//2
R = 0.99799
W = 52.0//
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Final Assessments (4280 Hours) Telecommunications,
Capsume Receiver, VHF
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Telecommunications, Capsule Receiver (continued)
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Final Assessment (4280 Hours) Telecommunications,
Receiver - S-Band
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T.elecommunications - S-Band Receiver (Continued)
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Telecommunication-3 - S-Band Receiver (Continued)
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Final Assessment (4280 Hours} Telecommunications, Transmitter
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Telecommunications, Transmitter (Continued)
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Telecommunications, Transmitter (Continued)
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Final Assessment (42.80 Hours) CS & C
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CS & C (Continued)
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CS &C (Continued)
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CS &C (Continued)
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CS& C (Continued)
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CS _ C (Continued)
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CS _ C (Continued}
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CS & C (Continued)
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CS & C (Continued)
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Final Assessments (4280 Hours) Power Sub,_ystem
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Power System (Continued)
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4. MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ASSESSMENTS
4. 1 Separation and Destruct Subsystem
A reliability analysis was accomplished to predict the reliability of
various configurations of separation planes and the spacecraft destruct
system. The configurations considered are contained in the attached
Douglas drawings (SK-BM00-5000 through SK-BM00-5003). Each of the
separation planes and destruct systems is considered separately _n the
following sections. In addition, the reliability analysis of each major
component and the mathematical models used in the analysis are attached.
Table 1 presents a summary of the reliability predictions al_d a
brief description of each subsystera considered. The reliability of the
separation systems become limited by the probability of the squibs firing
prematurely since the squibs do not act redundantly in this mode but in
series.
4. I. 1 Separation ConfigurationA1 andA2 (SK-BM00-5000)
This configuration is to be used with the monopropellant system and
has three attach points. Table 2 lists the reliability predictions for the
three configurations considered. The six squibs are considered to be
redundant sets of two in each nut such that the firing of either or both
would permit separation.
The "B" corffiguration is similar except that the separation nuts
contain only one squib each. The "A" configuration provides a 100% back-
up at each attached point using a separate method to separate the
spacecraft-pinpullers. Although Table Z shows configuration "A" to have
the highest predicted reliability, the weight is more than doubled over
configuration"R". In configuration "A", if both systems separated at
each point, a considerable amount of debris would be loose in the vicinity
of the spacecraft. In addition, if only the pinpullers released, consider-
able weight would be added to the spacecraft since a portion of the LV
would be separated with it.
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I. _'_.PARATIONSYSTD4S
i .0 ANALYSIS S_a4A_Y OF SEPARATION 2,_I_{0DSELECTION
Simpli® Avail-
W*__. _ abilitZ Shock Gasslng Rel. _ Total
zx. Bolt lO 9 10 2 7 8 7 53
Sep. Nut 9 g 9 9 9 9 9 62
Collect 6 6 5 i0 i0 9 i0 56
Pin Pulle _ 8 8 I0 9 9 9 9 62
FLSC I0 iC I0 1 6 i0 2 _9
2.0 Separation Nut System was selected from i.O. Baseline system is
illustrated at le. _.
3.0 WEIC,H_ - RELIABILITY - CON'FIGURATION TRADEOFF CHART
Subsystem Subsystem
Description Reliability Weight
S/C - LV B 3-nuts, 3-dual bridge cartridges 0.998_21 2.217
Separation R 3-nuts, 6-dual bridge cartridges 0.9(3)81.6 2.307
A1 _:A2 A "R" + 3-pin pvllers & 6-cartridges 0.9 (A)280 5.715
Separation S/C from LV
Confi&mtration A-I & A8
I_c SK-R400-5000
1,
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I. SEPARATION
1.0 ANALYSIS SIN4ARY OF SEPARATION METHOD _ION
Simpl/- Avail-
Wt. city abilit_ Shock Gassing Rel. Safety Total
Ex.Bolt lO 9 10 Z 7 8 7 _3
Sep.Nut 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 62
CoLlect 6 6 5 10 I0 9 i0 56
Pin Puller 8 8 !d 9 9 9 9 62
FLSC lO lO lO l 6 10 2 _9
2.0 Separation Nut System ",msselected from 1.0. Baseline system is
illustrated at left.
3.0 WEIGHT - RELIABILITY - CO_IGURATION TRADEOFF CHART
Subsystem Reliabilit_ WeightDescription
S/C - LV B _-nuts, _-dual bridge cartridges _°_/_ 2.956
Separation R _-nuts, 8-dual bridge cartridges
Bl & B2 A '_" + 4-pin pullers _ 8 cartridges _. _.3)_bO 3.076
_4_ @0 6 712
Separation S/C from L¥
Cpnfiguration B! & B_
lh%CSK-]3400-5001
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__, LANDER COVER BASE
- _ i _ L_ NDEI? RELEASE
"_" _-- SPACECR_F T
"_ FUSE
,|
TO BE RELEASED
_PIRATION NUT
?
-LAIVOER COVER
/,
t
c----- SEPARATION NUT
-- PERMANENT BOLT
1966011762-073
I. SEPARATION SY_
1.0 ANALYSIS SUMMARY OF SEPARATION METHOD SELECTION
Simpli- Avail-
wt___._ abilit_ Shoc___!Oasslng _el____.safet _ To_
Ex. Bolt i0 9 i0 2 7 8 7 53
sep._lut 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 6z
coLtect 6 6 5 Zo Zo 9 10 56
Pin Puller 8 8 l0 9 9 9 9 62
FLSC i0 l0 lO I 6 lO Z _9
2.0 Separation Nut System was selected from 1.0. Baseline system is
illustrated at left.
3.0 WEIGHT - RELIABILITY - CONFIGURATION TRADEOFF CHART
Subsystem
Subsystem Description Reliability Weight i
S/C - Lander Base B S-nuts, S-dual bridge ctg. _ _#76 2.967
3-leads
Separation R 3-nuts,6-dualbrtdsectg. D,_$_ /& 3.807
A1 & A_ A "R" + "R" {)" 80 7.61_
Separation S/C fr_ LV
Configuratio_ A1 &
SK-m400-50_
-,._
@ 6s
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I. DESTRUCT SYS_'I_4
1.0 %._IG_'I'__,L_ITY - CONFIGURATION TRADEOFF CHART
Subsystem
Subsyste_ Dgscriptlon Reliability
Destruct B Destruct in Centaur _,_ O "1
R 2-s_, 2-pr_aco_, _-shapedchg. _,'_-/77//
Xl & A2 A 2-58_, 4-primacord, 8-shaged chg. _. ¢_) 7._F 6
Destruct B Destruct in Centaur --- 0 *i
B1a _ A Z-_A, 4-pri=co_,_-s_ped chg. _,90)75 _ 5
2.0 Reference Configuration AI & BI is shown at left.
3.0 In Liquid Motor Configuration no shaped charges are required.
*i NOTE: A heavier total weight must be carried in the Centaur to do equal
dc_age to the spacecraft./_L UI_INUM
" FF
8E DLS TROYLD
_NDS OF
C
Destruct Charge and
: Safe and Am Devices
"_ Configuration A1 & A2SIC-IM00-5O03
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Table 1. Preliminary Reliability Predictions of Voyager
Separation and Destruct Subsystems
Reliability
Subsystem Subsystem De scription Prediction
S/C-LV Separation B. 3 nuts, 3 dual bridgewire squibs 0. 998521
A1 and AZ
R. 3 nuts, 6 dual bridgewire squibs 0.9"3"816(SK-BM00-5000)
A. R (above) + 3 pin pullers and 6 0.9(4)280
dual bridgewire squibs
S/C-LV Separation B. 4 nuts, 4 dual bridgewire squib,_ 0. 998018
BI and BZ
R. 4 nuts, 8 dual bridgewire squibs 0.9"3"760(SK-BM00-500 I)
A. R (above) + 4 pin pullers and 8 0.9{4)040""
dual bridgewire squibs
Separation S/C B. 3 nuts, 3 dual bridgewire squibs, 0. 998476
from LV Configura- 3 leads
tion A1 & AZ
(Lander Base R. 3 nuts, 6 dual bridgewire squibs, 0.9{3)8166 leads
Cover) (SK-BM00-
5002-) A. R (above) + R (above) 0.914'Z801_
Destruct Charge B. Destruct in Centaur - -
and Safe and Arm
R. 2 S & A, Z primacord, 4 shaped- 0.9"7"711Devices Configura-
tion A1 & AZ charges
(SK-BM00-5003) A. Z S & A, 4 primacord, 8 shaped- 0.9_7'738'_
charges
Destruct Charge B. Destruct in Centaur - -
and Safe and Arm
R. Z S & A, Z primacord, 0 shaped- 0.9"7"7Z9Devices Configura-
tion BI & AZ charges
(SK-BM00-5003) A. Z S & A, 4 primacord, 4 shaped- 0.9171738''
charges
4.1. Z Configuration B1 and BZ (SK-BM00-5001)
This configuration is to be used with the bipropellant system and
has four attached points. Table 3 presents the reliability predictions for
the configurations under consideration.
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Table 2. Preliminary Reliability Preduction of S/C-LV
Separation-Configuration A1 and AZ
Reliability
System De scription Prediction
B. 3 nuts, 3 dual bridgewire squibs 0.998521
R. 3 nuts, 6 dual bridgewire squibs 0.9(3)816
A. "R" (above) + 3 pin pullers and 0.9(4)280
0 dual bridgewire squibs.
Table 3. Preliminary ReliabilityPrediction of S/C-LV
Separation-Configuration B 1 and BZ
Reliability
System De scription Prediction
B. 4 nuts, 4 dual bridgewire squibs 0.998018
R. 4 nuts, 8 dual bridgewire squibs 0.9(3)760
A. R (above) + 4 pin pullers and 0 9(4)040
8 dual bridgewire so?Abs
The reliabilityof the completely redundant syster_._ A" in Tables
Z and 3) is limited by the probability of premature f_:_:_of the squibs.
Although redundant squibs result in a higher probab:_ _'_yfor the firing
mode, they also result in a lower probabilityLot the premature ¢iring
mode since thisbecomes a series relationship (i.e. the more squibs used
the more likelyitis flat a failure will occur). In Table 3 the reliability
prediction (tothe number of places shown) is the probability of no pre-
mature firingof the 16 squibs used. Although the release of one "ofthe
separation points would probably not result in spacecraft separation, it
undoubtedly would have some detlimental effecton the spacecraft and/or
launch vehicle.
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4_
4. I. 3 ConfigurationAl andA2 (Lander Base Cover) (SK-BM00-500Z)
The separation of the lander base cover is identical to the space-
craft separation (3 points in SK-BM00-5000) except for the additicn of
leads (fuses) from the squibs located in the bottom of the spacecraft to _he
cover. Table 4 gives the _'eliability of the configuration considered. Only
the B configuration varies from the figures presented in Section 3, because
the addition of the leads; however.-, when =.dundant leads are used they
have no effect on the calculations to the ,,:;.:_,er of places shown in the
table.
Table 4. Preliminary Reliability Prediction of S/C-LV
Separation (Lander Base Cover)-Configuration AI a:ad AZ
Reliability
System De sc ription Prediction
B. 3 nuts, 3 dual bridgew,re squibs 0. 998476
and 3 leads.
R. 3 nuts, 6 dual bridgewire squibs 0.9(3)816
and 6 leads.
A. R (above) + R (above) 0.9(4)280
4. 1.4 Destruct Charge and Safe and Arm (S&A) Devices Configuration At
and AZ and B1 an_ BZ (SK-BM00-5003)
The reliability of the spacecraft destruct system is shown in /ab, e
5. For the purposes of this analysis it was assumed that the system
x,-ould be in the safe position, otherwise the reliability of the system
would be limited by the probability of premature detonation of the squibs
which is 0.9 (4) 88.
The A1 and AZ configuration is used with the monopropellant config-
uratior where shaped-changes are required to destruct the solid motor
case. The B1 and BZ con/igurations are used with the bipropellant
configuration and the shaped-changes are not required except as a backup
(redv=,dant) to the primacord.
7i
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Table 5. Preliminary Reliability Prediction of Destruct Charge and Safe
and Arm Devices, Configuration A1, A2, B1 and B2 (SK-BM00-5003)
Reliability
System Description Prediction
A1 and A2
B. Destruct in Centaur - -
R. 2, S & A, 2 primacord and 4 shaped-charges 0.9{7)711
A. 2, S & A, 4 primacord and 8 shaped-charges 0.9_7)738""
t
B1 and B2
B. Destruct in Centaur - -
R. 2 S & A, 2 primacord 0.9(7)729
A. 2 S & A, 4 primacord and 4 shaped-charges 0.9_71738""
4. i.5 Reliability Analysis and Mathematical Models
Tables 6 through 11 present the reliability analyses of the major
parts used in the separation and destruct systems. The tables present
significant information about the Equipment, the majc- failure modes
considered, possible causes, any backup provisions and the failure rates,
and their sources, used in the analysis.
The reliability of each one shot device is simply the complement
of its failure rate (_), where the failure rate is essentially the probability
of failure (Q)
R= 1 -k= i-Q
If two devices are used redundantly, both must fail and the
reliability is determined from
R= 1 .Q2
_'_ The total system reliability is determined from the product rule
N
R T = v R.
i=I I
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Table 6 A
Item: Squib
Subsystem: Separation
De scription:
Explosive bridge wire with powder charge. (Redundant
bridgewires).
Operational Nctes:
One shot device. Apollo standard initiator.
Envi r onmental Note s:
Failure is most likely to result from vibration during the
boost phase.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to fire, with proper force, when proper electrical
input is present.
Possible Causes:
1. Poor workmanship (bridgewire coating)
2. Bad lot of charges
3. Broken bridgewires.
Effects on Subsystem/,Mission:
Catastrophic, failure to separate.
Backup Provisions:
Redundant squibs and bridgewires.
Inherent Preventives:
Lot qualification of squibs.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Premature firing.
Possible Causes:
1. Stray R.F. signals
2. Boost environment
3. Bad lot of charges.
Effects on Subsystem/Mis sion:
Catastrophic, early separation.
Backup Provisions:
None - However probably more than one squib would have to fire
before separation would occur.
Inherent Preventives:
Bruceton test - shielding from R.F. signals
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Table 6B
Mission
Failure Classification A
Time/Cycles
Units: Cycles I cycle
Q)
_o Basic Failure _ate,
Units: per 10 -u Firings 294
Environment/Application
Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: per 10-6 Firings 294>,
Failure Rate Source Code a
•_ Probability of
fl_ Failure, x I0 -6 294 ;:_
Failure Classification A
Time/Cycle_
o Units: x i0 "v Cycles I
0-6 6:::
Basic Failur c
Rate, Units: x i Firings
Environment/Application
•_ Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x i0"6 Cycles 6
Failure Rate Source Code a
O
u Probability of.
u_ Failure x i0" 6 6
Probability of Failure,
All Modex, x I0 "_ 300
Reliability 0.9(3)700
Failure Rate Data Sources: TRW experience - 2000 Squib firings
with no failures. Prob. of failure of 3 x 10 "4 at 50°/0confidence.
Farada indicates 47,332 firings with 10 failures. Failure rate
211 x 10 -4 which is in good agreement with TRW data.
Notes:
A Catastrophic failure; mission abort.
-_:,"Experience from Bruceton type testing indicates premature
failure mode is approx. 1/50 of total failure probability.
74
1966011762-084
Table 7A
Item: Separation Nut
System/Subsystem: Separation
Item Type/De sc ription:
Captive with a removable flange base and dual cartridge
capability.
Ope rational Note s :
Gas retaining, no fragmentation. All parts are retained and
locked in place.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to release the bolt when proper force is present.
Possible Causes:
1. Failure of the separator piston to fracture (workmanship).
2. Failure of the locking piston £o move forward (jammed).
3. Failure of the segments to displace from the bolt
_workmanship)
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic -. separation would not occur.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Lot qualification of separation nuts.
Secgndary Failure Mode:
Failure to eject the bolt.
Possible Causes:
Failure of the ejector piston.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
None if bolt is free could be pulled away by retro force.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Lot qualification of separation nuts.
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Table 7B
Mi s s ion
Failure Classification A
Q)
Time/CyclesO
Units: x l0 -6 Firings 1 cycle
® Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Firings 48"
,-'4
"_ Environment/Application Factor
>, Actual Failure Rate,
c_ Units: x l0 "6 Firings 48
•_ Failure Rate Source Code b
Probability of Failure, x 10 -6 48
Failure Classification M
C
Time/Cycles
Units: x 10 -6 Firings 1 cycle
;_
Basic Failure Rate, Units: x I0 6 Firings <1":"*
.v-4
Environment/Application Factor
>" Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Firings _1
o Failure Rate Source Code b
C9
-6
u_ Probability of Failure, x 10 <1
Probability of Failure, All Modex, x 10 "6 48
Reliability 0.9(4)52
Failure Rate Data Sources: b) Farada, Revision dated 3/1/65 Pg.
2. 279, Source 138. Martin Co. Report M-63-3 dated Oct. 63
(K factors not applicable). Explosive bolt used.
Notes:
A ibid
M Minor failure - noncatastrophic.
• The 3 causes of failure are broken down as follows:
i. Failure rate of 40 used (explosive bolt fracture).
2. Failure rate for this cause is considered to be
an order of magnitude less than in 1.
"_ 3. Same as 2.
_:-';:-"Failure rate was assumed to be negligible <l x 10-6 .
Note: Pin puller assumed to be the same as a nut.
76 :;
] 96601 ] 762-086
Table 8A
Item: Cable Assy (Squib Firing Circuit)
Ope rational Note s:
A Z pin connector, 2 solder joints and 2 wires were considered
for each cable assy.
Environmental Note s:
Failure could occur as a result of vibration during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to provide electrical signal to squib.
Possible Causes:
1. Poor pin contact.
2. Broken wire.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
None (would be catastrophic if all failed)
Backup Provisions :
Redundant squibs used; therefore cable assy are considered
redundant.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Circuit continuity check.
ii
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Table 8B
Mission
Failure Classification A
Time / Cycles
Units: Hours 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hours 0.438 _:-"
Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs 438
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of Failure,
x 10 -6 145
Reliability .9(3)855
Failure Raze Data Sources: c) Farada Revision dated 3/1/65.
Source 138: Martin Co. Report M63-3. ;:-_
N ore s:
A ibid
;:-"Total Failure Rate determined as follows:
i. Connector - .Z/pin x2 pins = .400
_. Wire - .015 xZ = .030
3. Solder Joint - _004 x Z = .008
.438
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Table 9A
Item: Shaped Charge
System/Subsystem: Separation
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to cut when proper force is applied.
Possible Causes:
1. Workmanship (voids or cracks in the material if at a
member to be cut).
Z. Boost environment (structural failure resulting in crack:_).
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Separation would not occur.
Backup Provisions:
None
Inherent Preventives:
None
Secondary. Failure Mode:
Vehicle damage from flying fragments.
Possible Causes:
Inability to contain all fragments.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Mission degradation to mission abort.
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Table 9B
Mission
-0
o Failure Classification A
Time/Cycles
Units: Cycles i
,i-t
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 Cycles 27
_ Failure Rate Source Code b
•,_ Probability of Failure, 27
0_ x 10 .6
,m , ,m
Failure Classification B
Time/Cycles0
N Units: Cycles 1
v Basic Failure Rate, 3"
= Units" x i0 -6
,,-4 *
Actual Failure Rate,L_
>, Units : 3
Failure Rate Source Code b
"O
Probability of Failure 3O
¢9
v x i0 -6
O3
Failure Rate Data Sources: b) ibid
N ote s:
A Catastrophic failure, mission abort
B Noncatastrophic failure, mission degradation
* An estimate of 10% of total failure rate from Farada (30)
was used for this failure mode.
8O
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Table 10A
Item: Safe and Arm Device
System/Subsystem: Destruct
Item Type/De s c ription
Two position rotary device.
Ope rational Note s:
Device must be capable of arming, firing or disarming on
command.
Environmental Note s:
Must function during and/or after boost environment
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to arm/disarm.
Possible Causes:
I. Electrical failure (open/short).
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
I. Unable to destruct.
Backup Provisions
Redundant safe and arm devices.
Inherent Preventives:
Electrical checks.
8i
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Table t OB
Mission
Failure Clas sification N
Time / Cycle s
Units: Hours 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: Hrs. 0.54
Environment /Application
Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 540
Failure Rate Source Code d
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 162
Reliability 0.9 (3)838
Failure Rate Data Sources: d) Farada, Pg. 2. 183 Revised 3/1/65,
Source 138 {Martin Co.) {Rotary switch was used assuming two sets
of contacts.)
Note s:
N No effecton mission success.
8Z
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Table 11
Sepnration system reliability determined as follows for the
monopropellant system:
R s = (Rsqui b, Rnu t, Rcable assy )3
Quantity raised to the third power because 3 attach points are used.
The individual reliabilities were determined as follows:
-%
Rsquib = (pZ + ZPQ) • (Rpremature) ,vhere P is
probability of success and O us probabilit 7
of failure (1 - P) since the squibs are
redundant, substituting P = 1 - Q
Rsqui b = (1- QZ). (Rpremature)2 = 1- (.000Z94)Z
. (999994) 2
Rprematur e is squared since either squib =ould fire early.
asqui b = (1 - .0(7)864) . 9(4)88
= 9(7)136 . 9(4)88
R = 9(4)879136
squib
Rnu t = 0.9(4)5Z
-.483 . I000 . .3 . 10 -6 -145x 10 -6
Rcable assy = e = e
= 0.9(3)855 each
Since the cable assemblies are redundant:
= I -QZ = I - (145 x I0"6) z = I - .0(7)Z!
Rcable assy
= 0.9 (7)79
3
R s = (0.9(4)879136. 9(4)5Z . 9(7)79)
R = 0.9(3)816
s
The reliability of the separation system for the bipropellant
system has four separation points and is determined as follows:
Rsw = (Rsqui b • Rnu t ' Rcab!c assy )4
= (0.9(4)879136 . 9(4)5Z . 9(7)79)4
Rs, = 0.9(3)760
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The reliabllity of the safe and arm devices was determined using
-%t
R = e
where k is the total failure rate and includes the environmental factor
(1000) and t is the boost time (0.3 hour).
If%t is small (<0.01) the first equation can be used.
4.2 Baseline Propellant Feed Systems
A preliminary reliability analysis was made of the baseline mono-
and bipropellant feed systems. In addition to computing nominal reliability
values, a rough error analysis was performed to assess the magnitude of
the uncertainty associated with this preliminary analysis. The results
are:
Monopr opellant Bipr opellant
System System
Best .9955 .9925
Mission Reliability: Nominal . 9923 .983
Worst . 896 . 821
An environmental factor of 1,000 is used during powered portions
of the mission; a factor of ! is used for unpowered flight. A mission
duration of seven months is used since the baseline engine configuration
is no longer used after entering Mars orbit. Exceptions are such items
as pressure vessels which must not rupture during an additional six
mcnths in Mars orbit.
Criticality factors are used in place of failure classifications on the
following tables. These are estimates of the probability of mission failure
given that a failure mode occurs. This accounts for small leaks and
other failures which may not be catastrophic to the mission.
The uncertainty of the reliability predictions is primarily due to
uncertainty of component failure rates. Many failure rates are known
only to the nearest order of magnitude. Most failure rates were taken
from the FARADA handbook, ! April i965 issue. Some were taken from
DAC studies on the Saturn S-IVB stage. _
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Table 1A
Item: Helium Sphere
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Operational Notes:
Titanium - Z req'd
Primary Failure Mode:
Rupture
Possible Causes:
Tank damaged after acceptance by improper handling
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic at any time during mission
Inherent Preventives:
Proof pressure test for acceptance
Table ! B
Nom. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure Classifi-
cation 1 1
Time/Cycles 0.43 10,800Units: hrs
Basic Failure
Rate, Units: 80 1590 Z0 80 80
x 10-9 hrs
Environment/
Application 1000 1
Factor
Actual Failure
Rate, Units: 80,000 80
x 16 "9 hrs
Probability of
Failure, 34 865 899
x 10 -6
Reliability 0.9466 O. 93135 O. 93101
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Table 2A
Hand: Hand Valve I
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed, Mono and Bi-prop.
Operational Notes:
Capped during flight. Used on ground for fillingHe and
propellant tanks.
3 req'd for mono, 5 req'd for bi-prop.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage in flight
Possible Causes:
Vibration: Improperly seated or capped.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Could be negligible or catastrophic depending on magnitude of
leak rate.
Backup Provisions:
Outlet sealed and capped.
Table 2B
Nom. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure Classifi-
cation i 0. 5
Time/Cycles 0.43 5040
Units: hrs
Basic Failure
Rate, Units: 60 224 20 60 60
x I0-9 hrs
Environment/
Application I000 ___i_:_
Factor O. 1 O. 1
Actual Failure
Rate, Units: 6000 6 I
x i6-9 hrs /
Probability of ::
Failure, x 10-6 2.58 f5. Z f7.8
'9
Reliability 0.9574 0. 94848 0. 94822 i_
Application factor of 0. ! is used to account for value being capped.
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Table 3A
Item: Filter
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Item Type/Description:
Gas or Propellant
Primary Failure Mode.:
Release particles or fragments
Possible Causes:
Vibration
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Negligible to catastrophic depending on effect of particles
downstream, whichalso depends on size of particles
Secondar_}( Failure Mode:
Incomplete filtration
Possible Causes:
Loose element
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Normally not serious
Other Failure Modes:
Burnt case; clogging
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic, although highly unlikely
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Table 3B
Nom. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
Classification 0.5 0.5
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.2 0.23
Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
o x I0 "9 hrs 120 1080 18 120 120
Environment/
h>' Applicationi',-I
r _ Factor I000 I000
p,4
Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10-9 hrs 120,000 120,000
Probability of
Failure, XI0 -6 12.0 13.8
Failure
Classification 0. 1 0. 1
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.2 0.23
Basic Failure
_o Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 hrs 80 720 IZ 80 80
>" Environment/
Application
Factor I000 I000
0
u Actual Failure
u_ Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 80,000 80,000
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 1.60 1.84
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 73.6 15.6 29.2
Reliability 0. 94864 0. 94844 0.94?08
8 8 ,_q2
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Table 4A
Item: Regulator
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Operational Note s:
Regulates 3000 psi to ZL0 psi. Must positively lock up when
downstream pressure exceeds ZL0 psi.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage during lockup
Possible Causes:
Contamination on seat.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Negligible to catastrophic depending on leakage rate
Inherent Preventives:
Upstream filter
Secondary Failure Mo_de:
Over pressurization or fail wide open
Possible Causes:
Excessive regulator drift. Binding or jamming. Contamination
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Major to catastrophic depending on degree of drift
Other Failure Modes:
Underpressurization or fail closed
Possible Causes:
As above
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
As above
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Table 5A
Item: Vent and Relief Valve
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Operational Notes:
Used as a solenoid vent valve on the ground; as a spring loaded
relief valve during flight. Preflight reliability is not consid-
ered in analysis.
primary Failure Mode:
Stuck; failure to relieve when required
Possible Causes:
Improper handling or installation
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic only if relief function is needed during flight.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Leakage
Possible Causes:
Contamination on seat
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Negligible to catastrophic depending on magnitude of leak rate
and at what time durin E the mission it starts leaking.
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Table 5B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
Classification 0. 1 0. 1
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 10,800
Basic Failure
_. Rate, Units:
x 10 "9 hrs 375 4,270 150 375 375
._ Environment/
_ Application
Factor I000 I
Actual Failure
Rate.gUnit s:x 10 375,000 375
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 16. 1 405
Failure
Classification 0.8 0.5
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 5,040
Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
x I0"9 hrs 125 1,425 50 125 125
Environment/
Application
Factor 1000 I
Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 125,000 125
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 43 315
Probability of 0F._ilure,All Modes x 1 59 720 779
Reliability 0. 9441 0.93280 0. 93221
%
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Table 6A
Item: Propellant Tank
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Operational Note s:
Contains fuel, oxidizer or monopropellant
4 req'd for Bi propellant system
Z req'd for monopropellant system
Primary Failare Mode:
Rupture
Possible Causes:
Tank damaged after acceptance by being dropped, struck, etc.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic at any time during mission
Backup Provisions:
Relief valve
Inherent Preventive s:
Proof pressure test for acceptance
Ill
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Table 6B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
Classification O. I* O. I*
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 I0,800
Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
x I0-9 hrs 120 I,640 ZO 120 120
Environment/
Application
Factor 1000 l
Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 hrs IZ0,000 120
Failure Rate
Source
Code a
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 5. 16 130 135
Reliability 0. 9548 0.9387 0. 93865
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) DAC Saturn S-IVB
Notes:
Considers backup effect of relief valve
CrRi = 0. 03818
I + • Z 1 066699
Ri = "
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Table 7A
Item: Propellant Tank _ellows
Systern/Subeystem: Propellant Feed (Bi-Prop. Tank)
Item Type/De scription:
347 Stainless Steel
primary Failure Mode:
Binding ol" failure to expell fluid
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic
Secondary Failure Mode:
Rupture or leakage
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Would no_ be serious if leakage is small. Some propellant
would be unavailable for combustion.
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Table 7B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
Classification i 1
Tim e/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 5, 040
Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10-9 150 225 50 150 150
Environ_rnent/
Application
._ Factor I000 !
Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -6 150, 000 150
Failure Rate
Source
Code a
Probability of 6
Failure, x 10- 64.5 755
Failure Classification 0.5 0.5
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 5,040
Basic Failure
e Units:Ra "9x 1 150 225 50 150 150
o
u. Environment/
u_ Application
Factor t 000 1
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 32.2 378
Probability of Failure,
AllModes x 10 -6 96.7 1133 1230
Reliability 0.94033 0.92887 0.92870
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) DAC SaturnS-IVB
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Table 8A
Item: Bladder
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed (.Monopropellant Tank)
Item Type/De s cription:
Butyl Rubber
Primary Failu_re Mode:
Leakage due to permeation, cracks, pinholes, etc. or complete
rupture
Possible Causes:
Material deterioration; damage in handling
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Would not be serious if leakage is small. Some propellant
would be unavailable for combustion.
Secondar_y Failure Mode:
B[ockage of tank outlet
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic
Inherent Preventives:
Design to prevent blockage
97
1966011762-107
Table 8B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
Classifi-
cation 90 % 0.5 0.5
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 5,040
_ Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 hrs 450 630 162 450 450
Environment/
_ Application
Factor 1000 1
Failure Rate
Source
Code a
Probability of
Failure, x 10-6 96.7 1130
Failure
C lassifi-
cation 10 % 1 1
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 5,040
_9
_o Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
>-x 10-9 50 70 18 50 50
Environment/
o_ Application
u Factor I000 1
u0
Failure Rate
Source
Code a
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 Zl.5 Z5Z
Probability of FaLilure,
All Modes x I0 -u 118. Z 138Z 1500
Reliability 0. 9388Z 0.9Z86Z 0.9Z850
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) DAC Saturn S-IVB
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Table 9A
Item: Check Valve
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Item Type/Description:
Spring loaded closed
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to prevent backflow
Possible Causes:
Stuck open, contamination, binding
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic in bi-propellant system if two valves leak; may
not be serious if only one leaks a small amount
Secondary Failure Mode:
Stuck in closed position
Possible Causes:
Jammed due to contamination
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic
99
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Table 9B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
C la s sifi-
cation 80 % 0.8 0.8
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0.43 5,040
_ Basic FailureRate, _Units:
x 10 -9 hrs 600 3,760 160 600 600
c_
Environment/
.,4
Application
Factor 1000 1
Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 hrs 600,000 600
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 206 2420
Failure
C la s sifi-
cation 20 % 1 1
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs 0. 43 5,040
_o Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
>,x 10 -9 150 940 40 150 150
Environment/
o_ Application
u Factor 1000 1
u_ Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10-9 150,000 150
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 64. 5 757
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 271 3177 3448
Reliability 0. 93729 0. 92682 0. 92655
I00
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Table 9A
Item: Fittings and Connections
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed and Engine
Item Type/Description:
Mechanical connections, not welded or brazed
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage
Possible Causes:
Improper connection
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Could be negligible or catastrophic depending on magnitude
of leak rate
Remarks:
Welded and brazed fittings are considered to have
negligible prob. of failure.
lOl
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Table 9B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit Mission
Failure
C las sification 1 0.5
Time/Cycles
Units: 0.43 5,040
Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 .9 hrs 30 710 20 30 30
Environment]
Application
Factor 1000 1
Actual Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 hrs _t),000 30
Failure Rate
Source
Code a
Probability of
Failure, x 10 .6 12.9 76 89
Reliability per Fitting 0. 9487 0. 9424 0. 9411
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) DAC Saturn S-iVB
102 ,',
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Table i 0A
Item: Ducts and Lines
Operational Note s:
1 / 4" and 1/ 2" Aluminum
Primary Failure Mode:
Rupture
Possible Causes:
Improper handling
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
C ata strophic
Table 10B
Nora. Worst Best Boost Transit MissJ.on
Failure
Classification 0. 1 • 0. 1 *
Time/Cycles
Units: 0.43 10,800
Basic Failure
Rate, Units:
x 10 -9 150 1000 150 150 150
Environment]
Application
Factor 1000 1
Probability of
Failure, x 10-6 6.45 162 168
Reliability 0.95755 0.93838 0.93_;3Z
Notes:
Considers backup effect of relief valve
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Table 1 I. Propellant Feed System
Monopropellant Baseline Configuration
Unit Number Total
C ompone nt R e liability R e q' d R e liability
Helium sphere 0. 93101 2 0. 92820
Hand valve 0. 94822 3 0. 94466
Filter 0. 94708 2 0. 94416
Regulator 0. 92863 1 0.9Z863
Relief valve 0. 93221 1 0. 93221
Propellant tank 0. 93865 2 0. 93730
Bladder 0. 92850 2 0. 92700
Fittings & connections 0. 9411 3 0. 93733
Lines & Ducts Assy 0. 93832 1 0. 93832
Total 0. 9222 5
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Table 12. Propellant Feed System
Baseline Bi-propellant Configuration
Unit Numbe r Total
Component Reliability Req' d Reliability
Helium sphere 0. 93101 Z 0. 92820
Hand valve 0. 9482Z 5 0. 93811
Filter 0. 94708 3 0. 94214
Regulator 0. 92863 1 0. 92863
Relief valve 0. 93221 Z 0. 92884
Propellant tank 0. 93865 4 0. 93460
Expulsion bellows 0. 92870 4 0. 92508
Check valve 0. 92655 Z 0.9Z310
Fittings & connections 0. 9411 5 0. 93555
Lines & Ducts Assy 0. 93832 1 0. 93832
r
E
Total O. 9825 ;
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Table 13. Uncertainty of Reliability Predictions
A rough estimate of the uncertainty of the reliability predic-
tions of the propellant feed system can be obtained from the range
between the best and worst case failure rates. These are summar-
ized as follows:
No. Req'd Failure rate, x 159hrs
Component Mono Biprop Worst Best
Helium Sphere Z Z I,590 Z0
Hand Valve 3 5 ZZ4 Z0
Filter Z 3 I,800 30
Regulator 1 1 7,870 200
Relief Valve 1 Z 5,700 200
Propellant Tank Z 4 i,640 20
Bellows 0 4 450 I00
Bladder 2 0 700 180
Check Valve 0 2 4,700 200
Fittings 3 5 7 i0 Z0
Line Assy 1 1 I,000 150
17 29
28,832 1170
= 1,694 -- = 68.8k4onopropellant ave. 17 17
Bipropellant ave. 51,28029= 1,770 19602_.__9_= 67.5
106
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Table 13 (Continued)
Equivalent Mission Failure Rate
R S - R B R T
where
R S = Miss._.on reliability of system
R B = System reliability during boost
R T = System reliability during transit
-ktBKBCn -ktTKTCn
R S = e .e
where
k = Ave. mission failure rate per component
t B = Ave. boost duration = 0,43 hr
t T = Ave. transit duration = 5,040 hrs
K B = Boost environmental factor = 1000
K T = Transit environmental factor = 1
c = Criticality factor, ave. = 0.7
n = No. of components = 17 for monoprop.
= Z9 for biprop.
R S = exp-lk nc(tBKB + tTKT) }
Mono:
0.9ZZZ5 = exp - [k (17)(0. 7)(430 + 5040)] = exp- [65, lOOk]
0. 00778
kmono - 65,100 = 119.4 x 10 "ghrs
Biprop:
0.98Z5 = exp-[k(Zg)(0.7)(430+5040)] = exp- [lll,O00k]
0.0177 = 159x 10 -9 hrs
kbi - 111,000
i ,. ml
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Table i3 (Continued)
An estimate of the best and worst reliability is obtained by
using the coefficients of k found above.
Mono:
RS(worst) = exp- [65,100(1,694 x I0"9)]
= 0. 8957
RSfbest _ = exp- [65,100(68.8 x 10-9)]Y
% #
= 0.92552
Biprop:
-9)]
RS(worst) = exp- [III,000(1770 x i0
= 0.8214
= exp- [111,000(67.5 x 10"9)]RS(best)
= O. 92254
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4. 3 Selected Propellant Feed System
Following is a reliability analysis of an integrated pressurization
and propellant feed system for the monopropellart midcourse propulsion
system of the Voyager spacecraft. This is the configuration adopted in
tne selected spacecraft design.
The analysis is based on the same assumptions and ground rules
J.
used in the preliminary reliability analysis of Section 4. 2.'"The analysis
has been divided into five mission phases as follows:
Reliability
Phase l - Launch and Boost 0.9(3)050
Phase 2 - Transit of .i,280 hours including 0.9(2)723
four midcourse correction firings.
Phase 3 - Retropropulsion and 2 days in 0.9(4)792
Martian orbit.
Phase 4 - One additional month in Martian 0.9(3)720
orbit.
Phase 5 - Five additional months in Martian 0.9(3)095
orbit.
Total Mission: 0.9(2)508
The major unreliability of the system occurs in Phase 2 where the
midcourse correction firings are made. The unreliability which occurs
in other phases is primarily due to leakage and the hazard associated
with tank rupture and other structural failure within the pressurized
system.
""Some of the component failure rates and failure probabilities differ
between Sections 4.2 and 4.3. This is because the selected system was
analyzed at a later date using revised failure rates based on a more
extensive search for applicable failure rate data.
t09
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The selected monopropellant configuration is shown below.
5A1-4V (ANNEALED) _ STANDPIPE
BLADDER (BUTYL RUBBER)
700 PSIA 700 PSIA
He He
II II
N2H4II N2H4I
2 ft3 II 2 ft 3 I
II II
II
1,/4"
=ITTINGS
,/2,,------ ----- DAC TRW
Pressure vessels are 24" dia. The failure rate data used is an
updated version of the applicable reliability assessment data sheets in
Appendix "A" of DAC-VOYAGER memo DAC-VM-Z8 dated 6-24-65.
Failure Probability (10 "6)
Component Phase i Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Pressure Vessel (Z) 786.4 881.6 I00 5
Capped Hand Valve (Z) 0.186 Z.68
Bladder (2) 86.4 776.24
Standpipe (2) 2.46 35. I0
.._ Fittings (5) 75.0 1075 Z0.85 180 900
TI-AI Interface
950. 446 277062 20.85 280. 000 90---5
Rmission = IRphase 1! [Rphase Z1 IRphase 3 ! IRphase 4 ! IRphase 5 i
\
Rmission = (9(3)050)(9(2)723)(9(4)792)(9(3)720)(9(3)095) = 9(2)508
If0
i'
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Table 1A
Item: Fittings (titanium-aluminum) interface
System/Subsystem: Propulsion/Pressurization Subsystem
Environmental Notes:
Leakage rate must be less than 10 -6 SCCM
Primary Failure Mode:
o Leakage at fitting
Possible Causes:
Damaged threads, improper torquing
Effects of Subsystem/Mission:
Loss of mission depending on severity
Backup Provisions:
Shut-off solenoid valves and regulator bank for fittings at
pressurization tank. No backup for failure of fitting at fuel
tanks.
Inhe rent Preventives :
Quality control and inspection procedures
|
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Table 2A
Item: Pressure Vessel
System/Subsystem: Propellant Feed
Operational Notes:
Titanium
Primary Failure Mode:
Leak
Possible Causes:
Defective welding, micrometeoroid impingement
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Dependent on degree of leak
Backup Provisions:
None
Inhe rent Preventives :
Closed loop control of all welding manufacturing processes,
adequate meteoroid shielding, quality control inspection and
testing in accordance with NPC 200-2, NPC 200-3
Secondary Failure Mode:
Rupture
Possible Causes:
Faulty weld or connection; flaw in material
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Ta'_lk explosion/loss of mission
Backup Provisions:
None
Inherent Preventives:
Same as above
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Table 3A
Item: Standpipe
System/Subsystem: Propulsion/Propellant Feed
Item Type/Description:
Perforated pipe [hat facilitates fuel loading
Operational Notes :
Pipe will be made of titanium and welded into place
Environmental Notes:
Standpipe will be exposed to hydrazine environment
Primary Failure Mode:
Standpipe broken
Possible Causes:
Defective welding
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Flow of fuel into bladder will be erratic
Backup Provisions:
None
Inherent Preventives:
Radiographic inspection of welds
Seconda_ry Failure Mode:
Burrs and imperfections on perforation holes
Possible Causes:
Inadequately controlled machine processe_ amd inspection
procedures
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Contaminant in fuel tank and ongine resulting in possible engine
damage, possible loss of mission
Backup Provisions:
None
Inherent Preventives:
Carefully deburr all perforations; polish standpipe
115
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Table 4A
Item: Bladder (Butyl Rubber)
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (Propellant Feed}
Item Type/Description:
Thin membrane type bag which contains the M MH or N 2 H4
fuel located in tank.
Operational Notes:
Partial pressure of He or N z should be equal to or greater thrn
the vapor pressure of the Hydrazine.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage due to permeation, cracks, pin holes, etc. or complete
rupture.
Possible Causes:
Faulty Manufacturing Process.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Burst/loss of mission.
Inherent Preventives:
Quality Control (NPC Z00-Z and Z00-3)
Secondary Failure Mode:
Blockage of tank outlet.
Effect on Mission:
Loss of Mission.
Ii7
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Table 5A
Item: Hand Valve (manual)
System/Subsystem: Propulsion/Propellant Feed
Operational Notes :
This valve is used on the ground for fillinggaseous helium or
nitrogen tank and propellant tanks.
Environmental Notes:
Valve willbe capped during flightbut itmight be susceptible to
leakage through stem.
}_rimary Failure Mode:
Valve leaks during flight.
Possible Causes:
Faulty capping, imperfections in body of valve and seals.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Loss of pressurization gas or propellant resulting in reduced
impulse fronlengine. Erratic engine p, rformance. Possible
loss of mission.
Inherent Preventives :
Quality control and inspection (NPC 200-2 and NPC 200-3)
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4.4 Low-Gain Antenna Deployment
Reliability analyses were performed for four different configura-
tions of the low gain antenna deployment system. The purpose of the
analyses was to provide a preliminary reliability prediction for each
configuration for comparison.
Each configuration, contained in the attached Douglas drawings,
(SK-BM00-7001 Lhrough SK-BM00-7004) is treated separately as a section
which includes the reliability predictions. In addition, this report
contains the mathematical models used and reliability analysis of th- _
parts required to compute the preliminary reliability predictions.
Table 1 presents a summary of the preliminary reliability
predictions for each of the configurations considered in the analysis. The
table shows that tl,e deployment system which uses no squibs had the
highest reliability prediction. In the remaining configurations the squibs
are the least reliable portion of the system; the next most unreliable
component is the damper/actuatoI which limits the reliability improve-
ment.
4.4.1 Hinge Spring Extension System (SK-BM00-7001)
The hinge spring extension system consists of a pin puller which
keeps the antenna in the stowed position and releases the antenna for
deployment upon firing of the squibls). The system also consists of a
coil spring for deployment, a hydraulic damper to prevent the antenna
from structural failure during deployment and two lock pins and springs
to lock the antenna in place.
Table 1 presents the reliability predictions for using the single and
dual {redundant) squibs in the pin puller. Although the squib in the pin
puller is the most unreliable portion of the system, the damper becomes
the limiting factor when the squibs are made redundant and the gain in
reliability is not larger (< an order of magnitude). The primary failure
mode of the damper is the loss of fluid. A major loss of fluid would
prevent the damper from providing the necessary damping force causing
the antenna to break during deployment. How much fluid loss could be
tolerated has not been determined. Since the reliability figure used for
12 1
1966011762-132
SK-BM00-7001
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Table I. Preliminary Reliability Predictions for
Low-Gain Antenna Deployment Configurations
Subsystem Configurations Reliability Predictions
i. Hinge Spring Extension System
SK-BM00-7001
a. Single Squib 0.9_3JZ58""
b. Redundant Squibs 0.9_ZJ691''
Z. Linear Spring Actuator System
SK-BM00 -7002
a. Single Squib 0.9(3)314
b. Redundant Squibs 0.9_31747''
3. Electric Omni-Antenna Deployment System 0.9(3)838
SK-BM00-7003
4. Gas Linear Actuator System
SK-BIV[00 -7004
a. Single Squib 0.9_3_441""
b. Redundant Squibs 0.9%3J785''
the damper is considered to provide for zero leakage, the total figure for
the system may be conservative.
4.4. Z Linear Spring Actuator System (SK-BM00-700Z)
This system is similar to the previous system except the extension
spring and locking device are all contained in the damper, which in effect
makes it an actuator. The reliability predictions are shown in Table 54.
The increase in reliability results from the simplified locking device.
4.4.3 Electric Deployment (SK-BM00-7003)
This configuration uses no ordnance devices and depends upon an
electric actuator to keep the antenna in the stowed position and to deploy
and lock the antenna. The reliability prediction for the system is
0.9(3)838,°" the highest reliability of all the configurations considered.
IZ6
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4.4.4 Gas Linear Actuator (SK-BM00-7004)
This configuration is similar to the sprJ _g-actuator configuration
except that the actuator uses gas pressure, from squibs, rather than a
spring to deploy the antenna. The antenna is held in the stowed position
by a shear pin which must be broken to start the antenna deployment.
The reliability predictions of the configurations considered are shown in
Table 2.
4.4.5 Reliability Analysis and Mathematical Model
The reliability analysis for each of the major parts considered in
each of the four different configurations is contained in Tables 3 through
10. For the most part the failure modes of the components were
determined and the failure rate of the parts contributing to this failure
mode were used (e. g. in Tables 6A and 6B the failure rates for seals and
orifices were used rather than the failure rate of a damper or actuator).
This method of prediction gives a better indication of the possible problem
areas.
The reliability of each one shot device is simply the complement of
its failure rate (X), where the failure rate is essentially the probability of
failure (Q)
R = I-_ = I-Q
If two devices are used redundantly, both must fail before the system is
considered failed and the reliability is
R = I-Q 2
Table Z. Preliminary Reliability Prediction for Gas
Linear Actuator System (SK-BM00-7004)
I Configuration Reliability Prediction i
1. Single Squib 0.9( 3)441
Z. Redundant Squibs 0.9(3)785 I
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Table 3A
Item: Squib
System/Subsystem: Low Gain-Antenna Deployment
Item Type/Description:
Explosive bridge wire with powder charge. (Redundant bridge-
wires)
Ope rational Note s:
One shot device.
Environmental Notes :
Failure is most likely to result from vibration during the boost
pha se.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to fire, with proper force, when proper electrical input is
pre sent.
Possible Causes:
I. Poor workmanship (bridgewire coating).
Z. Bad lot of charges.
3. Broken bridgewires.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic, failure to deploy.
Backup Provisions :
Redundant squibs.
Inherent Preventives:
Lot qualification of squibs.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Premature firing.
Possible Causes:
I. Stray R.F. signals.
Z. Boost environment.
3. Bad lot of charges.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic, early deployment.
Backup Provisions:
None
Inherent Preventives:
Bruceton tests, shielding from R.F. signals.
128
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Table 3B
"
Mi s s ion
Failure Cla,q sification A
_ Time/Cycles
Units: Cycles x 10 -6 1
Basic Failure LRate,
Units: Per 10UFirings g94
_ Environment/Application Factor
Actu=l Failure Rate,
, _ Units: Per 106 Firing_ Z94
Failure Rate Source Code a
Probability of Failure, x 10 -6 294
Failure Classification A
Time/Cycles
Units: Cycles x l0 "6 1
_o Basic Failure Rate,
Units: Per 106 Firings 6*
Environment/Application Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: Per 106 Firings 6
_Failure Rate Source Code a
Probability of Failure x 10 .6 6
O
U
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 300
Reliability 0.9(3)700
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) TRW experience - Z000 squib firings
with no failures. Prob. of failure of 3 x 10 -4 at 50_0 C.L. Teleeon
with Farada indicated 47,33Z firings with I0 failures. Prob. of failure,
Z. ll x 10 "4.
Notes:
A. Catastrophic.
":' Experience from Bruceton type testing indicates premature
failure mode is approximately 1/50 of total failure probability.
IZ9
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Table 4A
Item: Pin Puller
System/Subsystem: Low Gain-Antenna Deployment
Item Type/Description:
Captive with dual cartridge capability.
Ope rational Note s:
Gas retaining, no fragmentation.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to release pin when proper force is ,_resent.
Possible Causes:
1. Failure of pin to move (jammed)
2. Broken pin
Effects on Subs;-stem/Mission:
Catastrophic --deployment would not occur.
Backup Provisions :
None
Inhe rent Preventive s :
Lot qualification of pin pullers.
U
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Table 4B
ii i i
Mission
Failure Cla s sification A
Time/Cycles,Units: x i0 -6 Firings i
Basic Failure Rate, Units, x 106 Firings 48
Environment/Application Factor
-6
Actual Failure Rate, Units: x ,0 Firings 48
Failure Rate Source Code b
Probability of Failure, x 10 -6 48
Reliability 0. 945Z
b) Farada, revised 3/1/65. Pg° Z. Z79, Source 138. Explosive
bolt used - estimates for locking, etc. - I0% of failure rate.
Notes:
A ibid
Table 5A
Item: Cable Assy (Squib Firing Circuit)
System/Subsystem: Low-Gain Antenna Deployment
Item Type/Description:
A Z-pin connector, Z-solder joints and two wires were
considered for each cablc assy.
Environmental Notes"
Failure could occur as a result of vibration during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to provide electrical signal to squib.
Possible Causes:
1. Poor pin contact
Z. Broken wire or connection.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - no deployment.
Backup Provisions:
Redundant squibs used; the: _.fore cable assy are considered
redundant.
Inherent Preventives:
Circuit continuity check.
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Table 5B.
Mission
Failure Clas sification A
Time /Cycle s
Units: Hrs 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. 0.438 _:_
Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. 438
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of Failure,
x i0 -u 145
Reliability 0.9(3)855
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) Farada, Revised 3/I/65, Source 138
Note_.
A ibid.
",-_ Total failure rate determined as follows:
1. Connector - 0.Z/Pin xZ = 0.400
Z. Wire - 0.015 xZ = 0.03
3. Solder Joint - 0.004 xZ = 0.008
0. 438
13Z
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Table 6A
Item: Hydraulic Damper
System/Subsystem: Low Gain-Antenna Deployment
Ope rational Note s:
Used in SK-BM00-7001
Environmental Note s:
Failure could occur during boost environment.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage of fluid past seals.
Possible Causes:
i. Boost environment.
Z. Poor workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
None to catastrophic, depending on amount of leakage (structural
failure of antenna).
Backup Provisions :
3 antennas in system (redundant).
Inherent Preventives :
None.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Failure to extend antenna.
Possible Causes:
i. Clogged or wrong size orifice.
Z. Jamming of piston.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
No communication.
Backup Provisions :
3 antennas in system (redundant).
Inhe rent Preventive s:
None.
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Table 6B
Mission
Failure. Classification A
_ Time/CyclesUnits: Hrs. 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
_ Units: x I0 "6 Hrs. 0.352:`'
Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failu{e Rate,
Units: x I0 -u Hrs. 350
Failure Rate Source Code c
I Probability of Failure,
x i0 -u 105
Failure Classification A
_o Time/Cycles
Units: Hrs. 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 .6 Hrs. 0.45;',-';:-"
°_
Envir onment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 Hrs. 150
o Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of
Failure x 10 .6 45
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 150
Reliability 9(3)850
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) ibid.
Notes:
;:-"Failure rate of parts as follows:
Pg. 2. 316 - "O" Ring - 0.05
Pg. Z_369 - Seal (Slidin_) - 0.30
;:-';:-"Pg. Z. 348 - Orifice - 0.15
A ibid.
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Table 7A
Item: Coil Spring
System/Subsystem: Low Gain-Antenna Deployment
Ope rational Note s:
Used on SK-BM00-7001
Environmental Note s :
Failure would probably occur during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Break - fail to act as a spring. (Vacuum welding)
Possible Causes:
1. Boost environment.
2. Poor workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - antenna would not deploy.
Backup Provisions :
3 Antennas in system (redundant).
Inherent Preventives :
None.
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Table 7B
Miss ion
Failure Classification A
Time/Cycle s
Units: Hrs. x 10 -6 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 Hrs. 0.11
Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. Ii0
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of Failure,
x 10 -6 33
Reliability 0.9(4)67
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) ibid - Pg. Z. 374
Note s:
A ibid.
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Table 8A
Item: Linear Spring Actuator
Item Type/Description:
Used on SK-BM00-7002.
Environmental Note s:
Failure could occur during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage past the seals.
Possible Causes:
i. Boost environment.
2. Poor workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
None to catastrophic depending on amount of leakage (structural
failure of antenna).
Backup Provisions:
3 antennas in system (redundant).
Inhe rent Preventive s :
None.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Failure to deploy antenna.
Possible Causes:
Spring breakage or welding.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Backup Provisions :
3 antennas in system (redundant).
Inhe rent Preventive s :
None.
Other Failure Modes:
Failure to lock in place.
Possible Causes:
Broken lock ring.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Degraded performance.
Backup Provisions:
Same as above.
Inherent Preventive s:
None.
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Table 8B
Mission
_ _ _ .Failure Classification A
_ _o Probability of Failure,
x lo-6 15o':,
-_- ,
0_ Failure Classification A
_ _ _ Probability of Failure,
_ _ x I0-6 33':":'
Failure Classification M
Time/Cycles 6
Units: Hrs x 10" 0.3
O
Basic Failur_ Rate,
e Units: x i0 -u 0.033
Environrnent/Application Factor i 000
.e'4
Actual Failure Rate,
Units" x i0 "6 33
_9
.= Failure Source Code d
q.J
O Probability of Failure
x i0-6 i0
Probability of Failure,
All Modes i 93
Reliability 0.9 ( 3)807
i
Failure Rate Data Sources: d) Estimated based on other
components
Note s :
A ibid
M Mlpor
'," See Table 6B
;:,'," See Table 7B
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Table 9A
Item: Electric Actuator
System/Subsystem: Low Gain-Antenna Deployment
Item Type/Description:
Used on SK-BM00-7003.
Primary Failure Mode:
Electrical Failure.
Possible Causes:
Motor.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission."
Catastrophic - no deployment.
Backup Provisions:
3 antennas in system (redundant).
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Electrical checks.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Mechanical failure.
Possible Causes:
Structural failure of screw jack or gears.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - no deployment.
Backup Provisions:
3 antennas in system (redundant).
lnhe rent Preventive s:
None.
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Table 9B
Mission
Failure Classification A
Time/Cycles Units: 0.3
x 10 -6 Hrs.
Basic Failur_ Rate, 0.3
Units: x i0 "° Hrs.
Environment/Application Factor I000
>,Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. 300
._ Failure Rate Source Code e
Probability of Failure,
x 10-6 90
Failure Clas sification f_
_o Time/Cycles
Units: x I0 "o Hrs. 0.3
Basic Failur_ Rate,
Units: x I0 "° Hrs. 0.Z75
Environment/Application Factor I000
_-Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. Z75
o= Failure Rate Source Code f
O
Probability of
Failure x I0-6 8Z. 5
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 17Z. 5
R eliability 9(3 )8Z8
Failure Rate Data Sources: e) Farada, Revised 3/I/65, Pg. I.I00,
Source 138 (Motor) f) Farada, Revised 3/I/65, Pg. Z.318, Source
8Z (Screw Jack)
m
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Table 10A
Item: Shear Pin
System/Subsystem: Low Gain-Antenna Deplovment
Item Type /De scription:
Used on SK-BM00-7004.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to shear when proper force : _resent.
Possible Causes:
Workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/l_ission:
Catastrophic - no deployment.
Backup Provisions :
3 antennas in system - (rec__ndant).
Inhe rent Preventive s.
None.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Premature shear.
PoJsible Causes:
I. Boost environment.
Z. Workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - early deployment.
Backup Provisions:
3 antennas in system - (redundant).
Inherent Preventive s:
None.
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Table i0B
Mission
Failure Clas sification A
Time/Cycles
Units: x 10-6 cycles I
Basic Failur_ Rate,
Units: x i0 -U 6
Environment/Application Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x I0 -6 6
Failure Rate Source Code g
Probability of Failure,
x 10-6 6
Failure Classification A
Time / Cycle s
Units: x 10 -6 cycles 1
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 <1
Environment/Application Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 <1
Failure Rate Source Code g
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 <1
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 6
[ Reliability 9(5)4
Failure Rate Data Sources: g) Farada, revised 3/I/65, Pg. Z.351,
Source IZ3.
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Total system reliability is determined from the product rule
N
RT =]" [ R.
i=l i
, In those instances where time is a factor the following is used to determine
the reliability
-KktR = e
whe r e
K = Environmental and/or operational factor
= Failure rate
t = Mission time {boost 0.3 hour)
The boost time was selected since the actual operation time during
deployment is small {seconds) and the majority of the failure modes
considered would be caused by the boost environment rather than the
system operation.
If Kkt is small (<0.01) then the first equation can be used.
4. 5 Explosive Bolts and Shaped Charges
This study presents a preliminary comparison between explosive
bolts, explosive nuts, and a shaped-charge device for use in deter-
mining the method of separation for the Voyager sp_.cecraft. The study
is divided into two parts; (a) the general pros and cons of explosive
bolts, explosive nuts, and shaped-charges and (b) a reliability
analysis comparing several different configurations of the explosive
bolts, explosive nuts, and shaped-charges. This portion contains
a numerical analysis and a failure mode analysis.
The three primary reliability predictions are shown below:
6 Explosive Bolts: 0. 99796
(all must fire)
Single Shaped Charge: 0. 9{3)67
(Single Squib)
Ig Explosive Nuts" 0.9(5)31
(g at each point,
redundant)
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In order to obtain the reliability of the nut configuration (a stud
with a nut on either end) it would be necessary to use redundant
shaped charges. Using this configuration would actually give a higher
reliability; however, the increase in weight and the problems of
shock and contamination argue against this approach.
The primary failure mode of all devices is the failure of the
squib to fire with the required force when the electrical signal is
present. An additional failure mode is present with the nuts which
cc:'.r_ns the stud hanging up. The probability of this failure can be
reduced by the use of bufficicnt ramp angles and oversized holes and
control of tip-off angles.
4. 5. 1 Comparison
a. Explosive Bolts
The primary pros and cons associated with the use of explosive
bolts are as follows:
(1) Explosive bolts have been used as a method of
separation for many years and the probability of their
success is well known.
(Z) Explosive bolts, because of their size, are easily
manufactured, transported and handled.
(3) The fact that all of the bolts in the system must fire
to accomplish separation reduces the probability of
SUCCESS.
(4) The explosive bolts are not easily made redundant;
however, they can be made redundant by using a
spacer between the separation planes or an explosive
nut as the restraining device.
(5) Fragmentation can be easily contained.
b. Shaped-Charged Devices
The primary pros and cons associated wi*h the use of shaped-
charge devices are as follows:
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(1) Shaped-charge devices are a recent innovation;
however, uses on such weapon systems as Minuteman
and various payload fairings should provide a good
confidence in their probability of success.
(Z) The manufacturing (flatness and roundness), trans-
portation and handling of shaped-charges could be a
problem especially if the sections are large.
(3) The reliability of a single shaped-charge is high
(probably higher than a single explosive bolt).
(4) A shaped-charge is readily adaptable to various
r e dundant c onfigur ation s.
c. Explosive Nuts
The pros of a(I), a(2), and a(5) also apply here and the cons of
paragraph a{3) and a{4) are eliminated. The configuration consideret
uses a stud through the interface with a nut on both ends either of
which will provlde separation. Another failure mode is introduced:
the probability of the stud hanging up.
4. 5. Z Explosive Bolts vs. Shaped Charges
a. Failure Rates
The failure rates used in this study are based upon both TRW
experience with cartridges and FARADA':, information. TRW has
fired over Z, 000 squibs without encountering a failure. Using 2,000
firings without a failure, the statistical probability of success is
0. 9997 at a 50_/0confidence level (best estimate). This figure is the
total reliability used for the squibs in this study. This figure is
considered to be conservative since many companies have data for a
larger sample size. It has been reported that Hi-Shear has fired over
8,000 squibs without failure, a reliability of 0. 999923 for the squib.
In order to determine the probability of the bolt fracturing as
required and the shaped-charge cutting as required, FARADA was
* Failure Rate Data Handbook, Bureau of Naval Weapons, 1 June 196Z.
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consulted. Although shaped-charges were not listed in FARADA,
primacord was; therefore prima-cord was used as the failure rate for
shaped-charges. The failure rate listed in FARADA lot the two
devices is as follows:
• Explosive bolts: 40 failures per 106 firings
• Prima-cord (shaped charge): 30 failures per 106
firings
Based upon this information, the shaped-charge device was
considered to be rcore reliable than a single explosive bolt.
b. Model
The reliability of each one shot device (squib, explosi; e bolt
or nut) is simply the complement of its failure rate (k), where the
failure rate is essentially the probability of failure (Q)
R = l- k = I-Q.
If two devices are used in a redundant configuration, both must
fail and the reliability is
R = 1 - Q 2.
Separatipn system reliability is determined from the product
rule
N
= II R..
RT i=l I
c. Analysis
The reliability of several different configurations are shown
in Table i. Redundant squib firing circuits were assumed in all
cases and therefore were not considered in the analysis. The
explosive nut configuration uses a stud through the interface connected
on both ends by an explosive nut. If either nut fires, the point is free
to separate. A single squib firing circuit is used for each nut thereby
becoming redundant, as are the nuts.
146
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Table I. Reliability Comparison of Separation Methods
Failures per
Million
Component Reliability Attempt s
Explosive Bolt 0.9(3)66 (each) 340. 0 (each)
I. 6 out of 6 0. 99796 2040. 0
Z. 4 out of 4 0. 99864 1360. 0
3. 3 out of 3 0. 99898 1020. 0
Shaped-Charge
I. Single squib O. 9(3)67 330. 0
g. Dual squibs 0. 914J7"" 30. 0
3. Redundant shaped- 0. 91911"" 0. 0009
charge with
redundant squibs
in each
Explosive Nuts 0. 9(3)66 (each) 340. 0 (each)
(Z used redundancy at 0. 9(6)88 (per point) 0. lZ (per point)
each point)
1. 6 out of 6 points 0. 9(6)31 0.69
Z. 4 out of 4 points 0. 9(6)54 0.46
3. 3 out of 3 points 0.9(6)65 0. 35
Note: 0.9(6)65 = 0. 99999965
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Since the reliability numbers for all configurations are
greater than 0.99, the third column of the table has been presented to
aid in the interpretation of the reliability. The column presents the
number of failures predicted per million attempts. The table indicates
that the explosive bol_ (with no redundancy) is the most unreliable and
that the redundant shaped charge has the highest reliability. The
explosive nuts, however, are more reliable than a single shaped-charge
with redundant squibs. On a straight reliability comparison the
redundant shaped-charge could be recommended.
A failure mode analysis is presented in the attached worksheets.
Four separate items are considered: the squib, the bolt, the stud,
and the shaped charge. The explosive nut is considered to be the same
as the bolt. Sample calculations are shown on the final worksheets
showing how the reliability of the total item is determined as well as
some of the calculations of the reliability figures of merit in Table 1.
As is indicated on the worksheets, the rrlost probable mode of failure
is failure of the squib to fire. The reliability of the squib is nearly
an order of magnitude les_ than the mechanical reliability of either the
bolt. the nut, or the shaped char "_. The primary failure modes
considered for these two items result from workmanship errors. In
summary, if the squib fires with tLe proper force, the probability of
the bolt fracturing or the shaped-charge cutting is high; however,
the existence of the bolt and shaped-charge failure modes should not
be overlooked and close quality control is required to obtain these high
probabilities of success.
The probability of the stud hanging up is an estimate based on
a comparison with the bolt. It is assumed that all precautions would
be taken with the design to preclude the hanging up of the stud. The
failure mode was not considered in the reliability calculations because
several studs would have to hang up to prevent separation, which has
negligible probability.
t48
I
1966011762-159
Table 2A
Item: Squib
System/Subsystem: Separation
Irem Type /De scription:
Exploding bridgewire with power charge.
Operational Notes:
One shot device.
Environmental Note s:
Failure is most likely to result from vibrations during the
boost phase.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to fire when proper electrical imput is present.
Possible Causes:
I. Poor workmanship (Bridgewire coating).
Z. Broken bridgewire due to boost environment.
3. Poor electrical connection.
4. Bad lot of charges.
Effects on Subsystem/IV[is sion:
Catastrophic, failure to separate.
Backup Provisions:
None for the shaped charge and bolt configuration squibs
redundant in the nut configuration.
Inherent Preventives:
Lot qualification of all squibs. Circuit continuity check.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Premature firing.
Possible Causes:
I. Boost environment.
Z. A bad lot of charges.
3. Stray K.F. signals.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic, early separation.
Backup Provisions:
None for shaped charge; several would have to fire in the bolt
and nut configuration to accomplish early separation.
Inherent Preventives:
Testing to determine probabilty of all fire and no fire currents.
Shielding from R.F. signals.
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Table 2B
Mi s sion
Failure Clan sification A
Time/Cycles l cycle
o Units:
_ _ Actual Failure 6 294
Rate, Units' Per I0 Firing
Vailure Rate Source Code a
l_robability of Failure, 294 _'_
x 10 "6
Failure Clan sification A
Time/Cycles, l cycle
_o Units:
_ Actual Failure 6
o _ Rate, Units:
o
_ Failure Rate Source Code a
Probability of 6""
Failure, x 10 -6
Probability of F_ilure, 300
All Modes x I0"v
Reliability 0.9(3)700
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) TRW experience - 2000 squib.
firings with no failures gives probability of failure of 3 x 10 -4
at 50% confidence.
Notes:
A Catastrophic failure; mission abort.
;'s Experience from Brewston type testing indicates
premature failure mode is approximately 1/50 of
total failure probability.
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Table 3A
Item: Bolt (Explosive)
System/Subsystem: Separation.
Operational Notes:
One shot device. It is assumed that all fragments are contained.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to fracture when proper force is present.
Possible Causes:
Poor workmanship _The section is oversize)
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Separation would not occur.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inherent Preventives:
None.
Table 3B
Mi ssion
Failure Classification A
Time /Cycle s, 1
Units: Cycle
Actual Failure 40
Rate, Units:
Failure Rate Source Code b
Probability of Failure, 40
x 10-6
Probability of Failure, 40
All Mode s
Reliability 0.9(4)60
Failure Rate Data Sources: b) Farada, revision dated 3/1/65,
Pg 2. 279, source 138: Martin Co. report M-63-3, dated Oct 63.
(k factor not applicable)
Notes: A. Catastrophic failure, mission abort.
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Table 4A
Item: Shaped Charge
System/Subsystem: Separation
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to cut when proper force is applied.
Possible Causes:
I. Workmanship (voids or cracks in the ma1:erial if at a member
to be cut. )
2. Boost environment (strucLural failure resulting in cracks)
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Separation would not occur.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inherent Preventives:
None.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Vehicle damage from flying fragrn_nts.
Possible Causes:
Inability to contain all fragments.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Mission degradation to mission abort.
t
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Jp
Table 4B
I_ Mi sion
S
Failure Classification A
Time/Cycles 1
Units: Cycles
.¢'4
i_ Basic Failure -6 27
_Rate, Units: x 10 cycle
_ Failure Rate Source Code b
Probability of 27
Failure, x 10 -6
Failure Classification B
"O
o Time/Cycles 1
_ Units: Cycle 6
Basic Failure -6 3*
Rate, Units: x 10
_Actual Failure 3
Rate, Units:
Failure Rate Source Code bO
o_Probability of 3
Failure x 10 -6
Probability of Failure, 30
All Mode s
Reliability 0.9(4)7
Failure Rate Data Sources: b) ibid.
Note s:
A. Catastrophic failure, mission abort.
B. Non catastrophic failure, mission degradation.
* An estimate of 10% of total failure rate from farada (30) was
used for this failure mode.
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Table 5A
Item: Stud
System/Subsystem: Separation
Primary Failure Mode:
Hanging up in the bolt hole when the nuts have fired successfully.
Possible Causes:
I. High tipoff angle.
2. Cocked due to explosive force.
3. Stud end collared from explosive force
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic, the spacecraft would not separate.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inherent Preventives:
I. Ramp angle.
Z. Oversized hole.
3. Control of tip off angle.
4. Some separation force is present and it is assumed that
several studs would be required to hinge up before
separation could not be accomplished.
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Table 5B
Mission
Failure Classification A
Time /Cycle s 1
Units: Cycle
Basic Failure 5
Rate, Units: x 10 -6 cycle
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of 5
Failure, x 10-6
Reliability 0.9(5)5
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) Failure rate estimated based on a
comparison to the explosive bolt.
Note s:
A. Catastrophic failure, mission abort.
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Table 6
The total reliability of the explosive devices is determined as
follow s:
Rbolt/nut = Rsqui b Rbolt/nut = 0.9997 • 0.99996
= 0. 99966
Rs/c = Rsquib Rbolt/nut = 0.9997 . 0.99997
= 0. 99967
The reliability of all six bolts fracturing as required was
determined as follows:
R6 = (R I)6 = (0.99966) 6 = 0.99796
The reliabilities of 4 and 3 bolts were determined using the
same method except the exponent was 4 and 3.
The reliability of redundant items was determined as follows
using the nuts as a sample:
(p + Q)2 = 1 = p2 + 2PQ + Q2
where
Q = l-P
The problem is that at least one of the two nuts must function;
therefore the first two terms are used. (The probability that both
nuts will fire plus the probability that one will fire and one will fail.)
R = p2 + 2PQ
Substituting l - Q for P the following equation is determined:
R = 1- Q2 = i- {0.00034) 2 = l- 0.0000001156
R = 0. 9999998844 per attach point.
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4. 6 Structure
4.6. i Stress-Strength Approach
An estimate of the structural reliabilities may be obtained from
the values used for the factor of safety and the margin of safety in the
design of the spacecraft structure.
Each of the structural members in the Voyager is subjected to
one or more stresses of varying magnitude during the mission. Of the
stresses which are applied to an individual member, often one stress
is predominant and when failure occurs, it is almost always due to
this stress. This critical stress is used in the sizing of each member.
The second factor which determines the reliability of a member is its
strength or ability to withstand stress A part will fail only if the
applied stress or stresses exceed its strength. The probability that
this occurs is defined as the unreliability of the part.
Let X be the strength of the part and Y be the maximum stress
placed on the part during the mission where X and Y are independent
random variables Then reliability is defined as
R = P(X>Y).
Assuming that the probability densities of X and Y are reasonably
approximated by independent normal distributions; i.e. , X is normal
with mean _X and standard deviation _X' Y is normal with mean My
and standard deviation _y, we may let
D = X- Y
and write P, = P(X > Y) =P (D > 0) By the addition theorem for normal
variables, D has a normal distribution with
MeanofD = FD = _X - My
Standard Deviation of D -= _D = /_2 + _.
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Note that distributional assumptions of normality which may not be
precisely satisfied for X and Y will tend to be more satisfied for D
since by the central limit theorem, the difference of two variables will
be more normal than either of the two.
Thus,
= P(D > 0) = f_ exp- - _ dDR
o"D JZ_r -Z\ _D /"o
Letting
D- _D
t =
_D
dD
dt =
_D
_D
I t g _D 1 t z
R = _f _f2w exp --_- dt = --f exp- -_- dt
-_D -co
CD
by symmetry of the integrand.
R:o )o =o,z,(,,
where _ is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized
normal variable.
This procedure can be used as the basis for estimating the
reliability of structural members. In stress analysis, it is customary
to design in terms of a safety factor, S. F. , margin of safety, M. S. ,
and the stresses or loads. Enese are related by the equation
Allowable Stress
S.F. (M.S. + 1) =
Limit LGad
158
%
1966011762-169
The allowables are determined based upon material properties found
in military handbooks. Either 99% or 95% guaranteed values are used.
Similarly, the limit load is usually taken as some value above the
expected maximum stress.
Thus employing normal distribution notations:
_X " no-x
S F.(M. S. + 1) =
_Sy + m_y
For the Voyager a safety factor of I. Z5 is specified. A margin of
safety as close to zero on the positive side as possible is desired
Substituting these values in the above, one has
MX - n°-x
= 1. g5,
My +m_y
or
l-n (2)
The quantity v = 0-/g is called the coefficient of variation and measures
the spread of the distribution relative to the mean. If the four quantities,
n, m, UX, Yy were known, they would be substituted and the ratio between
the means determined from Equation (9).
gx
Rewriting the quantity Z = , one obtains
_/°'Z +°-_X
159
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Z = _ -I
_( CX 2 2 2
_X
- 1
_yZ =
_2 _(__y ) 2 ZX + Vy
Thus reliability can be determined as on equation (1)
R =¢(Z)
if n, m, Vx, and Vy are known.
4.6. I. I Estimation of n, m, VX: and Vy on Voyai[er Design
The allowable and limit stresses are not known with complete
precision in any given situation. Materials vary from batch to batch,
loads vary from vehicle to vehicle. Thus the quantities, a11owable
and limit stresses, can be considered as variables with probability
distributions, again approximable by the normal. The needed
quantities are estimated in the following paragraphs.
4.6. i. i. i Estimation of n
For the Voyager, 99% guaranteed values were used in deter-
mining allowables.
Thus
_X" nCx = allowable stress
is such that 99% of samples chosen will withstand the tabulated value
of stress without breaking, cracking, or otherwise failing catastro-.
phically in any way. As may be determined from a normal table, the
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number of standard deviations below the mean corresponding to
1 - 0. 99 = 0.01 is Z 33. Thus n is estimated as 2. 33.
4.6. 1. i. 2 Estimation of V.X
Two tabulated values are given in the Handbook of Material
Properties*, one 95070 guaranteed, the other 99%. For the type of
aluminum sheet which makes up the large majority of Voyager
70 - _X = (-z 33)(4.41)-)
= - I0. Z78
= 80. Z78 ksi
_X
,30 that
_X 4.412
- v - - 0.055
MX X 80.278
4.6.1. 1.3 Estimation oi M
The corresponding estimation of m and Vy is somewhat more
subjective. Hence, conservative, best, and optimistic estimates for
each are obtained and combined to arrive at an eventual range of
values for the Voyager structure reliability. The range of values
reflects the uncertainty associated with the load properties.
In the case of estimating m, it is difficult to assess the degree
of conservatism exhibited in determination of the loads since these
items were specified by JPL. An estimate is that actual loads would
be less than those specified with a probability of 90%. A range of
* MIL-HNBK-5, August 1962, Revised November I, 1963; pp 3. Z. 70C
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80% to 95% was assumed with 90% taken as a best estimate. In terms
of m, these percentages correspond to
80%: m = 0.84 Conservative
90%: m = 1.28Z Best Estimate
95%: m = 1. 645 Optimistic
4.6.1.1.4 Estimation ofl/y
In order to obtain some feeling regarding possible load variability,
the following question was asked of several Structures people (both TRW and
Douglas), "Assuming that actual load data is available from previous pay
loads which are similar enough to be meaningful to the Voyager structure,
what do you estimate as the probability that actual limit loads will fall
within ± 25% of conscientiously obtained best estimates of l_mit loads?"
Note that the question was phrased not in terms of possible conservatism of
JPL specified loads, but predicated upon the assumption that these loads
were best estimates. Thus, answers reflect estimates of the uncertainty
associated with load prediction with possible JPL conservatism being
accounted for in the estimation of mo
Answers to this question ranged over a considerable spread although
most felt that the past actual load information would greatly improve the
accuracy of present load estimates. A conservative answer to the question
is felt to be 8_%, a best 9(_, and an optimistic 95/J. The computation of
Vy from these values is done as follows:
Assuming an 80% probability that the actual loads will be within
_+ Z5% of the predicted implies that 80% of the probability distribution
will lie between _y + . 25_y and ,ay - . 25_y. This implies, from the
normal table, that
1.25_y = _y + 1.282_y
0.25_y = 1.282_y
O. 25 _Y
O. 195 - 1.282 - _Y - Vy conservative
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structural items, these two values are 73 ksi and 70 ksi, respectively
Thus
p(x< 70) = .Ol
l:'(X<73) = .05
or
.X - _X 70 - _X_P _X < _X ] 01
X - _X 73 - _X\P CX < _ X ) = .05
Again, consulting a normal table shows that the . 01 and . 05 lower
values are -Z. 33 and - 1. 65. Thus
'70 - _X
•- -_.33
o-
X
73 - _X
- -1.65
IT
X
Solving these equations for _X and _X:
70 - _X = -Z 33¢ x
73 - _X = - I.65_ x
-3 = - . 68o" X
4. 41Z ksi = _X
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or
0. 75_ = _y - l.Z8ZCy
1.282_y = 0.25py
Conservative
_Y 0. Z5
• .. _ --
Uy _Y 1.282 - 0. 195
Similarly, the best estimate of Vy is given by
Best Vy = 0. 25/I. 645 = 0. 15Z
And the optimistic by
Optimistic Vy = 0. Z5/1.96 = 0. IZ8
4.6. 1. Z Computation of Reliability of One Structural Member
Since all structural members follow the same general design
guidelines, it is a good first approximation to assume that all have
equal reliability On the basis of values for n, m, v x, Vy, the
reliability is then obtained from
R =¢(Z)
by consulting a normal table The values obtained by this process
are summarized in Table 1 for various sets of values of n, m,
vx, Vy. As may be seen from the values of R in Table 82, a range
of from 0. 93041 to 0. _5796 has been obtained depending upon the
degree of conservatism assumed for m and vy"
4.6. I. Z. I Estimation of (YR
In an effort to describe the variation of estimates of 1% statistic-
ally, assuming that the estimates have a normal distribution would
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Table 1.
m n #X _Y
1 O. 84 2. 33 O. 055 O. 195
Z O. 84 Z. 33 O. 055 O. 152
3 1. 282 2.33 0. 055 0. 195
4 1. 282 2.33 0. 055 0. 152 Best
_l-Estl-5 1. 282 Z. 33 0. 055 0. 128
mate
6 I. 645 Z. 33 0. 055 0. 152
7 1. 645 Z. 33 0. 055 0. 128
Input
Set _X/_y Z R
p,
1 1.6686 3. 1026 0 93041 6. 94866
2 1.6168 3. 5026 0 93770 8. 37718
J 3 1 7921 3.6253 0.93856 8.84541
4 I.7131 3.9882 0 94667 I0.30992 Best
+Esti-
5 I.6690 4.2473 0.94892 II.43595
mate
6 1 7922 4.3729 0.95387 12.00232
7 I.7356 4.6070 0.95796 13. 10256
be unrealistic since R can vary only between 0 and 1. However, the
transforme J variable,
£ = In
I - R
has a range from - coto +_as R ranges from 0 to I. Corresponding
values of _ are given in the finalcolumn of Table I. These values
are plotted in Figure 1.
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x I I x x 1 I K I x < Ix '
7 8 9 I0 II 2 13
Figure I. _ Values
Since the range of values for m and Vy may be thought of as roughly
about a • Z_ to • 3_ range, one would expect values of R derived
from combining one conservative value with one best value to lie
roughly at - g_ to - 3_ in the R or _ distributions. Similarly, one
optimistic estimate combined with a best estimate would place the
resulting _ value at about + g_ to + 3_ in the _ distribution. Combining
two conservative estimates yields a result at about -5(_and two optimistic
estimates yield a result at about +5c;. Assuming the mean _to lie near
the result obtained by combining two best estimates, one may obtain a set
of _, estimates from the values of _ obtained. Thus,
,_ = (I0.30992 - 6. 94866)/5 = 0.67Z
= (I0.3099Z - 8. 37718)/3 = 0.644
_z
= {I0.30992 - 8.84541)/Z = 0.73Z
_3
= (II.43595 - I0. 3099Z)/Z = 0.563
_5
= (IZ. 00Z3Z - I0. 309Zg)/3 : 0.564
_6
= (13. 10256 - 10. 30992)/5 = 0.559
_7
These estimates are fairly homogenous. Averaging them obtains an
estimate for s_ of
_ = 0.6gZ
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Thus the _ distribution is assumed normal with
= I0. 3099Z
_ = 0. 622
,:. 6.2 Estimation of R S and_____fiRs
NIaking the conservative assumption that Voyager mission
failure will result if any structural member fails, the structure system
reliability may be computed as
K S = Rk
where k is the number of independent structural members. At this
preliminary stage of the design only a rough estimate of k could be
obtained, a value of k = 80. Thus, using the best estimate for K of
• 94667,
^ 94667)80
R S -= _R S = (. = .997339
In order to estimate _Rs, one may expand K S in a series
R S R 80 _dRs_= = ( _-_)
Z
neglecting higher order terms. Now _Rs may be found as
_Rs s Rs \_-_-/___
or
:
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By definition,
= In(y_R)
Solving for R,
e _ _ R
l-R
(I-F,)e_ = R
e _ - Re _ = R
e_ = R(I + e_)
£
R = e _ 1 - (l+ e'£)"l
1 + e£ 1 + e'_
Thus,
Rs = R8° = (I + e-f)-e°
dR S = +80(I+ e'£)-81 e
d£
-£
d__ _ 80 e
- = 80_ (l - R)
d£ (1 + e-£) 80 (1 - e -£) R S
Substituting _ = F_ = 10.3099g,
_d--_] _=_= o.ooz6.w
Putting this value along with _ = O. 6ZZ, one obtains,
_BS = (0.00Z657) (0.6ZZ)
= 0. 001653
R S
I
Thus, the system reliability estimate is found to have a mean
_Rs = 0. 997339 and a standard deviation _R S = 0. 001653.
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4. 6.3 Deviation of Range of Values for R
S
For the same reasons discussed in Section 4.6. 1. Z. 1, a normality
assumption on R S would not be realistic. Once again define
= (3)
_S in 1 - R S
and expand this expression:
Again the standard deviation of _S may be found as
= Z / d _S\
_Rs (41
Now,
df S _ 1 - R S 1 - RS + RS 1
dRs RS (1 - R.S) 2 RS(I - RS)
Substituting R S = 0-R.S 0.99?339
d_s_ 1 1 : 3?6.8
d-_S/Rs=_R S = (0. 997339)(0. 002661) = 0.0026539
Putting these values in (4) along with CrRs = 0. 001653.
o- = (376.80) (0. 001653)
fs
= O. 62285
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Substituting _R S = O. 997539 in (3) one obtains as
O. 99?339
_S = In(_. 002661 ) = Ir_3,'4.798)
= 5. 92639
Since normality may be assumed for _S' _ ± 3_ confidence interval
may be formed as
_S lower limit = p_ - 3o'_
, S S
= + 3_S, upper limit _ '_S S
= 5. 92639 - 3(0.6ZZ85)
fS, lower limit
= 5. 92639 - 1.86855
= 4. 05784
_S, upper limit = 5. 92639 + 1.86855
= 7. 79494
Now the transformation from Z S to 1_S is one-to-one and preserves
probability, i.e.
P(_S -< _So ) = _h(_s) -< h(_So) )
where
= {l + "I
Consequently, a • 3_ confidence interval for R S may be obtained by
using the values of R S which correspond to _S, lower limit and
and _S, upper limit"
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These are found to be
= (I + e'4"05784) -I = (I + 0.017Z86) -IRS, lower limit
= O. 983008
7. 79494)-1= (I + e- = (I + 0.0004118) -I
KS, upper limit
- 0. 999588
4.7 Solar Panel Depioyment
A reliability analysis has been conducted on four configurations
under consideration, for use as the method of deploying the ten solar
panels of the Voyager Spacecraft to determine a reliability prediction
for each of the configurations such that trade-offs could be made with
other parameters and a system selected.
The configurations considered in the analysis are shown on the
attached Douglas Drawings {SK-BM00-9001 through SK-BM00-9004).
Table 1 presents a summary of the preliminary reliability predic-
tions for each of the systems considered. Predictions are given for
the use of a single squib as wei1 as redundant squibs.
The table shows that the pin puller and swivei catch system has
the highest prediction. The reiiabi!ity predictions of all systems
become limited by the damper/actuator.
4.7. 1 Pin Puller and Spring Hinge System
ISK-BM00-900I)
This configuration consists of a pin puller which holds the
panel in the stowed position and releases it on command, two springs
to deploy and lock the panel in place and a hydraulic damper to prevent
structural failure of the panel during deployment. The total solar
array system consists of 10 panels, each with identical deployment
hardware, and all I0 panels are required for successful operation.
Table 2 presents the preliminary reliability predictions for
the total solar panel deployment (I0 panels). It is noted from the
table that the reliability is improved by the use of redundant squibs,
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Table i. Preliminary Reliability Prediction
for Solar Pastel Deployment Systems --
(Total of I0 Panels)
Reliability
C onfigur ation Pr ediction
I. Pin Pul]er and Spring Hinge System
SK-BM00-9001
a. Single Squib 0. 99291
b. Redundant Squibs 0. 997z4
Z. Spring Actuator and Pin Puller System
SK- B M00 - 9002
a. Single Squib 0. 99514
b. Redundant Squibs 0. 99747
3. Cable Cutter System
SK-BM00-9003
a. Single Cable Cutter 0. 99757
b. Redundant Cable Cutters 0. 99804
4. Pin Puller and Swivel Catch System
SK-BM00-9004
a. Single Squib 0. 99804
b. Redundant Squibs 0. 99806
but does not reach the 0.999 level. This is due to the fact that next
to the squibs, the damper is the most unreliable portion of the
system; therefore, it becomes the limiting factor for re]lability
improvement when the squibs are improved.
The primary failure mode of the damper is loss of fluid ISee
Tables 2 and 3 ), which could allow the panel to fail structurally if
this loss is great. Since the amount of fluid loss acceptable has not
been determined, the reliability prediction assumes any loss to be a
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failure; therefore, the prediction for the damper is no doubt conserva-
tive. Since all configurations use a damper, the figures are valid for
comparison.
Table 2. Preliminary Reliability Prediction
for the Pin Puller and Spring Hinge System
(I0 Panels) (SK-BM00-9001)
C onfigur ation Reliability Pr ediction
I. Single Squib 0. 997.91
g. Redundant Squibs 0. 99724
4.7. g Spring Actuator and Pln Puller System (SK-BM00-9002)
This configuration consists of a pin puller, as in Section 4.7. I,
but the extension spring, damper and locking device are all
contained in the single spring actuator. The comments in Section
4. 7. I are applicable here. Table 3 presents the preliminary
reliability predictions for this configuration. Predictions are given
for the pin pullers using both a single squib and redundant squibs.
Table 3 . Preliminary Reliability Prediction for the
Spring Actuator and Pin Puller System
(I0 Panels) (SK-BM00-9002)
Configuration Reliability Prediction
I. Single Squib 0. 99314
Z. Redundant Squibs 0. 99747
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4.7. 3 Cable Cutter System (SK-BM00-9003)
The cable (cord) cutter system consists of the linear actuator,
as in Section 4.7.2; however, the panels are held in the stowed position
by a latch which, in turn, is held by a double wrap of cord. A cord
cutter is used to cut the cord which releases the latch and allows the
actuators to extend the panels.
The preliminary reliability predictions for the system are
shown in Table 4 for both a single cord cutter and redundant cord
cutters. (In order for the panels to release, only one cord must be
cut since it is a double wrap). The table shows a higher reliability
than the configurations discussed previously since a cord cutter is
not required at each _ " the 10 panels. The effect of the actuator is
shown in the redundant cable cutter prediction if compared to the
previous sections. The prediction for the actuator is 0. 99807 as
opposed to the system prediction of 0. 99804.
Table 4. Preliminary Reliability Prediction
for the Cable Cutter System
(10 Panels) (SK-BM00-9003)
Configuration Reliability Prediction
1. Single Cable Cutter 0. 99757
2. Redundant Cable Cutters 0. 99804
4.7.4 Pin Puller and Swivel Catch (SK-BM00-9004)
This configuration, although similar to that presented in Section
4.7. Z, allows, through the swivel catch, failures of a portion of the
pin pullers and the deployment will be successful. The firing of
one pin puller will release the two attach points on that panel and one
attach point on each adjacent panel; therefore, every other pin
puller could fail and the deployment would be successful.
178
1966011762-197
Table 5 presents the reliability predictions for the solar panel
system for two configurations, one using a single squib per pin
puller and the other using redundant squibs. The table shows that
this system has the highest reliability prediction of all four considered;
however, it is not significantly higher than the system presented in
Section 4.7.3.
Table 5. Preliminary Reliability Prediction
of the Pin Puller and Swivel Catch System
(I0 Panels) (SK-BM00-9004)
Configuration Reliability Prediction
1. Single Squib O. 99804
Z. Redundant Squibs O. 99806
4. 7. 5 Reliability Analysis
Tables 6 through 12 present the reliability analysis necessary
to determine the reliability predictions presented in the previous
sections. The tables contain a failure mode and effect analysis and
the failure rate and source used for the major parts components
used in each configuration considered. By reducing each component
to its major failure modes and determining the failure rate of those
parts contributing to these modes (See Tables 9A and 9B), a more
realistic prediction is obtained than if the failure rate of the com-
ponent were used (e. g. damper/actuator).
In the configurations presented in SK-BM00-9003 and 9004,
several items such as cord, latch, swivel, etc. , are used; however,
no analysis sheets are presented. This is because each item by
itself has a failure rate less than 1 x 10-6; however, they were
considered in the calculations because of the number of items (cord,
latch, etc. ,) and the fact that there are 10 panels in the system.
Several of these items would lend themselves to a reliability
,nalysis based upon a stress analysis.
179
1966011762-198
Table 6A
Item: Squib
System/Subsystem: Solar Panel Deployment
Item Type/Description:
Explosive bridgewire with powder charge. (Redundantbridgewires)
Ope rational Note s:
One shot device.
Environmental Note s:
Failure is most likely to result from vibration durin_ the boost
phase.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to fire with proper force, when proper electrical input
is present.
Possible Causes:
I. Poor workmanship (bridgewire coating).
Z. Bad lot of charges.
3. Broken bridgewires.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic --Failure to deploy.
Backup Provisions:
Redundant squibs.
Inherent Preventives:
Lot qualification of squibs.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Premature firing.
Possible Causes:
I. Stray R.F. signals.
2. Boost environment.
3. Bad lot of charges.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - earl}, deployment.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inherent Preventives:
Bruceton tests, shielding from R.F. signals.
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Table 6B
Mission
Failure Clas sification A
Time / Cyc le s
Units: Cycles x l0 "6 1
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: per l0 -6 Firings 294
Environment Application Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: per 10 -6 Firings 294
Failare Rate Source Code a
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 Z94
Failure Classification A
Time /Cycle s
Units: Cycles x I0 -6 1
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: Per 10 -6 Firlngs 6_:c
,-4
Environment/A/_/lication Factor
> Actual Failure Rate,
Units: Per 10-6 Firings 6o
c
o Failure Rate Source Code a
O
¢ Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 6
m
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 300
Reliability 0.9(3)700
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) TRW experience - Z000 firings with no
failures. Prob. of failure 3 x 10 -4 at 50_/0C.L. Teleeon with Farada
indicated 47,33Z firings with 10 failures. Prob. of failure Z. II x !0 -4
(good agreement).
Notes:
A catastrophic
'_ Experience from Bruceton type testing indicates premature
failure mode is approx. 1/50 of total failure rate probability.
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Table 7A
Item: Pin Puller
System/Subsystem: Solar Panel Deployment
Item Type/Description:
Captive with dual cartridge capability.
Operational Notes:
Gas retaining, no fragmentation.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to release pin when proper force is present.
Possible Causes:
I. Failure of pin to move (jammed).
Z. Broken pin.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - deployment would not occur.
Backup Provisions :
None.
Inherent Preventives:
Lot qualification of pin pullers.
, I
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Table 7B
Miss ion
Failure Classification A
Time /Cycle s
Units: x 10 .6 Cycles 1
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: Per 106 Firings 48
Environment/Application Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: Per 106 Firings 48
Failure Rate Source Code b
Probability of
Failure, x 10-6 48
Reliability 0.9(4)5Z
Failure Rate Data Sources: b) Farada, revised 3/1/65, Pg. 2.Z79,
Source 138, Explosive bolt used - estimate for locking etc - I0_0 of
failure rate.
Note s:
A ibid.
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Table 8A
Item: Cable Assy (Squib Firing Circuit)
Item Type/Description:
A Z pin connector, Z solder joints and two wires were
considered for each cable assy.
Environmental Note s:
Failure could occur as a result of vibration during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to provide electrical signal to squib.
Possible Causes:
1. Poor pin contact.
Z. Broken wire or connection.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - no deployment.
Backup Provisions:
Redundant squibs; therefore cable assemblies are considered
redundant.
Inherent Preventive s:
Circuit continuitycheck.
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Table 8B
Mi ssion
Failure Clas sification A
Time /Cycle s
Units: Hrs. 0.3_
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. 0.438"
Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. 438
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 145
Reliability 0.9(3)855
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) Farada, Revised 3/i/65, Source 138.
Notes:
A ibid.
;:-"Total failure rate determined as follows:
I. Connector - 0.Z/Pin x Z = 0.400
Z. Wire - 0.015 x Z = 0.030
3. Solder Joint - 0.004 x Z = 0.008
0.438
Booster duration.
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Table 9A
Item: Hydraulic Damper
System/Subsystem: Solar Panel Deployment
Ope rational Note s:
Used in SK-BM00-9001.
Environmental Note s :
Failure could occur during boost environment.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage of fluid past seals.
Possible Causes:
1. Boost environment,
2. Poor workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
None to catastrophic depending on amount of leakage (structural
failure of panel).
Backup Provisions :
None --all i0 panels required.
Inherent Preventives:
None.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Failure to extend antenna.
Possible Causes:
I. Clogged or wrong sized orifice.
Z. Jamming of piston.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
System degraded.
Backup Provisions:
None- all lO panels required.
Inherent Preventives:
None.
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Table 9B
Mission
Failure C1as sification A
Time/CyclesUnits: Hrs. 0.3
Basic Failur_ Rate,
._ Units: x I0-u Hrs. 0.35":,
Environment/Application Factor 1009
>.
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 Hrs. 350
.2
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 105
Failure Classification A
_o Time/Cycle
Units: Hrs. 0.3
Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 Hrs. 0.15::';:"
Environment/Application Factor I000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 Hrs. 150
oc Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of
Failure x 10 -6 45
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 150
Reliability 0.9 (3)850
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) ibid.
Note s:
_:'Failure rate of parts as follows:
Pg. Z. 316 - "O" Ring - 0.05
PE. Z.369 - Seal (Sliding) - 0.30
_._ Pg. Z.348 - Orifice - 0.15.
A ibid.
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Table l0A
Item: Spring.
System/Subsystem: Solar Panel Deployment.
Ope rational Note s :
Used on SK-BM00-9001.
Environmental Note s:
Failure would probably occur during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Break - fail to act as a spring (vacuum welding).
Possible Causes:
i. Boost environment.
2. Poor workn%anship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - Panel would not deploy.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inherent Preven:ives:
None.
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Table I0B
Mission
Failure Clas sification A
Time /Cycle s
Units: i{rs. x 10 -6 0.3
Basic Failur_ Rate,
Units: x I0 "° Hrs. 0. Ii
Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 Hrs. 110
Failure Rate Source Code c
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 33
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 35
Re liability 9 (4)67
Failure Rate Data Sources: c) ibid - Pg. Z.374.
Notes:
A ibid.
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Table 11A
Item: Linear Spring Actuator.
System/Subsystem; Solar Panel Deployment.
Item Type/De sc ription:
Used on SK-BM00-900Z through SK-BM00-9004.
Environmental Note s :
Failure could occur during boost.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage past the seals,
Possible Causes:
1. Boost environment.
Z. Poor workmanship.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
None to catastrophic depending on amount of leakage (structural
failure of panel).
Backup Provisions :
None.
Inherent Preventive s:
None.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Failure to deploy panel.
Possible Causes:
Spring breakage or vacuum welding,
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Backup Provisions:
None,
Inherent Preventives:
None.
Other Failure Modes :
Failure to lock in place.
• Possible Causes:
Broken lockring.
,_ffects on Subsystem/Mission:
Degraded performance to catastrophic.
Backup Provisions: None.
Inherent I-'reventives: None.
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TaBle 1 1B
Mission
o Failure Clas sification A
Probability of
Failu:e, x 10-6 150"
>,
_ Failure C: q sification A
_._ Probability of
i0-6 33._Failure, x
u_ Failure Clas sification A
Time/CyclesQ_ Units: Hrs. 0.3
o Basic Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 "6 0.033
_ Environment/Application Factor 1000
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 "6 33
Failure Rate Source Code d
Probabilit 7 of.
Failure x 10"6 I0
Probability of Failure,
A11 Modes 193
Reliability 9(3)807
Failure Rate Data Sources: d} Estimates based on other components,
Note s:
A ibid
* See Table 9B
** See Table 10B.
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Table 1ZA
i ill
Item: Code Cutter
System/Subsystem: Solar Panel Deployment
Item Type/Desc ription:
Used on SK-BM000-9003.
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to completely cut cord.
Possible Causes:
1. Jammed piston
2. Dull cutter.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic - failure to deploy.
Backup provisions:
Redundant cutte rs.
Inherent Preventives:
Lot qualification of cord cutters.
i
Table 12B
Mission
Failure Clas sification A
Time / Cycle s
Units: Cycles 1
Basic Failur_ Rate,
Units: x I0 "u cycles 40
Environment/Application Factor
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10 -6 cycles 40
Failure Rate Source Code e
Probability of .
Failure, x 10 -6 40
Reliability 9(4)60
Failure Rate Data Source: e) Farada, Revised 311/65, Pg. Z.Z79,
Source 138, Based on explosive bolt.
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4.7.6 Mathematical Models
The reliability of each one shot device is simply the complement
of its failure rate (k), where this failure rate is essentially the
probability of failure (Q)
R = l -k = I -Q
If two devices are used redundar_tly, both must fail in order to fail the
system and the reliability is determined frcrn
2
R = l-Q
In the case of the pin puller and swivel catch system (SK-BM00-
9004) where only every other pin puller was required to function, the
following was used to determine the reliability
R = (P + Q)n
P = Probability of success
Q = Probability of failure
n = Number of items (10)
Since all combinations of failure would not result in success of
the system, the failures had to be ordered such that success did occur:
l0
R = p + 10p90 + 35p8Q 2 + 50p7Q 3 + 25p6Q 4 + 2p5Q 5
The reliability of time dependent components was determined from
the following
-KXt
R - e
K = Environmental/application factor (1000)
X = Failure rate
t = Time (0.3 hr)
The boost operating time was used because the operation during
deployment is short (seconds) and in many cases the boost environment
was considered to be the major contributor to failure. In the case
where K.k.t is small (<0.01) the first equation is applicable.
Total system reliability was determined from the product rule.
N
= _ R
RT i=l i
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4.8 Monopropeliant Engine (With Solid-Propellant Retro)
The reliability analysis has been performed for each of five distinct
mission phases as follows:
Mission Phase I. For the period from liftoffthrough boost and
the spacecraft injection (0.3 hour).
Mission Phase Z. For the period after injection through transit
and capsule separation. This phase was
further reduced into:
A. Midcourse maneuver (4 cycles or 0. 056
hour)
B, Cruise (4,280 hours)
Mission Phase 3. For the period after capsule separation and
including accomplishment of successful
retropropulsion for the spacecraft. The
analysis shows:
A. Retropropulsion (0.0ZZ hour)
B. Cruise (50 hours)
Mission Phase 4. For the period after successful spacecraft
orbit attainment and extending for one month
in orbit (720 hours)
Mission Phase 5. For an additional 5 months in orbit (3,600
hours).
The analysis was performed for the five mission phases and
includes both the baseline and augmented configuration. All powered
flight portions of the mission (launch, midcourse and retro) have an
environmental "k" factor of I000 associated with them. In addition all
four midcourse maneuvers were considered during Phase Z although at
least one of the four maneuvers may be an orbit adjust. This has no effect
on the mission reliability assessment, but does tend to lower slightly the
Phase 2 reliability while raising Phase 4.
Criticality factors are shown in the failure classification box of the
attached reliability analysis forms. These are estimates of the
probability of mission failure given that a failure mode occurs. This
accounts for small leaks and other failures which may not be catastrophic
to the mission.
t94
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The results are:
Engine System Reliability
Phase Total
1 2 3 4 5 Miss ion
Baseline 0.999173 0.995471 0.974234 0.999964 0.99982 0.968811
Augmented 0.999173 0.997954 0.974234 0.999964 0.999817 0.97122
The above values are for the liquid engine, solid motor and their
associated thrust vector controls as shown in Figures i and 2. When
combined with the pressurization and propellant feed system the following
propulsion reliabilities are obtained. These numbers are for the selected
propulsion configuration.
Propulsion System Reliability
Pha s e T otal
1 2 3 4 5 Miss ion
0.998314 0.99519 0.974214 0.999684 0.998912 0.966446
The failure rates used in the analysis are shown in the detailed
reliability analysis sheets attached and were primarily based on the
FARADA handbook, 1 April 1965 issue, as well as combined TRW data
from various programs.
The probability of failure per failure mode for each component for
every l%{issionphase is shown in Table i. This table is for one
component only with the math model taking into account the number of
components per system.
4.8.1 Phase 1
This represents the most severe environment from a vibration
standpoint and thus has a "K factor" of 1000 applied in the analysis. The
engine is nonoperative at this time and only the connection upstream from
the valves and the jet vane assembly is subject to failure.
Thus,
R I = (I - El) (I - FI) = (I - 15 x 10"6)(i - 812.4 x 10 -6 )
= (0.999985)(9991876) = 999173
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Table i. Reliability (Baseline A)
Failure Mode Probability Summary
Monopropellant Engine (A)
-6
Prob of Failure (Phase) x I0
Component Failure Mode 1 Z 3 4 5
A Explosive Valve a. Failure to Fire N.A. 294 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(N. C. ) b. Premature N.A. 6 N.A. N.A. N.A.
B Explosive Valve a. Failure to Fire N.A. 294 N.A. N.A. N.A.
(N. O. ) b. Premature N.A. 6 N.A. N.A. N.A.
c. Leak after N.A. Z9.4 N.A. N.A. N.A.
closing
C Fuel Injector Plugging N.A. Z56 N.A. N.A. N.A.
D Combustion Weld Failure N.A. 371.5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Chamber and
Nozzle
E Fittings and Leakage 15 Z14.56 3.6 36 180
Connect
F JetVane Assy Incorrect Position 81Z. 41178.6 71.6 N.A. N.A.
or Inoperative
G Ignitor Failure to Ignite N.A. N.A. Z237 N.A. N.A.
H Solid Propellant a. Burnthrough N.A. N.A. 6400 N.A. N.A.
Motor
b. Overpressure N.A. N.A. 6700 N.A. N.A.
c. Structural N.A. N.A. 5500 N.A. N.A.
I Thrust Vector Incorrect or N.A. N.A. 5000 N.A. N.A.
Control (Liquid Inoperative
Inj e ction)
where
R 1 = Engine system reliability for Phase 1.
E l = Component E (Table 1) probability of failure for
Phase 1.
The above applies for the remainder of the math model where a
capital letter refers to a specific component in Table 1, a numeral
subscript to the applicable phase, and a small letter subscript to the
failure mode as shown in Table 1, i.e., B2b means explosive
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valve (N. O. ) Phase 2 probability of premature. H 3 means solid
propellant motor, Phase 3, all failure modes combined.
4.8.2 Phase 2
This phase includes the necessary rnidcourse maneuver and the long
cruise. The monopropellant engine operates here and thus all its failure
modes are applicable. All four branches of the explosive valves {Figure
1) have to operate.
Thus
r_2 = (1 - 4A2) (1 - 4B 2) (1 - C 2) (1 - D2) (1 - E2) (1 - FZ)
(1 - 371.5 x lO "6) (1 - 214.56 x lO "6) (1 - 1178 x lO -6)
R2 - (0. 9988) (0.998682) (0. 999744) (0.999629) (0. 999785)
(0. 998822)
= 0. 995471
4.8.3 Phase 3
This phase concerns the retropropulsion sequence and as such is
primarily concerned with the solid propellant motor. We are, however,
including connection leakage here in the event that orbit adjust is neces-
sary. The orbit adjust sequence is assumed to be at least one of the four
monopropeUant firings which are included, somewhat out of sequence, in
Phase 2. This does not affect our assessed reliability for the mission but
does lower our Phase Z value while raisil_.g our Phase 4 assessment.
Thus
R 3 = (l - E 3) (I - F3 ) (I - O 3) (i - H 3) (1 - 13)
= (I - 3.6 x l0-6) (I - 71.6 x I0"6) (I - 2237 x I0"6)
(l - 18.600 x 10'6) (1 - 5000 x 10 "6)
= (0. 9999964) (0.9999284) (0. 997763) (0.9814) (0.995)
= O. 974234
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4.8.4 Phase 4
This phase concerns the spacecraft one-month Mars orbit and is
subject to orbit adjust as discussed during Phase 3.
Thus
R 4 = (1 - E4) = (1 - 36 x 10 -6) = 0.999964
4.8.5 Phase 5
This phase concerns the additional 5 months in orbit. Since all
functions have been performed, the only concern here is that of propellant
leakage which could contaminate the spacecraft or cause other hazards.
Thus
R 5 = (t- E 5) = (1- 180 x 10 -6 ) = 0.99982
From the above we obtain the entire mission reliability, as follows:
Rmissio n = (R 1) (R 2) (R 3) (R 4) (R5) = (0.999173) (0.995471)
(0. 974234) (0. 999964) (0. 99982)
= 0. 968811
4.8.6 Selected Configuration
The augmented configuration is identical to the baseline except for
the valves ( Figure 2). The augmented configuration also uses
explosive valves except in a different arrangement which includes an
additional N.C. valve in series with a normally closed solenoid valve.
Thus, the solenoid valve offers an effective multi-operating backup should
any of the other explosive valves fail. In addition the N.C. explosive
valve in series with the solenoid eliminates the solenoid's major failure
mode (leakage) up to the time it is required to operate.
Rvalves = All four sets of explosive valves work + one set
fails, the solenoid valve operates with its N. C.
Explosive valve + two sets fa._.l, the solenoid
operates twice its N.C. Explosive valve operates,
and the solenoid does not leak + three sets fail,
the solenoid operates 3 times, the N.C. Exp. valve
operates and the solenoid does not leak + all four
sets fail, the solenoid operates 4 times. The N. C.
Exp. valve operates and the solenoid does not leak.
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-- (M) 4 + 4(M) 3 (1 - M) (N) (P)Rvalve s
+ 6{M) 2 (1 - M) 2 {N) 2 {P) (Q)
+ 4(M) (1 - M} 3 (N) 3 (P} (Q)
+ {1 - M) 4 (N) 4 {V} {R)
where
M = 1 - A 2 + B 2 (reliability ofN. C. xN.O. explosive
valve for all failure modes}
N = Reliability of one solenoid valve cycle (open and
close}
P = 1 - A 2 (reliability of N.C. explosive valve}
O = The reliability of the solenoid valve for 800 hours
in the leakage mode.
R = The reliability of the solenoid valve for 5000 hours
in the leakage mode.
Rvalves = {0.999371} 4 + 4(0.999371} 3 {0.000629} {0.9999993}
(0. 9997}
+ 6(0. 999371) 2 (0.000629) 2 (0. 9999993) 2 (0. 9997)
(0. 999886)
+ 4(0.999371) (0. 000629) 3 (0.9999993) 3 (0.9997)
(0.999886)
+ (0.000629) 4 (0.9999993) 4 (0.9997) (0. 999285)
= 0.997486 + 0.0025102 + 0.00000237 + 0 + 0
- O. 9999725
The above represents an oversimplification of the Analysis for the
valve configuration in that it does not look at the effects of each failure
mode but instead combines all modes. Since a detailed analysis requires
considerably more time, the above is felt to be a valid approximation for
the purposes of this analysis. It appears, however, that the reliability
• value obtained with the approximation is somewhat higher than the actual.
R_ = (Rvalves) (I - C2)(I - D z) (I - E z) (I - F z)
= (0.9999725) (0.999744) (0.999629) (0.999785) (0.998822)
= 0.997954
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Table 2A
Item: Explosive (Squib) Valve
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to fire.
Possible Causes:
Faulty squib, shorted wiring.
Effects on Subsystem/M/ssion
Catastrophic.
Inherent Preventive s:
Redundant bridgewires, careful checkout.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Premature firing.
Possible Causes:
Stray RF signals, static discharge.
Effects on Subsystem/Mis sion:
Catastrophic.
Inherent Preventives:
Adequate shielding, 100°70 no-fire test both current and
capacitor discharge.
Other Failure Modes:
Leaks after closing.
Possible Causes:
Contamination,
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Negligible to catastrophic.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Adequate filtration in conjunction with thorough cleaning and
careful assembly of system.
Z01
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Table 2B
Nominal 2 h_i s sion
Failure Clas sification 1
Time/Cycles, I
_ Units: Cycle
Basic Failure
Rate, Units: x I0"6 294 294
._ Failure Rate Source a
#=d
Code
Probability of
Failure, x I0 v 294
Failure Classification I
Time /Cycle s
_ Units: Cycle 1
o Basic Failure 6* 6
°o_ Rate, Units: x I0"6
Failure Rate Source a
Code
Time / Cycle s I
Units: Cycle
Basic Failure 29.4 29.4
o Rate, Units: x 10=6
Failure Rate Source bCode
Probability of
Failure x I0"6 29.
Probability of Failure, 0.0'I'_)329 O. 0(3)329
All Modes
Reliability 0.9(3)671 O. 9(3)671
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) TRW Experience - 2000 Squib Firings
with no failure Probability of Failure 3x10 .4 a 50T0 con/telephone call
to Farada office indicated 47,332 firings and I0 failures ( Minn.
Honeywell) for a failure rate of 211 x I0 "4. b) Failure rate for this
mode considered to be an order of magnitude less than primary mode.
Note s:
* Experience from Bruceton testing indicates premature
failure mode is approx 1/50 of total failure probability.
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Table 3A
Item: Solenoid Valve.
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A).
Ite r, Type/Description:
Spring loaded normally closed.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage.
Possible Causes:
Contamination.
F.ffects on Subsystem/Mis sion:
Could be catastrophic.
Backup Provisions:
Normally closed explosive valve in series with solenoid.
This prevents leakage until solenoid is needed.
Inherent Pceventive s:
Adequate filtration in conjunction with thorough cleaning and
careful assembly of system.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Failure to open.
Possible Causes:
Open or short circuit. Mechanical interference.
Effezts on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Backup Provisions:
Only has to operate if one of the explosive valves fails.
Inher ant Preventives:
Adequate testing and checkout.
Other Failure Modes:
Failure to close.
Possible Causes:
Mechanical interference.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Backup Provisions:
Only has to operate if one of the explosive valves fa%Is.
Inherent Preventives:
Same as above.
Z03
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Table 4A
Item: Fuel Injector
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Primary Failure Mode:
Plugging.
Possible Causes:
Contamination, damage due to improper handling.
Effects on Subsystem/Ntis sion
Minor to complete loss of performance.
Inherent Preventive s:
Adequate filtration,stringent cleanliness and handling
procedures.
Z06
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Table 4B
Ncminal Worst Best ZA IViis sion
Failure Classification l_-"
Time/Cycle s
Units: hrs. 0.056 0. 333 0 0.056
Actual Failure
Rate, Units: hrs. 04572 30456 0.0(3)6624 04572
Failure Rate Source
Code a.b.
Probability of
Failure, x 10 -6 Z56 256
Reliability 0. 9{_744 0. 9{3_44
Notes: * Failure Classification of . I used since data is based on a
bipropellant variable thrust injector.
Failure Rate Data Sources: a) STL memo 64-9701, 3-127, "Reliability
Input for September Surveyor Progress Report "8 October 1964.
b) Lem Descent Engine Component Failure Summary, Dated 04-06-65.
Note s:
Surveyor 37,320 sec of firing with no applicable failures
Lemde 17, 160 sec of firing with no applicable failures
54,480
×Z 0.50,0 = I. 386
×2 0.01,0 = 0.0201
xZ 0.99,0 = 9.21
X 2k-
ZT
1 386 sec = 04572 hrkNom = " = 1.27 x 10-5
1.09 x 105 sec
0201 see = 0006624hrkbest = = I.84 x i0-75
1.09 x I0 sec
kworst = 9 21 sec = 30456 hr= 8.46 x 10 -5
1.09 x 105 sec
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Table 5A
Item: Combustion Chamber and Nozzle
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
item Type/Description:
All welded Haynes Z5 alloy.
Primary Failure Mode:
Weld failure.
Possible Causes:
Porosity or microcracks.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Leaks or rupture of combustion chamber. Minor to
catastrophic.
Inherent Preventive s:
Inspection of welds (X-ray), proof test.
Z08
i il,
1966011762-228
Table 5B
Nominal Worst Best ZA
Failure Classification 0. 1_'
Time] Cycles
Units: hrs. 0.056 0.333 0 0.056
Actual Failure
Rate, Units: 0.06608 0.4391 0.00096 0.06608
Failure Rate Source
Code (a) (b)
Probability of
Failure, x I0" 0.0(3)3715
Reliability 0.9(3)6285
Notes: ;:'Failure classification of . 1 used since data is based on
bipropellant ablative liner combustion chamber.
Failure Rate Data Sources: (a) STL Memo 64-9701.3-IZ7 "Reliability
Input for September Surveyor Progress Report " 8 October 1964.
(b) LEM Descent Engine Component Failure Summary, dated 4-6-65.
Note s:
Surveyor Z0,593 sec of firing with no applicable failures
Lemde 17, 160 sec of firing with no applicable failures
37,753
)(Z = I. 386 - I. 386
0.50, 0 kNom 20. 974
0. 06608
×2 0. 0201
= 0.0201 kBest - 20. 974 - 0.000960. 01, 0
X z 9.21
0.90,0 = 9.21 kworst = 20.974 - 0.4391
×Z
k= 2T
Z09
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Table 6A
Item: Fittings and Connections
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Item Type/Description:
;:4Mechanical Connections, not welded or brazed. 1 required.
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage.
Possible Causes:
Contamination and faulty assembly.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Negligible to catastrophic depending on magnitude of leak rate.
Inherent Preventives:
Careful assembly and adequate inspection.
Remarks:
_,,cWelded and brazed fittings are considered to have a negligible
probability of failure.
ZiO
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Table 7
Item: 3et Vane Assembly
Syst_:m/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Item Type/De scription:
This assembly consists of four jet vane actuators. Each of
which drives a deflection vane directly, without gearing.
Operational Notes:
3et vanes used for midcourse correction thrust vector control.
Primary Failure Mode:
Improper vane positioning.
Possible Causes:
Potentiometer wiper contact problem.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Could be catastrophic.
Inherent Preventive s:
Thorough ground testing and checkout.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Stuck vane.
Possible Causes:
Contamination or bearing problem.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
C atastrophic.
Inherent Preventives:
Adequately sealed unit.
212
1966011762-232
213
1966011762-233
Table 7B
Jet Vane Assembly
Quantity Failure Rate Total Failure
Item Per Ass 7 x 10 -9 Rate x 10 -9
I. D.C. Torque Motor 4 200 800
2. Dual Potentiometer 4 92 368
3. Bearing 8 i00 800
4. O-Ring Seal 4 600 x 0.1 _ 240
5. Connector 8 leads 4 80 320
6. Vane on Output Shaft 4 45 180
2,708
Motor, Brushless FAI_ADA Page 2. I02 Source 86 (Autonetics)
Potentiometer FARADA Page 2. III Source 96 (_h/[inn.
Honeywell)
Seals "O-Ring" FARADA Page 2. 368 Source 9 (Minn.
Honeywell)
Vane_ Exhaust Guide FARADA Page 2.419 Source 111 (Boeing)
0. I criticality factor. Since seal failure does not cause, but may
contribute, to mission failure.
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Table 8A
Item: Ignitor (Solid Motor)
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Primary Failure Mode:
Failure to ignite.
Possible Causes:
Open bridgewires, faulty ignition charge.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Table 8B
Nominal Worst Best 3 Mission
Failure Classification 1
Time/Cycles
Units: cycles 1
Actual Failure Rate,
Units: x 10-6 cycles 2237 5176 1328 2237
Failure Rate Source
Code (a)
Probability of
Failure, x 10 "v 2237
Reliability 92 7 76 92 7 76
(a) Minuteman Stages 1 thru 3, Tests. (753 tests with one failure)
Nom 50% conf - 0.002237
Worst 90% con/ = 0.005176
752 0.001328
_est- 753 -
215
1966011762-235
Table 9A
Item: Solid Propellant Motor
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Item Type /De scription:
Spherical motor with subrnerged nozzle. I0,000 ib-thrust.
800,000 Ib-sec impulse.
Primary Failure Mode:
Burnthrough.
Possible Causes:
Insulation bond separation, insulation quality or thickness
deficiency.
Effects on Subsystem/Mis sion:
Catastrophic.
Inherent Preventive s-
Stringent manufacturing controls coupled with adequate quality
control and inspection {X-ray).
Secondary Failure Mode:
Overpressure.
Possible Causes:
Propellant deficiencies and voids, erosive or unstable burning.
Effects on Subsystem/IV[is sion:
Catastrophic.
.:.herent Preventives:
Same as above.
Other Failure Modes:
Structural.
Possible Causes:
Inadequate weld; joint failure, seal failure.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Inherent Preventive s:
Same as above.
\
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Table 9B
_[ Nominal 3 Mission
[
_ _ [ Basic Failure
"c o Rate, Units: 0.0064 0 0064
Failure Rate Source
Code (a)
>,
Basic Failure
Rate, Units: 0.0067 0 0067
o Failure Rate Sourcet_
Code (a)U3
Basic Failure
_ Rate, Units: 0.0055 0.0055
_z_o Failure Rate Source
_ Code (a)
Probability of Failure,
All Modes 0. 0186 0. 0186
Reliability 0. 09814 0. 09814
Failure Rate Data Sources:
(a) AIA.A Paper No. 65-165 "Development of Malfunction
Sensors for Use on Large Solid Rocket Motors" AIAA 6th
Solid Prop. Rocket Conf. Feb I-3, 1965.
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Table 10A
Item: Thrust Vector Control (Solid Motor)
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (A)
Item Type/Description:
Liquid injection
Operational Notes:
Thrust vector control for solid rocket.
Table 1015
Nominal 3 M_ission
ActualFailure
-6
Rate, Units: x 10 5000 5000
Failure Rate Source
Code (a)
Probability of
Failure, x 10-6 5000 5000
Reliability 0.995 0.995
FailureRate Data Sources:
(a)JPL Technical Memorandum No. 33-219, Page 3 (May I0,1965)
Notes:
LiquidInjectionper Wing V1 Minuteman shows 53 trialswith
0 failures
R 50% conf. = 0.98698
2.18
1966011762-238
Phase 5 changes in that we now have to account for solenoid valve
leakage provided one or more of the explosive valves failed.
Thus,
!
=(Rsl M%(sl]
where
S = Prob of failure of the solenoid valve for 3600 hrs
in the leakage mode.
- (0.9998Z) I1 - (0.002514} (286 x 10 -9) (3600)]
= (0.99982) (1 - 0.0000026} - (0.99982} {0. 9999974)
= 0. 999817
!
Rmissio n = (R I)(R2) (R3) (R4) (R_)
= (0.999173) (0.997954) (0.974234) (0.999964)
(0.999817)
= 0.97122
4.9 Bipropellant Engine
The attached analysis was performed for the five mission phases
defined in 4.8 and includes both the baseline and reference configuration.
All powered flight portions of the mission (launch, midcourse and retro)
have an environmental "k" factor of 1000 associated with them. In
addition, all four midcourse maneuvers were considered during phase Z
although it is felt that at least one of the four maneuvers probably will be
an orbit adjust. This has no effect on the mission reliability assessment
but does tend to lower slightly the phase Z reliability while raising phase 4.
Criticality factors are shown in the failure classification box of the
attached reliability analysis forms. These are estimates of the probabil-
ity of mission failure given that a failure mode occurs. This accounts
for small leaks and other failures which may not be catastrophic to the
mission.
The results are:
ZI9
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ENGINE SYSTEM RELIABILITY
PHASE
1 2 3 4 5 M/SSION
BASELINE 0.998762 0.991649 0.980118 0.999722 0.99861 0.969110
REFERENCE 0.998847 0.992892 0. 980131 0.999928 0.99964 0.971621
The above values are for the engine, and its translation control as
shown in Figures 1 and 2. When combined with the pressurization and
propellant feed system the following propulsion reliabilities are obtained:
PROPULSION SYSTEM RELIABILITY
PHASE
1 2 3 4 5 MISSION
BASELINE 0.996055 0.983025 0.979186 0.999046 0.996727 0.955494
REFERENCE 0.996120 0.985296 0,979684 0.999286 0.997841 0.958754
;:_Ref: A-830-BM00-59 (DAC-VM-28) 24 June 1965, Page 5 (Bipropellant)
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SOLENOID VALVE
Y
Figure I. Baseline
w
_ENGINE SUPPORT PLATE
REFERENCE
Figure 2. Reference
Translation Control
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The failure rates used in the analysis are shown in the detailed
reliability analysis sheets attached and were primarily based on the
FARADA handbook, 1 April 1965 issue, as well as combined TRW data
from various programs.
The probability of failure per failure mode for each component for
every mission phase is shown in Table 1. This Table is only for one
component with the math model taking into account the number of com-
ponents per system.
Table 1. Failure Mode Probability Summary
Bipropellant Engine {B)
-b
Prob of Failure {Phase) x 10
I
Component Failure Mode 1 2 3 4 5
A Solenoid a. Leakage 4Z. 9 61Z 7. 15 103 515
Valve
b. Failure to Open N.A. Z. 1 4.2 N.A.N.A.
c. Failure to N.A. I.4 Z. 8 N.A.N.A.
Close
B Injector Poor Combustion N.A. 1540 4580 N.A.N.A.
Pattern
C Combus- Material Out- I _. 3710 11070 N.A.N.A.
tion gassing
Chamber
and
Nozzle
D Fittings Leakage 15 214.56 11.35 36 180
and
Connect.
E Transla- Inoperative 561 Z09.44 6Z5.58 N.A.N.A.
tion
Control
I
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Reliability (Baseline B)
4.9. 1 Phase 1
This represents the most severe environment from a vibration
standpoint and thus has a "K factor" of 1000 applied in our analysis. The
engine is nonoperative at this time and the valves, connections and
translation control are subject to their failure modes. The translation
control is dormant at this time but has to survive the launch environ_nent.
During this phase we applied a criticality factor of 0.5 to its operating
failure rate since the mechanism is less likely to fail in this environment
while dormant.
Thus
R I = (I - ;'.A1)(1 - 2D I)(I - 2E1)
= (1 - 85.8 x 10-6) (I - 30 x I0"6) (I-I122 x 10-6)
= (0.9999142) (0.999970) (0.998878)
= 0.998?62
R 1 = Engine system reliability for Phase 1
A 1 = Component A (Table 1)probability of failure for Phase 1.
The above applies for the remainder of the math model where a capital
letter refers to a specific component in Table 1, a number of subscript
to the applicable phase and a small letter subscript to the failure mode
as shown in Table 1 i.e., - A2c means solenoid valve, Phase 2, failure
to close. A 3 means solenoid valves, Phase 3, all failure modes. A2b, c
means solenoid valve, Phase 2, failure to open and/or close.
4.9.2 Phase 2
This phase includes the necessary rnidcourse manurers and the long
cruise. The solenoid valves have to open and close four times in this
phase.
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R 2 = (1 - 2A2a ) (1 - 8A2b 'c ) (1 .- B2) (1 - C2) (1 - 2D2)
(1 - 21:"z)
= (1 - 1224.08 x 10 "6) (1 - 28 x 10 -6 ) (1 - 2560 x 10 "6)
(I - 3710 x I0 "6) (I - 429. 12 x I0 -6) (I-418.88xi0 "6)
R 2 = (0.998776) (0.999972) (0.99744) (0.99629) (0.999571)
(0.999581)
= O.991649
4.9.3 Phase 3
This phase concerns the retropropulsion sequence and the 50-hour
cruise. Valve leakage i3 included here to allow for any necessary orbit
adjusts.
Thus,
R 3 = (I - 2A3) (I - B3) (I - C3) (I - 2D3) (I - 2E3)
(1 - 14.2 x 10 "6) (1 - 7630 x 10 -6)
(1 - 11070 x 10 "6) (1 - 22.7 x 10 -6 )
(1 - 1249. 16 x 10 "6)
= (0.9999858) (0.99237) (0.98893) (0.9999773)
(0.998751)
= O.980118
4.9.4 Phase 4
This phase concerns the spacecraft one-month Mars orbit. The
problem encountered here is that of leakage at the connections or
solenoid valves. This failure mode could prevent orbit adjust were it
necessary or in general is undesirable in that it may contaminate the
spacecraft or cause other hazards.
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R 4 = (1 - ZA4) (1 - ZD4)
(1 - Z06 x 10-6 ) (1 - 7Z x I0"6)
= (0.999794) (0.9999Z8)
= 0. 999722
4.9.5 Phase 5
This phase concerns the additional 5 months in orbit and is there-
fore similar to the above Phase 4 conditions.
Thus
R 5 = (I - ZAs) (I - ZD5) = (I - 1030 x 10-6 )
(i - 360 x 10 -6 )
= (0.99897) (0.99964)
= 0. 99861
From the above we obtain the entire mission reliability, as
follows:
RlVtission = (R I) (R 2) (R 3) (R4) (R 5)
= (0.99876Z) (0.991649) (0.980118) (0.9997ZZ)
(0.99861)
= 0. 969110
4.9.6 Reference configuration
The reference configuration is identical to the baseline except for
valves (see Figuresl and 2). The reference configuration uses quad
redundant solenoid valves in both the fuel and oxidizer sections. The
valves in this memo are applicable here since they represent the same
mission profile. One difference is that the valves in the engine are
mechanically linked. This will have a minor effect on the analysis since
we do lose some independence in the valve operating modes. This is
somewhat off-set by the fact that either quad valve set failing is catas-
trophic to the mission.
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In the analysis,
G = Probability of failurefor leakage (one quad valve set)
a
Gb --Probability of failureto open (one quad valve set)
G = Probability of failure to close (one quad valve set)C
In phase 1, only the leakage mode is present for the quad solenoid valves
with other components remaining as in the baseline analysis.
Thus, for Phase 1,
I
R I = (1 - 2DI) (1 - ZE I) (1 - ZGla)
= (I - 30 x 10 -6 ) (I - 1122x 10 -6 )
x I
- ¢0. (0. co.
= 0. 998847
The reasoning for all the additional phases is the same as for the baseline
analysis except that the quad redundant valves are subsitituted for the
single solenoid valves.
Phase 2
!
R 2 = (1 - B Z) (1 - C2) (1 - ZD 2) (1 - 2E 2) (1 - 2Gza)
(I - 2Gzb 'c)
= (I - 2560 x 10-6) (I -3710 x 10"6) (I - 42,9.12,x 10-6)
= (I - 418.88 x 10-6)
= (0.99744) (0.99629) (0.999571) (0.999581)
(0.97394) (0.988)
= 0.992892
* = 1 -0.99853; page 14 of referenced memo (Phase t Leakage)
** = I -0.9'697 and 1 -0.99+; page 14 of referenced memo Phase Z
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Phase 3
!
R 3 = (I - B3) (I - C3) (i - 2D3) (I - 2E3) (I - 2G3a )
(1 - 2G3b ' c)
= (1 - 7630 x 10 -6 ) (1 - 11070x 10 -6 ) (1 - 22.7 x 10 -6 )
(i-I249.i_xI0"6)li-(z)(0.35_xio'9)l
Ii-(z)(ixio'9)]
= (0.99237) (0.98893) (0.999773) (0.998751)
(0.9929) (0.988)
= O.980131
* = leakage for 50 hrs = (30.3x 10 -94280 ) (50) = 0.354 x 10";
Phase 4
!
R4 = (1-ZD4) (l-2G4a)
: (I - 72 x I0"6) [1 -(2) (5._ x 10"9)IJ
= (0.999928) (0.97898)
= (0.999928)
* = leakage for 720 hrs = (30.3 x 10-94280 ) (720) = 5. Ix 10 "9
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Phas: 5
!
R 5 = (I - 2D5) (i - ZO5a )
= I1- 360x 10-61[1- Izl Izs 4_x 10-911
= 10. 99964) 10. 9749)
= 10. 99964)
* = leakage for 3600 hrs = {30"3x 10 .94280 ) (3tO0)
= 25.49 x 10 .9
I I ! I I I
R : (R1)(R 2) (R 3) (R 4) {S.5)
= (0.998847) (0.992892) (0.980131) (0.999928) (0.99964)
= 0.971621
ZZ8
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Table 3A
Item: Injector, Bipropellant
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (B)
Item Type/Description:
Coaxial, single element injector.
Primary Failure Mode:
Non-uniform combustion pattern.
Possible Causes:
Contan_iration_ damage due to improper handling.
Effects on Subsystem/lVIis sion:
Erosion of combustion chamber which could result in a minor
loss of performance or burnthrough and catastrophic failure.
Inherent Preventives:
Adequate filtration, stringent cleanliness and handling
procedure s.
i
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Table 3B
2a _t Norn Wor st Be st Mi s sion
Failure Classification 1 1
Time/Cycles
Units: hrs. 0.056 0. 167
Actual Failure
Rate, Units: hrs. 0.04572 0. 05472 0.04572 0.30456 0.036624
Failure Rate
Source Code a,b
Probability of
Failure, x I0" 0.0_56 0.02763 0.0102
Reliability 0.92744 0.9_37 0.9898
Failure Rate Data Sources:
(a)STL Memo 64-9701.3-127 "ReliabilityInput for September
Surveyor Progress Report "8 October 1964
(b)LF,M Descent Engine Component Failure Summary, dated 4-6-65
Note s:
Surveyor 37,320 sec of firingwith no applicable failures
LEMDE 17, 160 sec of firing with no applicable failures
54,480
Z
= I. 386
X. 5O,0
Z
× = O. 0201
.01,0
2
×.99,0 = 9.21
XZ
k = 2T
I. 386
kNom = 5 = 1.27 x 10 .5 sec = 0.04572 hr
1.09 x 10
0. 0201
kBest = 5 = 1.84 x 10 .7 sec = 0.0006624 hr
I.09 x I0
9.21
= 8 46 x 10-5 sec = 0.30456 hr
kW°rst ; 1.09 x 105 "
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Table 4A
Item: Combustion Chamber and Nozzle
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (B)
Item Type/Description:
Phenolic refrasil ablative liner encased in metal shell
{Haynes 25) Bipropellant engine.
Operational Notes:
Liner thickness overdesigned.
Primary Failure Mode:
Material outgas sing (plugs injector, weakens material
properties which leads to a higher erosion rate).
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Minor to catastrophic depending on degree of outgassing.
Inhe r ent Pr eve ntive s:
Selection of low outgassing materials.
Z33
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Table 5A
Item: Fittings and Connections
System Subsystem: Propulsion (B)
Item Type/Description:
_cMechanical connections, not welded or brazed. Z required,
Primary Failure Mode:
Leakage
Possible Causes:
Contamination add faulty assembly.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Negligible or catastrophic depending on magnitude of leak rate.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Careful assembly and adequate inspection.
* Welded and brazed fittings are considered to have a negligible
problem of failure.
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Table 6A
Item: Translation Control
System/Subsystem: Propulsion (B)
Item Type/Description:
Consists of two servo actuators which move the engine support
plate in the x and y planes.
Operational Notes:
Used for midcourse and retro propulsion maneuver.
Primary Failure Mode:
Inope rative.
Possible Causes:
Actuator jammed.
Effects on Subsystem/Mission:
Catastrophic.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inherent Preventive s:
Careful checkout of assembly.
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Table 6B
1 ZA 3A Mission
Failure Classification 0. 5_ 1 1
Time/Cycles Units: 0. 3 0. 056 0. 167
Basic. Failure R_te, Units:
x 10-6 hrs 3.74 3. 74 3.74
Envir onment/Applicatlon
Factor I000 I000 I000
Actua_ Failure Rate, Units:
x I0 -u 3740 3740 3740
Failure Rate Source Code a
Probability of Failure, 0Zx 10 -6 561 Z09.44 6Z4.58 139
Reliability 93439 9"791 93375 9Z861
Failure Rate Data Sources:
a) FARADA Page B-l, Source 179 (Norair Div. of Northrop)
Notes:
_ 0. 5 criticality factor used for phase 1 since mechanism is
nonoperative at this time and is therefore less susceptible
to failure.
m,
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4. t0 Thermal Louver Mechanisms
This analysis of nine proposed Voyager spacecraft thermal louver
mechanisms is based on the current design status, mission profile,
mechanism operation, certain necessary assumptions, and available
failure rate data. The mission profile is common to all mechanisms
and is defined in Table 1.
Table t. Mission Profile
v
Mi'_sion Time Environmental
Mission Phase (hrs) K-Factor
1. Lift-off and boost (including 0.3 1000
injection)
2. Post-injection through capsule
s epar ation
a. Midcourse maneuver (accomplished
during Phase 2b) O. 056 1000
b. Cruise 4, 280 1
3. Post-separation (capsule) through
post-retro cruise
a. Retropropulsion 0. 022 1000
b. Cruise (after retro) 50 1
4. Mars Orbit 720 1
5. Additional Mars Orbit 3,600 1
Since the configuration is differentfor each of the nine mechanisms,
nine analyses are presentcd. In each, there is a brief mechanism
description and schematic followed by a criticalcomponent breakdown,
and, finally,mechanism mission reliabilitycalculations and results.
The nine thermal louver mechanisms fallroughly into two classes:
those that contain a relativelylarge number of components and generate
relativelylarge operating forces and those of simple design that generate
relativelysmall operating forces. Those mechanisms generating large
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forces operate a 3 inch louver and require 72 such louvers to complete
the entire thermal control system. Those mechanisms generating small
forces operate 2 inch louvers and require 108 such louvers to complete
the entire thermal control system. It is assumed that the 3 inch louver
thermal control system allows as many as two louvers to fail and still
achieve mission success, while the 2 inch system allows as many as
three louvers to fail and stillachieve mission success. Those mechan-
isms generating large forces utilize a spring and sliding seal on the ends
of their louvers. These sliding seals fitflush against the spacecraft
frame. The mechanisms generating small forces do not utilize slid.ng
end seals since they probably would have difficulty overcoming any
stiction developed between the seal and the spacecraft frame.
This reliability analysis is not of sufficient refinement to include
performance considerations. Thus, a paradox develops in the reliability
calculations. Those mechanisms generating large enough forces to insure
good performance are penalized in the reliability calculations because
they require more parts, while those mechanisms generating small forces
tend to be as signed relatively higher reliabilities even though their per-
formancc may be at a lower level. The assumption is made, for the
purposes of this analysis, that all mechanisms yield adequate performance
to 2ssure mission success if they operate as d_signed.
4. 10. l Wax Filled Thermal Actuation with Rack and Pinion
This mecha" [sm consists of a thermal actuator, overshoot spring,
rack and pimc'_, louver, torsional return bar, and sliding end seals
(Figure i). The thermal actuator consists of a case, plunger, Teflon
diaphragm, and wax fill. The sliding end seals consist of a seal and a
sznall spring.
The thermal actuator, riding on the overshoot spring, is partially
embedded in a thermal s_nk that serves as a mount for the heat generating
.. electronic equipment. As the electronic equipment looses hea_ to the
sink, _he thermal actuator is also affected. A characteristic of the ther-
mal actuator wax fill is that in the solid and liquid states, its volumetric
240
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increase with temperature rise is small; however, in the change of phase
between solid and liquid, volume increases greatly with a relatively
small temperature increase. It is around this temperature range that
the mechanism is designed to operate. The louvers remain closed until
the heat sink and thermal actuator wax fill reach the temperature at which
the wax begins its change of phase from a solid to a liquid. At this
temperature th_ wax experiences a large volume increase. This increase
in volume is transformed to louver opening motion, against torsional
return bar force, through the thermal actuator piston, Teflon diaphragm,
and the rack and pinion. With increasing temperature the thermal
actuator piston is driven against the louver adjust screw stop. At this
position the louver is fully opened. Any further increase in wax volume
and associated piston travel after the piston is driven against the louver
adjust screw is absorbed by compressing the overshoot spring and driv-
ing the thermal actuator further into the heat sink well. If the thermal
actuator were embedded solidly in the heat sink with no overshoot spring,
further increase in temperature after the piston had been driven against
the louver adjust screw stop could cause serious structural damage to the
spacecraft. As the louver is opened, the heat sink is exposed to low
space temperatures and is cooled. Decreases in heat sink temperature
cause the thermal actuator wax fill to contract allowing the torsional
return bar to close the louver.
The louver end sliding seals are merely a device to increase
efficiency by decreasing "gap fraction" {the space between the louver
ends and the spacecraft frame). The sliding seals are forced against
the spacecraft frame by small compressed springs. Since the thermal
actuator can apply in the order of 50 lbs force to its piston, it is assumed
that any stiction forces between the sliding seals and the spacecraft
frame can be easily overcome.
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Table 2
Louver Mechanism Component and Lower Limit Failure Rate
Handbook Component x 10 -6 and Source ( )
Overshoot Spring
Spring, Simple Return Force 0. 001 (1)
Actuator Diaphragm
Diaphragm 0.1 (1)
Rack and Pinion
Gears 0.00Z (1)
Teflon Bearing Block
Bearing, Ball, Light Duty 0.035 (1)
Torsional Return Spring (Twist Bar)
Spring, Simple Return Force 0. 001 (1)
Bearing, Sleeve
Bearing, Translatory, Sleeve 0.210 (1)
Gap Fraction Sliding Seal
Spring, Simple Return Force
TOTAL MECHANISM FAILURE RATE 0. 147 x 10 -6 hrs
Failure of this component is not considered critical since the
result would not be mechanism failure but only decreased
efficiency.
(1) Reliability Engineering Data Series, Failure Rates, April 1962,
AVCO Corporation, Research and Advanced Development Division.
Necessary data for reliability calculations is as follows:
a. Mission phase time aI_d environmental K-factors from
Table 1.
b. Total failure rate from Table 2.
c. Number of mechanisms required to complete the system
= 72.
Reliability formula for each mechanism:
5
= II R.
Rm i=l 1
R. = _ "kKti
1
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qwhe re:
R = mechanism mission reliability
m
R. = mechanism mission phase reliabilityi
k = total mechanism failure rate
K = environmental factor
t = mission phase time
Calculation:
-0. 147 x 10-6[{1000)(0.3)]
R 1 = e = 0.9456
-0.147 x 10 .6 [{I000)(0.056) + i{4,280}] = 0.93363
R 2 = e
-0.147 x l0 -6 [(1000)(0.02Z) + 1(50}] = 0.9489
R 3 = e
-0.147 x 10 -6 [(I)(720)] = 0.93894
R 4 = e
-0. 147 x 10 -6 [(i)(3600}]
R 5 = e = 0.93471
R = 0. 928673
m
Reliability formula for total system:
5
R = II R
s j=l sj
Rsj" = R'nl + nRin'1"(i-R i) + n(n-I }Rin'2(l -Ri)22!
+ n(n-l)(n-Z)R3!in'3(l-Ri )3
whe re:
R s = system mislion reliability
Rsj = system mission phase reliability
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R. = mechanism mission phase reliability1
n - number of mechanisms in the system
NOTE: Ifn - 108 the formula (Rsi) is applied through the
fourth term. Ifn - 72 the formul_ (Rsj) is applied through
the third term.
Calculations:
Rs I = (RI)7Z + 72(RI)71(I_RI)I + 72(71)2(nl)70(I-R1)z
= (0.9456)72 + 72(0.9456)71(0.000 044) + 2556(0.9456)70
(0. 000 044) 2
= 0.926836 + 0.003 158 + 0.000 004 = 0.958
Rs2 = 0.955170 + 0.043835 + 0.000 991 = 0.9567
Rs3 = 0.999 208 + 0.000 791 + 0.000 000 = 0.96
Rs4 = 0.992 396 + 0.007 574 + 0.000 028 = 0.958
R = 0.962 627 + 0.036 683 + 0.000 687 = 0.957
s5
R = (0.958)(0.956)(0.958)(0.957) = 0.9488S
4. 10. Z Wax Filled Thermal Actuator with Cable and Pulle)r Drive
This mechanism is identical to that of 4. 10.1 except that a cable
and pulley arrangement is used in place of a rack and pinion (Figure
2). The operation is identical.
The failure rate in source (1) for cabl_ _ is identical to that of
gears. Thus the total mechanism failure rate is the same as in 4. 10.1.
The necessary data for reliability calculations, the mechanism
mission reliability calculations, and the system mission phase reliability
calculations are the same as in 4. 10.1. All results are also identical.
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Figure 2.
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4. i0.3 The Bimetal Louver System
This system consists of 216 bonded bimetal strip mechanisms
partially embedded in the heat sink that serves the electronic heat
generating equipment (Figure 3). The strips are sgt at 1 inch intervals.
When the electronic gear is cold, the expansion properties of the bimetal
strips are such that adjacent metal strips bend over to cover the heat
sink surface. As heat to the heat sink increases, the adjacent bimetal
strips tend to straighten, exposing the sink surface to the colder space
environment.
The mechanism consists of two dissimilar metals and the bond
holding them together. There is no failure rate data available on these
three items. There is no experimental test data on this mechanism
available at this time. Thus this mech ._m cannot be assigned a
quantitative reliability prediction numbe,- at this time.
4.10.4 The Wax Filled Bellows Actuator
This mechanism consists of a wax filled bellows actuator, mech-
anical gearing, torsional return bar, and s]iding end seal ( Figure 4 ).
The mechanical gearing is assumed to be equivalent to the rack and
pinion of 4.10. 1. The mechanism operation is similar to that of 4. 10. 1
except that there is no overshoot spring and the actuator is in a stationary
mount on the heat sink.
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Figure 4,
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Table 3
Louver Mechanism Component and Lower Limit Failure Rate
Handbook Component x 10 .6 and Source
Wax Filled Bellows Actuator
Bellows 0. 090 (1)
Link Arm (Rack and Pinion)
Gears 0. 002 (1)
Bearing Block
Bushings 0.020 (1)
Torsional Return Spring ('i'wist Bar)
Spring, Simple Return Folce 0. 001 (1)
Bearing, Sleeve
Bearing, Translatory, Sleeve 0.008 (1)
Gap Fraction Sliding Seal
Spring, Simple Return Force
TOTAL MECHANISM FAILURE RATE 0. 121 x 10 .6
Failure of this component is not considered critical since
the result would not ba mechanism failure but decrease
efficiency.
(1) Reliability Engineering Data Series, Failure Rates, April
1962, AVCO Corporation, Research and Advanced Development
Divis ion.
Necessary data for reliability calculations is as follows:
a. Mission phase time and environment K-factors from
Table I.
b. Total failure rate from preceding table.
c. Number of mechanism required to complete the
system = 72.
Reliability formulas for the mechanism and the system are the
same as in 4.10.1.
Calculation re sults:
R 1 - 0.9464
R 2 = 0. 93475
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R 3 = 0.951
R 4 = 0. 9413
R 5 = 0.93564
R = 0.9Z8907
Rsl = 0.96
RsZ = 0.957
R = 0.96
s3
R = 0.958
s4
R = 0. 957
s5
R = 0.95
S
4. I0. 5 The Freon Filled Bellows Actuator
The only dlfference between this mechanism and the preceding
mechanism is the actuator material (Figure 5). /"his rnechanisln
utilizes Freon where the other uses wax. However, this difference is not
reflectable in this reliability analysis and the results for this mechanism
are therefore identical.
4. I0.6 Spiral Bimetal Actuator
The spiral bimetal actuator mechanism consists of a bearing
assembly, bimetal actuator spiral spring, and a louver all attached to
the heat sink by an inner frame (Figure 6). Temperature effects on
the bimetal spring cause it to flex, thereby opening and ,;losing the
louver. This mechanism develops a torque of about 0.01 inch-pound.
The bimetal actuator spring is similar to that used on the Pioneer,
while the louver is simil_r to that used in the OGO.
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Test data on the similar projects are used in the reliability
calculations• Test results are given in the following report:
Test Report 23ZI-601Z-TU-000, "Orbiting Geophysical
Observatory Temperature Control Louvers Life Test",
(OGO-VZI-Z5), 23 April 1963.
In these tests there were 510,000 individual louver cycles with no
failures. The mechanism failure rate can be calculated:
Q = l-R,
where
Q = the mechanism failure rate/cycle
R = the mechanism reliability/cycle
Reliability (R} can be calculated:
R n = 1 -Y,
whe r e
n = the number of test cycles = 510,000
y = the desired confidence level (50% confidence
level is used here}
Thus
R n = I-Y
R n = 0.5
lnR = In 0.5 _ -0.693 = - 1.36 x l0 -6
n 0.51 x 106
-1.36 x 10 -6 -kcR = e =e
where
k = failure rate in cycles
c = 1 cycle
Since
Q = I-R
• o-6 -kQ = 1 . e-I 36xi = I - e
but for small exponents Q-- k
Thus
Q= k= 1.36xi0"6-- 1.4:¢I0 -6
The failure rate is thus calculated to be 1.4 x 10 -6
Failures
Cycle
254
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It is estimated that the louver system will be subjected Lo 500
operative cycles during the mission. For the purposes of this analysis,
it is assumed that the mission phase cyclic louver operation will be
proportional to the mission phase duration. Thus the operative cycles
assigned for each phase is as follows:
Phase Operative Louver Cycles
1 0
Z 247
3 3
4 4Z
5 208
Using k = I.4 x I0"6
failures _ _C
cycle and R = e where c = cycles/
phase as above, mechanical mission phase reliability is calculated to be
R > 0.96l
R z = 0.93654Z
R 3 = 0.9558
R 4 = 0. 94412
R 5 = 0.937088
R = 0. 933
m
System mission phase reliability calculations:
Rsl > 0.96
RsZ = 0.9488
Rs3 = 0.96
Rs4 = 0.96
Rs5 = 0.96
R = 0.9484
S
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4.10.7 Wax Filled Bourdon Tube Actuator
This mechanism consists of two U-shaped wax-filled bourdon tubes
and a louver (Figure 7). One leg of each tube is attached to the heat
sink and the other is attached to the louver. The wax has the character-
istics previously described. Thus as the temperature rises the wax
expands, tending to open the curved tubes _nd attached louver.
Necessary data for reliability calculations is as follows:
a. Mission phase time and environmental K-factors from
Table 1.
b. Total failure rate from Table 4.
c. Number of mechanisms required to complete the system =
108.
Mechanism mission phase reliability calculations:
R1 = 0. 954
R 2 = 0.9409
R 3 = 0.958
R4 = 0.9485
R 5 = 0.9424
R = 0.9381
m
System mission phase reliabilitycalculations:
Rsl = 0.96
RsZ = 0.96
Rs3 = 0.96
Rs4 = 0.96
Rs5 = 0.96
R = 0.955
S
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Table 4
\
Louver Mechanism Component and -6
Handbook Component Failure Rate x I0 hrs.
Wax-Filled Bourdon Tube (Z)
;:-'JointsWelded (4)
4 x 0. 00537 = 0.0ZI (Z)
Total Mechanism Failure Rate 0.0Zl x 10 -6
* The assumed failure mode for this mechanism is wax extruding
from the point where the bourdon tube was filled and sealed.
(Z) The Sippican Corporation, Sippican Report FA-AZ0ZZ34-B,
Revised 1 May 1961.
4. i0.8 Gas Filled Bourdon Tube Actuator
This mechanism is similar to that of 4. i0.7 except that a gas is
used here instead o_ wax a_ d a sensor-expander with connecting tubing
has been added to achieve more heat sink temperature test points
(Figure 8). The mechanism operation is the same.
Table 5
Louver Mechanism Component and Failure Rate x 10 -6 and
Handbook Component Source ( )
Gas Filled Bourdon Tube (Z)
with Sensor-Expander and
Connecting Tubing
,:,Joints Welded (I0)
10 x 0.00537 = 0.054 x 10 -6 (Z)
Total Mechanism Failure Rate 0.054 x 10 "6
":, The assumed failure mode for this mechanism is gas leaking from
a joint or sealing.
(Z) The Sippican Corporation, Sippican Report FA-AZ0ZZ34-B,
Revised 1 May 1961.
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Necessary data for reliability calculations are as follows:
a. Mission phase tin,e and environmental K-factors from
Table I.
b. Total failure rate from preceding table.
c. Number of mechanisms required to complete the
system = 108.
Mechanism mission phase reliability calculations:
R 1 = 0. 9485
R 2 = 0.9-766
R 3 = 0. 956
R 4 = 0. 9461
R 5 = 0. 93806
R = 0. 93513
m
System mission phase reliability calculations:
Rsl = 0.96
RsZ = 0.96
Rs3 = 0.9 6
Rs4 = 0.96
Rs5 = 0.96
R = 0.955
S
4. I0.9 The Bimetal Helix Actuator
The bimetal helix actuator consists of a bimetal spring and a
lc,.'eer (Figure 9). One end of the bimetal helix is attached to the heat
sink while the other is attached to the louver. Temperature effects on
::he bimetal helix cause it to flex, thereby opening and closing the
louve r.
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No available handbook failure rate data exiqts on a bimetal helix.
There is no apparent applicable test data available on a bimetal helix.
It is noted, however, that similarities exist between this mechanism
and the spiral bimetal actuator. Therefore, as an estimate, the
mechanism reliability is assumed to be identical to that of 4.10.6.
4.11 Strip Heaters
This analysis of the Voyager strip heater system is based on the
current design status, mission profile, system operation, certain
necessary assumptions, and available failure rate data. Following the
mission profile and a brief system description, a section is devoted to
mission success criteria and calculated results. The calculated
results follow directly from mission success criteria and individual
cornponent analyse s.
For reliabllity calculations, the mission profile is assumed to
consist of the following phases:
? .ission Time Environmental
Mission Phase (hrs) K-Factor
I. Lift-off and boost (including 0.3 1000
injection)
2. Post-injection thru capsule
separation
a. Midcourse maneuvers 0. 056 I000
(accomplished during
phase Zb)
b. Cruise 4,Z80.000 1
3. Post-separation (capsule
thru post-retro cruise)
a. Retropropulsion 0.02Z I000
b. Orbit (after retro) 50. 000 1
4. Mars Orbit (one month) 7Z0.000 1
5. Additional Mars Orbit 3,600. 000 l
(5 months)
Z6Z
1966011762-283
The Voyager spacecraft strip heater system contains six independent
strip heaters located as follows, one each on the
• 3 ft. dish antenna gimbal
• 6 ft. dish antenna gimbal
• POP gimbal
• POP package
• each of two external experimental packages
Each strip heater is comprised of one TWR standard strip heater
element and one TRW standard hermatically sealed normally closed
thermostatic switch as described in the component analysis. This strip
heater design is being used successfully on the OGO spacecraft program.
Power is applied to the heaters early in the mission and is
continuously available throughout. Heat generated by a striI- heater is
controlled by its associated thermostatic switch. When the desired
preset temperature is obtained, the normally closed contacts of the
switch separate thereby opening the circuit. When the component
temperature falls below the preset value the contacts again close
thereby reactivating the heater.
The following success criteria have been established:
(1) If a heater fails "on" (ie. the contacts do not open} near
earth, the system will fail due to overheating.
(Z) If a heater fails "on" near Mars, the system will not fail
since it would normally be in near continuous operation
due to the extreme cold.
(3) If the heater fails :'off" (open circuit} the system fails.
For the purposes of this analysis the separation point between
criterion (1) and (Z) is arbitrarily assumed to occur midway into the
first spacecraft cruise (after 2,140 hrs). The phase and mission
reliabilities for one strip heater are calculated on Tables I and 2.
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Strip Heater
Phase Component Phase Reliabilities Mission Phase Reliability
1 (0.957) (0.957) 0. 954
2 {0.96){0. 9457)(0.96)(0. 0479) 0. 9436
3 (0.96)(0.96)(0.96)(0.96) 0. 956
4 (0.953)(0.96 ) 0. 952
5 (0.9464){0. 957) 0. 9461
Strip Heater Mission Reliability 0. 9387 9
The corresponding calculated reliabilities for the strip heater
system {six independent strip heaters) is as follows:
Strip Heater Strip Heater System
Phase Mission Phase Reliability Mission Phase Reliability
1 0. 954 0. 9464
2 0. 9436 0. 93616
3 0. 956 0. 9476
4 0. 952 0. 945Z
5 0. 9461 0. 93766
Mission Reliability 0. 93274
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Table 2A
Item: Switch, Thermostatic (TRW Standard)
System[Subsystem: Strip Heater System
Item Type[De scription:
Switch, thermostatic, SPST, snap acting, hermetically sealed,
normally closed.
Primary Failure Mode:
Fail closed.
Possible Causes:
Oxidation of contacts, pitted contacts - arcing, insulation
breakdown, shorts.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Proven de sign.
Secondary Failure Mode:
Fail open (open circuit}
Possible Causes:
Vibration, shock.
Effects on Subs-ystem]Mission:
System failure.
Backup Provisions:
None.
Inhe rent Preventive s:
Proven design.
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4.1X Magnetometer Boom Mechanisms
This anal_ sis of five proposed Voyager spacecraft magnetometer
boom mechanisms is based on the current design status, mission profile,
mechanism operation, certain necessary assumptions, and available
failure rate data. The mission profile is common to all mechanisms and
is defined in Table 1. Since the operation is different for each of the
five mechanisms, the analysis is handled on an individual system basis.
In each analysis a brief system description is followed by a critical
component breakdown, and finally reliability calculations and results.
Four of the five proposed boom mechanism configuration schematics
show an 18 inch fixed boom backup to the 20 foot boom. This 18 inch
fixed boom consists of a single structural member deemed sufficiently
strong to withstand all mission loads. The 18 inch boom is thus assumed
to have a negligible mission failure probability for the purposes of this
analysis. The 18 inch fixed boom is not sufficient in terms of perform-
ance to obtain the data required during the long cruise portion of the
mission. It is sufficient and necessary to obtain the required data after
retropropulsion since there is a *l ° three axis orientation requirement
during Mars orbit of which the 20 foot boom is not capable. During
transit the requirement is only -+3°. Therefore, in this analysis, to
obtain the data required, it is assumed that there must be a Z0 foot boom
non-failed during the long cruise and at least an 18 inch boom non-failed
during the orbit phases of the mission.
4. lZ. 1 The DeHavilland STEM Type Boom
The DeHavilland STEM boom is a production type item that has
been utilized on the OGO spacecraft and several other aerospace projects.
In the proposed application, the mechanisrr, consists of a brushless AC
motor, gearing and windup drum, and an extendable boom all encased in
an hermetically sealed box. The natural lower energy level state of the
boom is an extended tubular shape. It is forced flat, wound onto the
windup dlum, and stored in the hermetically sealed box ualtil needed.
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Table 1 Mission Profile
Environ-
mental
Mission Phase Time(hrs) K-Factor
i. Lift-off and boost (including
injection) 0.3 1000
_. Post-injection thru capsule separation
a. Midcourse maneuvers
(accomplished du.'ing phase Zb) 0. 056 I000
b. Cruise (Boom deployment is
assumed to be accomplished in the
first hour of cruise in this analysis.
Boom retraction is assumed to be
accomplished in the last hour of
cruise in this analysis). 4,280. 000 1
3. Post-separation (capsule) thru post-
retro cruise
a. Retropropulsion 0.0ZZ 1000
b. Cruise (after retro) 50. 000 1
4. Mars Orbit (i month) 720. 000 1
5. Additional Mars Orbit (5 months) 3,600. 000 1
The boom remains retracted during launch and boost. Upon space-
craft injection, the motor-gearing brake is released, whereupon the boom
extends to its natural position which in this case is a Z0-foot flexible
tube. The boom remains in the extended position until just prior to retro-
propulsion, at which time it must be retracted to 18 inches to withstand
the retro loads. The boom then operates for the rest of the mission in
the 18 inch n_ode, if the motor-gear brake fails to hold the boom in the
18 inch position after retropropulsion, system failure will occur since the
boom would extend to the Z0-foot position. Euen though the magnetometer
package would operate from that point, the -+I° three axis orientation
requirement could not be met. After retropropulsion, there are no
anticipated loads of magnitude sufficient to fail the boom in its extended
position.
A breakdown of the critical components is given in Table 2 includ-
ing operating times, environmental K-factors, operating K-factors, and
failure rates.
°
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Since there is no component redundance inthe mechanism, the
mission reliabilitycan be calculated from the following formula:
5
RMechanism for the = (P) _ (e'X)ii=lMission duration
where:
P = the probabilityofsuccess ofany "one-shot" components
(e'X)i = reliabilityof the mechanism during the ith phase
", _- "Duration of _ /'Phase i envir- Phase i
=_ phase i onmental K- opt.rationalx k applicable factor appli- K-factor
to the cable to the J
, applicable to
/ I component component \', the component/
where:
k = failurerate of the component.
For phase 1:
x = 0.01xi0"6(0.3)11000)11) + i.?,.5xi0"6(0.3)(i000)(0.I)+
O. 12xi0"6(0,.3)(I000)(i)= 0.000076
R = (e'x)l = e "0'000 076 = 0. 9424
For phase 2: (s-bphases Za and Zb)
x= 0.01x10 "6 4, Z80.000)(I)(I) + (0.056)(I000_(I +
I.ZSxIO "6" (I)(I)(I)+(4,Z78)(I)(0. I)+(I)(I)(I) +
(0.056)(1000)(0.1) + 0.12x10 "6", (1)(1)(1) +
(4,278)(1)(0.1) + (1)(I)(1)+ (0.056)(1000)(0.1)
= 0.000 640
e-0°
000 640
93360R = (e'X)z = = 0.
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Table 2
Critical Component K-Factors
Breakdown Environmental Opera- Failure
Applicable (Mission Phase) tional Rate x
Mission 1 2 3 4 5 10 -6 &
Component Hours a b a b Op Non-Op Source
Hermatically 4, 280. 378 1000 1000 1 1000 - - - 1 - 0.01 (1)
sealed case
(Use o-ring
failure rate5
_C Motor 4,280.378 I000 I000 1 I000 - - - 1 0. I 1.25 (2)
(Brushless5
Gearing 4,280.378 I000 I000 1 I000 - - - 1 0. I 0.12 (15
(15 Reliability Engineering Data Series
Failure Rates, April 1962
AVCO Corporation
Research and Advanced Development Division
(Z) MIL-HDBK-217
For phase 3:
0.01xl0 "6
-3
+I.25x10 "6x = (0.02-2)(1000)(I)!
{o.o22)(IOOO5_,'I)I+o.IZxlO"6F(o.ozz)(_,_,;os(!)+
0.01xl0 "6 (50)(I)(I) +I.25xi0 "6 (50){,)(0.I):' +
0.12x10 -6 (5C,}(I)(I)
= 0. 000 018
= e-0.000 018 = 0.94 816
For phase 4:
x = 0.01x I0"6 (720)(I)(I)!+1.25x I0-6 (720)(I)(0.i) +
0.*Z x 10"6,j720)(1)(I)_ : 0.000 184
i,J
R = e-0"000 184 = 0.93 816
For phase 5:
x = 0.01 x 10"6i(3600)(I)(I)I + 1.25 x 10 -6 (3600)(I)(0. I) +
0.1Z x 10 "6,(3600)(15(1)_[ = 0.000 918
-0. 000 918 93R = e = 0. 082
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Finally:
5
Rmechanism for the P$ -x
= _ (e )i = (0.9424) (0.93360)
mission duration
i=l
(0.9482) (0.93816) (0.9308Z) = 0.9Z816
_._P = 1 since no "one shot" components exist in this
mechanism.
4.12. Z STEM Type Boom with a Fixed Bac'<_9 .5oom
The addit:on of the fixed backup boom allows less stringent
operation of the retractable boorn during the mission. The retractable
boom remains in its retracted position during launch and boost as pre-
viously. It is also extended to its full length when the spacecraft achieves
injection and remains in that position until retropropulsion as before.
ha this case, however, the 20 foot boom need not be retracted _.o 18
inches before retropropulsion since if it is functionally destroyed in
the extended position by the retro acceleration load, the 18 inch fixed
backup boom still allows mission success. If the STEM boom is buckled
by loads in the extended position, it will return to its original shape as
soon as the loads are removed. It is felt that a buckled 10-foot STEM
boom would not cause damage to other spacecraft systems during retro
firing. Since the boom need not be retracted before retropropulsion,
the last required operation for mission success of the nC motor, gearing
and windup drum, and hermetically sealed case occurs within one ho .r
into the first mission cruise phase when the retractable boom is first
extended.
A breakdown of the critical components is given in Table 3
including operating times, environmental K-fa-tors, operating K-factors,
and failure rates.
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Since there is no component redundancy in the mechanism, the
mission reliability can be calculated by the following formula:
Formula identical to that of 4.12.2.
Results are:
The calculated mechanism reliability for the 1st mission
phase is: 0. 9424
The calculate_ mechanism reliability for the 2nd* mission
phase is: 0.9 °
Mission phases 3, 4, and 5 are not applicable as per
4.12.2.
Finally:
Rmechanism for the 5
= P** " (e-X)i = (0.9424)(0.96 ) =
mission duration i= 1
0.9424 = 0.942
$ 1 hour of mission phase 2b (mission phase 2a is not
applicable as per 4. 12.2.
• $ P = 1 since no "one shot" components exist in this
mechanism
Table 3
Critical Component K-Factors
Breakdown Environmental Operational Failure
Applicable , (Mission Phase) Rate x
Mission 1 2 3 4 5 10 -6 &
Component Hours a b a b Op Non-Op Source
Hermatically 1.3 i000 - , 1 .... 1 - 0.01 (I)
sealed case
AC Motor I. 3 i000 - 1 .... 1 0. 1 i. Z5 (2)
(Brushless)
Gearing 1.3 1000 - 1 .... 1 0. 1 0. lZ (1)
(1) Reliability Engineering Data Series
Failure Rates, April 196Z
AVCO Corporation
Research and Advanced Development Division
(Z) MIL-HDBK-217
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4. 12.3 Non-Retractable Boom with a Fixed Backup Boom
The non-retractable boom consists of two structural sections and
two joints, One joint connects the boom sections, while the other joins
the boom to the spacecraft. Both joints are identical and consist of an
actuator spring, a damper, and an extended position lock. The damper
operates on the principle of a vane moving through a viscous fluid. The
damper case is attached to one segment of the boom, while a shaft with
several vanes attached to -t is connected to the other segments of the
boom. The viscous fluid and several necessary seals complete the
damper. A squib operated cable cutter and nylon cord serve to retain
the boom in the retracted position.
During launch and boost the boom is retained in the retracted
position. During the first hour of cruise after spacecraft injection, the
cable cutter squib is activated and the nylon retaining cord cut. The
joint spring actuators, which are in a loaded state while the boom is
retracted, immediately extend, thus deploying the boom. The dampers
serve to slow the spring action, thus avoiding any damage caused by the
otherwise rapid boom deployment. When the boom is fully deployed,
spring operated extended position locks activate and hold the joints rigid
and the boom remains deployed for the duration of the mission. The boom
will be structurally able to withstand retropropulsion loads.
A breakdown of the critical components is given in Table 4
including operating times, environmental K-factors, operating
K-factors, and failure rates.
Since there is no component redundancy in the mechanism, the
mission reliability can be calculated by the previous formula.
The calculated mechanism reliability for the 1st mission
phase is: 0.93772
The calculated mechanism reliability for the 2nd mission
phase is: 0.93697
The calculated mechanism reliability for the 3rd mission
phase is: 1.05
SThe reliability is not 1.0, but is greater than 0.96 , which is the limit
of the mathematical scope of this analysis.
275
1966011762-296
2.76
!'
1966011762-297
277
1966011762-298
The calculated mechanism reliability for the 4th mission
phase is: 0.96
The calculated mechanism reliability for the 5th mission
phase is: 0.953
Finally:
R 5
mechanism for the (e-X)i 93772) 3697)ission duration = P _r = (0. (0.9
i=l
(I.0)(0.96)(0.953) = 0. 93462_-0. 9346
4. IZ. 4 Retractable Boom with a Fixed Backup Boom
_l__ismechanism consists of a brushless AC motor and associated
gearing, cable, two boom sections, and two hinge joints. Each joint
utilizes one spring actuator. An l8 inch fixed backup boom is provided.
During launch and boost the motor, gearing, and cable restrain
the boom in the retracted position against joint spring actuator pressure.
After spacecraft injection and during the first hour of cruise, the motor
is activated allowing the boom to deploy slowly against the spring
pressure. When the boom is fully deployed, the motor is shut down
and the boom held in place by the spring actuator pressure. The boom
remains in this state until just prior to retropuopulsion at which time the
motor is reactivated and the bocm retracted to its initial position. This
action is necessary since the boom is lightweight and would fail during
retro loading and possibly damage other spacecraft systems. In this
analysis, it is assumed that the boom is extended after retro and remains
extended for the duration of the mission unless one of the spring actuator
fails in which case the boom is retracted and the mission completed on
the backup boom. Thus, a double failure is necessary to fail the
mechanism after retro. That is, one of the spring actuators must fail
and the motor, gearing or cable must fail, allowing the boom to flop
around and damage the spacecraft.
A breakdown of the critical components is given in Table 5
including operating times, environmental K-factors, operating K-factors,
and failure rates.
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Since there is no component redundancy in the mechanism up to
phase 3b, the mission reliability can be calculated by the preceding
formulas.
In phases 3b, 4, and 5 the motor, gearing, and cable are con-
sidered in standby with the spring actuator. The usual standby reliability
formula is utilized in these phases.
-k 1KEKot k 1KEK O - k 1KEKot - k 2 KEKot
R = e +kzKEK O -k IKEKo (e -e )
where:
k I = the failure rate of two spring actuators
K E -- the phase environmental K-factor
K O = the phase operational K-factor
k z = the combined failure rates of the motor, gearing,
and cable
t = the appropriate phase time
The calculated mechanism reliability for the five mission phases
are as follows:
(1) o.9(3)855
(2) 0.9(3)299
(3) 0.914)88
(4) 0.9 (6)
15) O. 916)
IT
Rmechanismfor the = P i =I--_ (e'X)i
mission duration
= (0.93855)(0.93Z99)(0.9488)(0.96)(0.96 )
= 0. 93140"_ O. 9314
4.12.5 Non-Retractable, E_xpendable Folding Boom with Fixed
Backup Boom
This mechanism consists of a cable cutter, nylon cord, two boom
sections, two hinge joints, and an umbilical thruster. The cable cutter
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is squib operated while the umbilical thruster is spring operated. Each
hinge joint utilizes a spring actuator, a spring operated extended position
lock, and a damper. An 18 inch fixed backup boom is also provided.
During launch and boost the nylon cord holds the boom in the
retracted position against the joint spring actuator pressure. After
spacecraft injection and during the first hour of cruise, the cable cutter
squib is fired and the nylon cord severed. The boom sections extend
under hinge spring actuator pressure subject only to the restraint pro-
vided by the hinge dampers. When the boom is fully extended, it is held
rigid by the extended position lock. The boom remains in this position
throughout the first cruise including the midcourse maneuver. In the last
hour prior to retropropulsion, the boom is jettisoned by the umbilical
thruster. The remainder of the mission is completed utilizing the 18
inch backup boom.
A breakdown of the critical components is given in Table 6 includ-
ing ope r-ting times, environmental K-factor s, operating K-factor s, and
failure rates.
Since there is no component redundancy in the mechanism, the
mission reliability can be calculated by the preceding formulas.
The calculated mechanism reliability for the first mission phase
is . 93613 and for the second is . 927394. The other three phases are
not applicable.
5 (e-xRmechanism for the = u )ii=1
mission duration
= (.93613)(.927394) = .9Z7008=. 9Z701
4.13 Stabilization and Control Subsystem
The attached analysis was performed for the five mission phases
previously defined and includes both the baseline and seven other options
including the selected configuration. All powered flight portions of the
mission (launch, midcourse and retro) have an environmental "k" factor
of 1000 associated with them. The results are tabulated in Table 1
which shows the reliabilities of the various options for each mission
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phase as well as for the entire mission. Also shown are weights,
changes in weights and reliability for the various options.
The seven options listed in Table 1 are sketched as follows. In
the sketches, the numbers refer to the following:
i. Canopus sensor
Z. Coarse sun sensor
3. Fine sun sensor
4. Control gyro assembly
5. Reaction thrust control
6. Control signal electronics
The stabilization and control subsystem provides full attitude
stabilization of the flight spacecraft using the sun and the star canopus
as the basic attitude references. The system is composed of six
elements.
1. Canopus sensor
Z. Coarse sun sensor (Z required)
3. Fine sun sensor
4. Control gyro assembly
5. Reaction thrust control
6. Control signal electronics
The baseline reliability block diagram is as follows:
P' P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
|CANo_sH JJ F,N_t
_o_ l,_,c_,oJIco_,,o_llco_,o_!
-[ I-i su"'1"l _'.'"'....| "-'_u_'i-I_'_'_Li-IG¥_°I'--,:,._c- E. oR lco, r, o
where
Pl' P2' P3 etc. denote the reliability of each block.
Thus
6
System reliability (Rs) - v. P.i=l
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OPTION 1
OPTION 2 1
286
1966011762-307
OPTION 4
--D D
OPTION 5
1
OPTION 6 I
'I
I
I
L 1
O PTION 7
I
I
!
!
I
I
_1
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The following terms are used throughout the analysis:
k = Environmental "k" factor of 1000 applied to all powered
a
portions of the mission, i.e., launch, midcourse
corrections, etc.
k b = Environmental "k" factor of ! applied to all cruise
portions of the mission
t = Time in environment per phase where p goes from 1
P
through 5 and
t 1 = 0.3hr
tZa = 0.056 hr
tZb = 4280 hrs
t3a = 0.022 hr
t3b = 50 hrs
t 4 - 720 hrs
t 5 = 3600 hrs
Pli = Reliability of block (subsystem element} i for Mission
Phase 1.
_ kikat 1
Pli = e
where
k i = failure rate of the i th block (subsystem}
In order to simplify later calculations, we will factor out the "kt"
portions for the various phases.
Thus, for
Phase 1 (katl} -- (1000}(0.3} = 300
Phase 2 (k-atZa + kbt2b ) = (1000_'0.056} + ( 1}(4280} = 4336
Phase 3 (kat3a+ kbt3b ) = (IO00)(O.OZZ) + (I)(50) = 7Z
Phase 4 (kbt4) = (1)(720) = 720
Phase 5 (kbt5) = (I)(3600) = 3600
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The above holds true for most parts of the analysis. Where
exceptions exist, they are noted. The failure rates used are as those
described in this appendix; exceptions and additions are noted.
Other failure rates used were reduced to lab conditions by division
with the following k factors;
Missile = 1000}
Reliability engineering data series - D.R.
Aircraft = 50} Earles - April 1962, page Z9.
Ground = 8)
The resultant basic failure rate was then multiplied by the
appropriate "k" factor consistent with the mission profile.
4.13.1 Canopus Sensor
This sensor provides a basic attitude reference for the system and
for all practical purposes is in operation throughout the mission. The
etectronics associated with this sensor has an MTBF of 154,000 hours
(Barnes Engineering Data}.
Thus
X - 1 1 - 6494 x 10 .9 hoursMTBF - 154,000
Also the sun shutter is activated by a solenoid.
k = 440 x 10 .9 cycle; FARADA Page 2. 175 Source 50 {Boeing}
For purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that the shutter will oper.
ate 1000 times throughout the mission. In addition, there exists a
capability of ground control under certain conditions should the canopus
sensor fail. This is reflected in the analysis by the use of a criticality
factor of 0.6.*
':'Probability of mission failure should this subsystem fail
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- k kt - O. 6 kkt
e e
-(6494x 10 -9 ) (3001 = 0.998052 0.998831
Pll = e
= e" [(6494 x 10-9)(4336)PZ 1
+ (440 x 10"9)(500 i 0.97Z19 0.98324
= e" [(649 x 10"9)(7Z)P31
+ (440 x 10"9)(10)} 0.99953Z 0.9997Z
= e" [(6494 x 10"9)(7_0)P41
+ (440x 10"9)(90)] 0.9953Z4 0.997195
P51 - e- [(6494x 10-9)(3600)
+ (440 x 10"9)(400)] O. 97687 O. 98609
Pml = (PII)(Pzl)(P31)(P41)(P51) = 0.94Z98 0.965443
where
Pml = mission reliability for Block 1 = Pl
The Canopus sensor was considered fully redundant in several of the
options explored (see Table 1).
Thus,
Pll = 1 - (1 - Pll )z = 0.9999986
PZI = i - (I - PZl )z = 0.9997Z
P31 = 1 - (i - P31 )z = 0.999999
P41 = 1 - (i - P41 )z = 0.99999ZZ
P5I = 1 - (i - P51 )z = 0.999807
)zPm_ = 1 - (i - Pml - 0.998806
Where P' refers to redundant configuration with ground override.
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4.13.Z Coarse Sun Sensor (2 Required)
These sensors provide the other basic attitude reference for the
system and are in operation for the entire mission, A criticality factor
of 0.5 is associated with these sensors since under certain conditions the
fine sun sensor in combination with one of the coarse semsors can success-
fully perform the intended function. Table 2 is a breakdown of the parts
associated with the coarse sun sensors. This table also shows the corres-
ponding failure rates for the individual items as well as for the sum.
Table 2
Failure T otal
Rate Failure rate
Item Quantity x 10-ghrs x 10-9 hrs
1-inch diam. solar cell 4 75 300
Metal film resistor 2Z 10 220
Capa c it o r (Tantalum) 4 20 80
Capacitor (ceramic) 4 15 60 -
Linear integrated circuits (uA702) 4 80 320
98O
-(0.5)(980 x ).0-9)(300) = 0.999853
P12 = e
-(0,5)(980 x i0"9)(4336) = 0.997875
P22 = e
-(0,5)(980 x I0"9)(72) = 0.999965
P3Z = e
-(0.5)(980 x I0"9)(720_ = 0.999649
P4Z = e
-(0.5)(980 x 10"9)(3600) = 0. 998236
P52 = e
PmZ = (PIz)(PZZ)(P3Z)(P4z)(P5z) = 0.995584
4.13.3 Fine Sun Sensor
This sensor operates for the entire mission and also has a 0.5
criticality factor associated with it in that the coarse sun sensors can
under certain conditions perform the intended function. Table 3 is a
breakdown of the parts associated with the fine sun sensor. This table
also shows the corresponding failure rates for the individual items as
well as for the sum.
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Table 3
Total
Failure Failure
Rate Rate
Item Quantity x 10 -9 hrs x 10 -9 hrs
Radiation tracking transducer 1 300"I, 300
Resistor (Metal film) ZZ I0 220
Capacitor (Tantalum) 4 Z 0 80
Capacitor (Ceramic) Z 15 30
Linear Integrated Circuit (uA70Z) 2 80 160
790
":'Assumed failure rate of 4 times that of a solar cell.
-(0.5)(790 x 10-9)(300) = 0.999882
P13 = e
-(0.5)(790 x 10-9)(4336) = 0.998287
Pz3 = e
-(0.5)(790 x 10"9)(72) = 0.999972
P33 = e
e-(0.5)(790 x 10 -9 ) (720) _ 0.999716
P43
-(0.5)(790 x 10"9)(3600) = 0.998578
P53 = e
Pro3 = (PI3)(Pz3)(P33)(P43)(P53) = 0.996439
4.13.4 Control Gyro Assembly
This assembly has an approximate 2"/0duty cycle and is used pri-
marily during spacecraft orientation for Midcourse maneuvers and
retro. It will also be used during occultation while in Mars orbit.
Table 4 is a breakdown of the parts associated with thecontrol gyro
assembly. This table also shows the corresponding failure rates for
the individual items as well as for the sum.
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Table 4
Failure Total
Rate Failure rate
Item Quantity xl0"9hrs xl0-9hrs
a. Gyro (integrating) 3 i000':-" 3000
b. Resistors 840 i0 8400
c. Capacitors 60 30 i800
d. Capacitors 60 20 1200
e. Diodes G.P. 66 15 990
f. Transistors G.P. 183 50 9150
g. Transformers 3 120 360
h. Diodes, Zener 24 40 960
i. Linear Integrated Ckt. (uA70Z) IZ 80 960
26,820
":'FARADA Page 2.321 Source 136 (Wright-Patterson)
-(z6,8z0x 10"9)(300)
P14 = e = 0. 991954
-(26,820 x 10 "9) (141 6)':,
P24 = e " = 0.996202
-(26, s20 x 10 "9) (23)*
P34 = e = 0.999383
-(26,820 x 10"9) (14.4);:'*
P44 =e = 0.999614
-(Z6,820 x 10-9) (72)*".,
P54 = e = 0.998069
Pro4 = (PI4)(PZ4)(P34)(P44)(P54) = O. 985290
* Z% of cruise and 100% of maneuver time
** 2% of cruise time.
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REACTION THRUST CONTROL AND SIGNAL ELECTRONICS
Detailed analysis is minimum. (Copy attached. )
Reaction Thrust Control
This assembly operates for the entire mission after launch and keeps
the spacecraft in the proper desired attitude throughout the mission.
Table 5 is a breakdown of the parts associated with the reaction
thrust control. This table also shows the corresponding failure rates
for the individual items as well as for the sum. The solenoid valves
were assumed to operate a total of 30,0OO cycles during the mission.
Failure Total
Item Quantity Rate Faille Rate
x 10-9 hrs x i0" hrs
-- j
a. Regulator i (a_ 8680 hrs
b. Solenoid valves 6 (b) 700 cyc. -
c. Pressure transducer 2 (c) .7 cyc. -
d. Pressure vessel I (d) 80 80
e. Nozzle 6 (e) _O.2 242.12
f.Fillv,ave 1 .62 .62
g. Plumbing set 1 (6) I00 I00
9102.74
TABLE5
a) FARADA Page 2.361 source 70 (North American Aviation)
b) Leakage assumed negligible due to dual seat valve FARADA page 2.416
source 136 (Wright-Patterson)
c) FARADA page 2.388 source 136 (Wright-Patterson)
d) Reliability Engineering Data aeries, Avco - April 1962 - page 83
Z94
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e) FARADA page 2.348, source 123 (Chance Vought)
f) FARADA page 2.403, source 83 (Grumman) x .01 to account for valve
being capped.
g) Reliability Engineering Data seriem, Avco - April 1962 - page 74,
assuming _ connections will be brazed or welded.
P : l - (18o.6zx lO'gi(30o): "-.S099_
15
P25 " 1 - _(mo2.74_ lO"9)(_3_)+(5ooo)(?m._o'9)] : .9579_
P3_ " 1 - _(91o2.?__ lO"9)(72)+(_oo)(?o1._x lO-9)_ • .so899_
P_5 : l - [(gloz.?_ x lO"9) (?z_)+(_5oo)(?Ol._x lO'9)] : .99oz9
P55 : l - [(mo2.':_ x lO'9)(:_oo)+ (2o,ooo)(?Ol._,x lO"9)_] • .9_-_
* Pressure vessel, fill valve and plumbing set are applicable in Phase 1.
The relatively low reliability of this assembly made it subject to improvement.
This assembly _as made fully redundant in several of the optionr considered.
The reliabilities for the fully redundant reaction thrust control subsystem
are:
, 2
P15 -- 1 - (1 - P15 ) = .99999999
!
P2_ : l- (l-P25)2 : .998228
P35' : z- (I -P35)2 = .999999
, 2
P45 : l- (l- ._5) = .9999o6
' : l- (l-P55)2 = .9979lI=55
' 2
PMs =' l- (Z-PMS) : .997255
Z95
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Control Signal Electronics
This subsystem operates for the entire mission and is responsible for
the proper operation of the stabilization and control system. Table 6
is a breakdown of the parts associated with the control signal electronics.
This table shows the corresponding failure rates for the individual items
as well as for the sum.
FAILURE RATE TOTAL FAILURE RATE
IT_ QUANTITY 7,/.0"9H_S xlO-9 KRS
a. Resistor 356 8 28_8
b. Capacitors (tantalum) 24 20 _80
c. Diodes G.P. 28 15 420
d. Flip Flop Integrated Ckts 23 35 475
e. Gate Integrated Ckts 25 35 _75
f. Medium Power Transistor 24 130 _i_0
g. Low Power Transistor 59 50 2950
h. Power Diodes 8 i00 900
i. Medium Transformers 2 120 2_O
J. Capacitor (Paper Ceramic) _6 30 1080
k. Linear Integrated Ckt. (uAT02) 21 80 1680
P16 " e'(15368 x lO°9) (3OO) @ 99_ _9=
P26- e-(15368 x 10"9) (4336) ._.93556
P36- e"(15368 x 10-9) (72) = .99889_
-(15368 x I0-9) (720) = .98896P46 : e
-(15368 x IO-9) (3600) ,, .94620
P56 : •
PM6 CP16)(P26) (P36) (PI_.6) (P56)".870h54
The relatively low reliability of this assembly made it an appropriate candidate
for improvement. This was accomplished with the addition of selected redundancies
such as triple redundant va._vedriver_ with _he following results.
Z96
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t ! ! ! | I
FMe = (PA_) (P26) (P36) (P_6) (P56)
Thu_ by increastn6 the weight _y &pgroximstely 50_p:,_ closel,y approach the rcltn._.] Lty
that vould be obt_tned by complete redundancy.
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RELIABILITY TRADEOFF STUDIES INVOLVING
PROPOSED ALTERNATE CONFIGURATIONS (AUGMENTED
VERSION) OF THE PROPULSION PRESSURIZATION AND
PP.OPELLANT FEED SUBSYSTEM
This section presents the analysis and reliability assessments of
several proposed component arrangement, and their impact on the total
subsystem weight. Specifically, the method used to configurate the pro-
pulsion pressurization and propellant feed subsystem was to vary the
shutoff and pressurization design configuration (denoted by G-) and also
to to vary the pressure regulation design configuration (denoted by H-).
Included in this section is a schematic diagram of each of the com-
ponent configurations along with necessary basic assumptions made in
deriving thu equations used to assess the reliability.
The results, showing the reliability assessments and the associated
increase in weight above that of the baseline configuration, are presented
in Table I. This tabular format makes evident significant trends pertain-
ing to the reliability and weight parameters.
298
1966011762-319
TABLE I
MODIFICArIONS TO A-Z AND
C ONFIG URA T I C)_NS
Reliability Reliability
Modification Mission Weisht IMilsion} WeiRht
G-I 9(Z)748 + 0.51bs. 9(_)686 + 1.01bl.
G-Z 9(4)O_2 + Z. 5 lbs. 9(3)B79 + 3.5 Ibs.
G-3 9(7)307 + 3. 3 Ibs. 9(7)300- + 3.3 ibs.
H-I 9(6)769 + 7. 9 Ibs. 9(5)867 + 7. 9 Ibs.
H-2 9(3)809 + I.9 Ibs. 9(3)233 + I.9 Ibs,
H-3 9(5)135 + 5. 5 Ibs. 9(5)101 + 5.5 Ibs.
Q G-I and H-I 9(Z)748 + 8.4 iba. 9(Z)683 + ft.9 ibs.
Q G-I and H-2 9(Z)729 + Z. 4 ibs. 9(Z)610 + Z. 9 Ibs.
Q G-I and H-3 9(2)747 + 6. 0 Ibs. 9(Z)685 + 6.5 Ibs.
Q G-Z and H-I 9(_)0,50 +I0.4 Ibs. 9(3)87B +II. 4 Ibs.
Q G-Z and 11-2 9(3)712 + 4. 4 ibs. 9(B)l _ + 5.4 Ibs.
Q G-Z and H-3 9($)B95 + 8.0 ib,. 9(3)87_) + 9.0 Ibs.
Q G-3 and H-I 9(6)700 +II. Z Ibs. 9(5)860 +II. Z lbs.
G-3 and H-Z 9(3)808 + 5.Z ibs. 9(3)Z3Z + 5.2 Ibs.
G-3 and H-3 9(5)iZ8 + ".8 Ibs, 9(5)094 + 8.8 Ibe.
G-4 9(Z)881 + I,01bs.
G-5 9(4)7a5 + I.9 ibs.
G G-4 and H-I 9(2)880 + 8. 9 Ibs.
G-4 and H-Z 9(7)86Z + 2. 9 Ibs.
Q G-4 and H-3 9(2)880 + 6. 5 ibs.
Q O-5 and H-1 9(_)'/_._ + 9. 8 ibs.
G-5 and H-Z 9_)7_ + 3.8 ibs.
G-5 and H-3 9(_')_:_59 + 7.4 Ibs.
Z99
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_ L. _ _ _ Fifth branch
AN 81 _ ]) _": i• applicableT7-...
tothe
NC_ ;_ N{:)_ _ N(_v_--_ N_-_ bipropellant
This particular configuration utilizes a normally open and a normally closed
explo•ive valvet in series for each branch, to be u•ed to pressurize and sub-
• equently shut off the pres•urization function. Since four engine starts are
nece•s;_ry for the monopropellant configuration and five engine starts are
neces•ary for the bipropellant configuration, four and five pressurization
path• are required respectively. For analysis purposes, these paths are
labeled from left to right as A, B, C, D, and E. It becomes readily apparent
that this particular configuration ha• no redundancy built into it. Also, the
operation of each pressurization branch is independent of its neighbor, and
all branches have an equal probability of success.
THEORYOr Qr.2ALI
For the purpose of analysis, it will be assumed that branch "A" is the first
de•irable pressurization path, Upon command, the normally closed valve is
actuated. This allows the pressurization ga• to flow through the pressuriza-
tion module for the specified amount of time, expel.ling the fuel into the engine
combustion chamber, facilitating engine firing until the appropriate mid-
course correction has been made. Once this happens, the normally open valve
in branch "A" is commanded closed and pres•iruzation of the system cease•.
For the monopropsllant cor_iguration, this procedure would be repeated for
pre••_a.isation paths "B". "C" and 'WDV'. For the bipropellant configuration.
thi• procsdul.s would also be perfot, med for pressurizatiou path "E" to facff°
irate the noco•sary retropropul•ion maneuver.
INVEgTYGATIOI_ OF _ FAYLURE _IODER
A reliability analysis of explosive squib valves was conducted in conjunction
with the reliability aosemsments performed on the augmented and baseline
version| M the men•propellant and bipropellant configurations {•ee DAC-
VOYAGER Memo DAC-VM-28, dated 6-Z4-65}. The failure modes determined
weirs:
1. Explosive valve gaffs to fire (both normally open and normally closed)
2. Explosive valve fire• prematurely (both normally open and normally
closed)
3. Normally open explo•ive valve leak• after' clo•ing.
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G.-I (continued)
The probabilities of failure asso,'lated with these three failure modes are
re spectively:
-6
I. Pfl = Z94x I0
-6
Z. Pfz = 6 x lO
-6
3. Pf3 = 29.4 x I0
DER/VATION _ RELIADILIT¥
The probability of failure associated with branches A,B,C,D and E is the
same and is equal to the probability that either the normally open or normally
closed valve fails to fire plus the probability that either explosive valve flrem
prematurely plus the probability that the normally open valve leaks after
closing. Algebraically, this can be represented as follows:
Pf = ZPfl + Zl:'fZ+ Pf3 ± Znd and higher order terms
per
branch
Reliability : I - Pf = 1 - ?fl + ZPfz+Pf3 ]per per
branch branch
Reliability = FRBr "] VR
mono _ anch_L Branch _l_RBranch C1 _Branch _
c onfig
Reliabilit_ = _Branch_R._ranch _IRBranchC][RBranch D] [RBranch E]
config
Since the reliability of the branches is equal:
mono , per
config t..; branch]
Rbi =[Rper 1 5config branch_
P_per :I'I12941  ZI6_+'9.4](I0"61:(6Z9.4_i0-6
branch
Rpe r = i- Pf = I- 6Z9.4(I0 -6)
branch per
branch
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G-I (continued)
R = .9(3)3706
per
branch
Rmono = [Rper -] 4 = 0.99937064
conflg Lbranch_
F- ....... ,_ -I
I R = •9`2,748 I
mono
I conflg I
branc
conflg L, .- _--
f 1.9(21686)I Rbl
I conflg I
30Z
4.
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_7_ _'17....i,_
Fifth branch (E) used only in blpropellant configuration.
INTRODUCTION
This p_rticular configuration is very similar to the G-1 configuration. The major
difference is the introduction of additional explosive valves in each branch to facil-
itate redundancy. The redundancy is accomplished by utilizing two normally open
explosive valves in series with two normally closed explosive valves in parallel.
This arrangement of explosive valving is used in each of five pressurization paths. ,
Since four engine starts are necessary for the monopropellant configuration and
five engine starts are necessary for the bipropellAnt configuration, four and five
pressurisation paths are required respectively. For analysis purposes, these paths
are labeled fresh left to right as A, B, C, D and E. It becomes readily apparent
that this particular configuration offers dual redundant prot_ection against the "fails
to fire" mode of failure for both the normally open and normally closed explosive
valve. Dual redundant protection is also offered against the "leakage" failure mode
of a normal_y open explosive valve after it has been fired. The probability of failure
of each branch associated with the premature firing of the explosive valves is twice
that of the G-I configuration because of the use of additional explosive valves.
For the purpose of analysis, it will be aastnned that branch "A" is the first desirable
pressurisation path. Upon c_and, the norxnaily closed valves #3 and #4 are actu-
ated. It is only necessary for one of these two explosive valves to actuate to achieve
success/w/pressurisation of the system. The pressurisation gas then flows through
the pressurisation module for the specified amount of time, expelling the fuel into the
elqKine coa_bustiowcharnber, flLcilit_ting e_ine firing until the appropriate n_d-course
correction has been made. Once this happens, the normally open valves #1 and #2
of branch A are commanded closed. Again, it is only necessary for one of these two
valves to successfully close to shut off the pressurisation of this system. For the
monopropellant configurat/on, th/s _rocedure would be repeated for pressurization
paths "B", "C" and "D". For the bipropellant configuration, this procedure would
also be performed for pressurization path "E': tofacilitate the necessary retropro-
Ftlsion maneuver,
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_NVESTIGATION O___FPROBABLE FAILURE MODES
A rellability analysis of explosive squib valves was conducted in conjunction with
the reliability assessments performed on the augmented and baseline versions of
the monopropellant and bipropellant configurations (see DAC-Voyager Mm'no
DAC-VM-28, dated 6-24-65) The failure modes determined were:
I, Explosive valve fails to fire (both normally open and normally closed)
2. Explosive valve fires prematurely (both normally open and normally
closed)
3. Normally open explosive valve leaks after closing.
The l_robabillties of failure associated with these three failure modes are
respect/rely:
I. Pfl = 294x l0 "6
2. ffi6xlO "6
Pf2
3. Pf3 • 29.4xi0 -6
DERIVATION O__FRELIABILITY
The probabillty of failure associated with branches A, B, C, D, and E is the same
and is equal to the probability that both normally closed valves #3 and #4 fail to
fire plus the probability that both normally open valves #I and #2 fall to fire plus
the probability that either explosive valve #I, #Z, #3 or #4 fires prematurely, plus
the probability that both normally open valves #I and #2 leak, after having been
fired. Algebraically, this can be represented as fo]/ows:
Pfper • 2P_ + 4Pf2 + 21 Pf'3 _.+other 2nd and higher order terms
branch
• " Pfper = + 4Pf2 + p2Rpe r I I - (2P_I f3)
branch branch
RelialMlitYcmoO_g = _branch A_branch _ [Rbranch c_[Rbranch
ReltabilitYbionfig = _branch_branch B]_branch C_ Ibranch D_branch _
Since the reliabil/ty of the branches is equal:
Rrr_ono = _per q4
config [ branch.J
Rbi =_per qS
config L. branch_J 3 04
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6)z i 4 _ZPf - Z(Z94xI0" +4(6x 10"b_+ (29. x I0 "b, - Z4.1737x10 -6
per
branch
Rpe r = I = Pf = I - Z4. 17 (I0 "6)
branch perbr_nch
R - 9141758 +
per
branch
'
[I_ 914103Z ]
mOTto
[ config ...I
= _.Rper 35 • 914)758 5Rbl branc_
config
j r_bl • 9131879 I
I. Config j
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IG 3
This configuration was analyzed in detail as part of the reliability analysis of
the augmented versions of the monopropellant and bipropellant configurations
in DAC-Voyager Memo DAC-VM-28, dated 6-24-65. This arrangement of
solenoid valve is colloqu_11y called the "quad solenoid" configuration.
THe.,ORY _._
This configuration has power applied to the solenoid valves only when the sys-
tem is being pressurized to facilitate engine firing. It is necessary for either
valves #i and #2 or valves #3 and #4 to open successfully to facilitate system
pressurization. It is also necessary for either valves #3 or #4; or valves #I
or #2 to both close su :essfully and not leak to bring about system depressuri-
zation. Therefore, t_:s configuration is redundant for both the "leakage" mode
of failure and the "fails to open" or "fails to close" mode of failure.
INVESTIGATIO N OF _ FA.ILU_E
Each single solenoid has the following failure _,modes:
I. Solenoid valve fails to open
2. Solenoid valve fails to close
3. Solenoid valve leaks after closing/or normally r.loeed valve leaks.
The probabilities of failure associated with these failure modes are respectively:
• (1-s o) = 0. 42 x 10"8/c¥cle 4 cycles will be required for phase 2
Z. (1-s c) = 0. 056 x 10"8/cycle associated with the required mid-coursecorrections, and I cycle will be required
3. (1-S) = 131.58 x 10"8/hr for phase 3 to f_cilitate retropropuielon.
mission
The phases mentioned here are as defined in DAC-Voyager Memo DAC-VM-28,
dated 6-24-65. Also, a phase 5 h_s been added for this analysis. Phase 3 is
defined as an additional five-month period during which the spacecraft orbits
Mars. Actually, this particular portion of the pressurization system need func-
tion properly only during Inhase8 1, 2, and 3. Only failure mode 3 is applicable
during Phase 1! failure modes 1, 2 and 3 are appl/cable during Phase _-i failure
modes 1 and 2 are applicable during Phase 3 for the bipropellant conYiguration
only.
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DERIVATION OF _EI.T_BILITY EQUATIONS
- _ ]_R _ *R.f.rtopp 30-31 51 of
*Rmono phase phase DAC-VM-28 Memo dated
config 6-24- 65.
Phase 1
7Rphase I = Rquad solenol_ - (l-S_ )leakage phase I
Phase 2
Rph_..2 =_q._d.ole-o,d_ ERq--d.o,.-o,d_Lleakage phase cycle phase 2J
2
leakage phase 2 phase 2
,,_Rquad solenoid = So484+c 48483oo (l-Sc)+ 404oS2c (!'Sc)2+ 403o (l'So) °3c
cycle
sz )+zsZ(l.,Zo),z +4,Zo11.,o)Z%111+ 8a3o (l'So) c (l"Sc o c "Sc
This equation gives the rel/abLUty of the quad solenoid for failure in the "open"
or "closed" mode. The rellabflit]_ of the quad solenoid conllguration was ca/-
culated to be greater than I-- 10"Y.
Phase 3
,j'r.I quad solenoid - (I-SRphase 3 = " (1"S_phaee 1 L. 4 cycles phase phase 2
Rmono = 9191853 9191+ 9171697
config
m o11o
I con.fig I
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Rbi = - (I - S_ quad solenoid - (l - S_phase Z
config phase I L 4 cycleo phase
Rquad solenoid I *1 cycle phase
Rbi = 9(9)8_3 9(9)+ 9(7)697 9(9_
c on.fig
m m J m
I = 9(7)300 I
I Rbi J
[ config .l
* Page 51 of DAC-VM-28 Merr.o, dated 6-7.4-65
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G-4 ' T
I
1
• • probability that • norm&lly closed valve opens successfully.
b • probability that • norrr_lly open valve closes successfully.
¢ • probability that • normally open valve does not leak after closing.
RG. 4 = {&bc)4 + 3a4b3(l-b)c3&bc + 4•3(1-a)b3c4abc + a4b3(l-b)
+ (0. 5)a464c3(1-c) + 0. 5 a4b4c2(1-c)2(10) + 3rd and higher order :errns
m
- = O.999706 • = eoi., = O. 999994• " • C
(1-_) = O. 000294 (l-c) = O. 000006 ffi 6 x 10 .6
a 2 = O. 99941209 (l-c) 2 = 36 x 10 "IZ
,4 = O. 998824:5" c 2 = O. 999989
a 7 = 0. 9979438 c3 = 0. 999982
a 8 = 0. 99765044 ¢4 = 0. 999976
• 9 0. 99735713 c 5 = 0. 999970
b=e = 0.999706
0
RG. 4 = O. 99767-65
+0. 0008796
+ O. 0000117
+ O. 0001934
+0. 0000003
+ O, 0000000
[ o.998811s1
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G5 t
r
i
The reli&bility ar_lysis and assessments of the ,-_-S conCigur&tion will be submitted
a_ part of the TRW input. The result of this m_alysls is given in T&ble I and Figure I.
:10
I
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H I
This particular coMiguration offers protection against both the underpressur-
ization and overpressurization modes of failure.
A logic diagram has been attached showing the results of all outcomes including
success and failures. The regulators are designated A_ Bt C, and D.
The following ground rules and definitionsare _pplicable to the derivation of the
reliabilityexpression for the success criterion associated with phase 2 and
phase 3.
R = R
mono phase 2
config
O A = O B = O C = O D ---Probability of regulator not faiXing in the overpres-
surization mode.
OA = _B = _C -_D m Probability of regulator failing in the overpressuri-
zation mode.
U A = U B = U C = U D -=Probability of regulator not failing in the underpres-
surization mode.
_'A = _'B = _'C = _'D -=Probability of regulator failingin the underpressuri-
zation mode.
O 2 = 9(3)708 Referring to the logic diagram, the probability of the
outcome is as follows:
_2 = 013)2_2
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H- 1 (continued)
-- - __03 = 9(3)128 (OAOBUBODUD) + O O D + (OAOBUBODOcU C)
U3 = 9(3)4_3 The terms in parentheses contribute to success! the termsin brackets contribute to failure.
U-3 = 0(3)577
Phase g
Probability of Success is the sum of the following terms:
OzU z = (9(3)708)(9(3)809) 9995170558
OzUz-Uz = 9(3)708 Z(9(3)809)(0(3)191) 00019085Z0
(Z)OZ_U-zUz = (Z) 9(3)708 Z(0(3)Z9Z)(0(3)191)(9(3)809) 0000001115
oz_zuz = (9(3)708)(0(3)z9z)(93)809) 000z918589
z--z -- (3 z z 9(3 (0(3OzOzUzU z -- 9 )700 0(3)Z9Z )809 )191 0000000000
ffi .999999878Z
Probability of Failure ia the sum of the following terms:
ozZ_z - (9(317o8)Z(o(3)1911z 0000000364
Z_'zZO"z -" (9(3)708)Z(0(3)191)Z(O(3)Z9Z) 00000000000 z
_z_z0z - (0(3)zgz)(0(3)I91)(,)(3)708) oooooooss8
Z-Z
OzUz(5 z • (9(3)708)Z(0(3)191 )Z(0(3)zgz) 0000000000
UZ --Z..Z )Z(0(3 )ZZuZuZ = (0(3)191 )zgz)Z(9(3)708 0000000000
O_OzV z -- (0(3)_-9Z)Z(9(3)708)(0(3)191 ) 0000000000
- (O(3)Z9Z)z 0000-_00853
31Z .0000001775
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1:51&e e ,,3
ProbLbility of Success is the Jurn of the followin 8 torso:
P
03U 3 - (9(3)128)(9(3)423) 9986615031
OZ3U3"0'3 ,,, (9(3)128)2(9(3)423)(0(3)577) * 0005756618
2 02303_'3'[7"3 • (2)(9(3)128)2(0(3)872)(0(3)577)(9(3)423) ¶ 0000010039
03 8'3U3 - (9 (3)128 )(0(3)872 )(9(3)423) 0008707369
Z=Z
0303 U 3'_ 3 = (9 (3)XZ8 )(0 (3)872 )2(9(3 )4?..3)(0 (3)577 ) 0000000004
• 9999989061
Probability of Failure is the sum of the following terms:
Z 7_
03U 3 • (9 (3)128)2(0(3 )577)2 0000003323
02_3i_3 • (9 (3)128 )Z(0(3)577)2(0(3)872) 0000000003
'_'U'303 = (0 (3)87Z )2(0(3)577 )(9 (3)128 ) 0000000003
03U32''-'£(_3 • (9 (3)128 )2(0(3 )577)2(0 (3)872) ooooooooo3
.-_.-Zu303032 ,_ (0(3)577)Z(0(3)872)2(9(3)128) 0000000000
O_ 03_' 3 • (0(3)872 )3(9(3)128)(9 (3)423 ) 0000000006
=2
03 • (0 (3)872)Z 0000007602
i | .i
0000010940
Rmono • Rphase Z
config
:
:
, oo._..g ........ ,
co ,, L ,] """'""""'*'
I I
JIRb i = 9(5)8671tI I
I
: confl8 ,
i ................. I 3i3
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H-?
ID?sl
I
I
,
...._Ops'I
1-_al
This configuration offers additional protection against failures that might
result due _.ooverpressurization of the regulator. The two pressure
switches are set at a value of 330 psi. Iffor some reason the regulator
fails to regulate at 310 psi and the downstream pressure tries to increase,
the two pressure switches pick up when the downstream pressure reaches
330 psi. When the two pressure switches pick up, the normally open
solenoid valve is commanded closed. If either pressure switch fails to
pick up or prematurely drops out, the solenoid valve would remain in the
normally open position, resulting in a failure.
DE_IVA TiQN QF RE LIABILITY E_UATIQNS:
Rmisslon =[Rphase _[Rphase _
P = Probability of success associated with the underpressurization
2 reg mode of the regulator for phase 2under
P = 913)809
2 reg
under
P = Probability of success associated with the overpressurization
reg
2 mode of the regulator for phase 2
ore r
p _ 9131708
2 reg
over
m
P2freg = Probabil._,ty of failure associated with the overpressurizationmode of the regulator for phase 2over
315
1966011762-336
H-2 (continued)
= 0(3)zgz
2f reg
ovltr
P = 9(6)440
pres
SW
S = Probability the solenoid valve cycles successfully
0
S = 916)524
0
Assume 4cycles(n 2) necessary during phase 2 and 1 cycle (n3) necessary
during phase 3.
sl = Probability the solenoid does no'. leak during phase 2 when
._phase 2 it has been closedp = 9 (3)
P = Probability of success associated with the underpressurization
3 underreg mode of the regulator for phase 3
P = 9(3)423
3 reg
under
P -- Probability of success associated with the overpressurization
3 reg mode of the regulator for Phase 3
over
p = 9(3)iz8
3 reg
over
P = Probability of failure associated with the overpressurization
reg
mode of the regulator for phase 33f over
F - 0(3)872
reg
3f
ore r
reg]r P reg re, _phase
Rphase 2 = 2unde_L 2°ver-I P2f over ,r" ,
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H- 2 (continued)
= + (Pprel)Rphase 3 reg re reg o) 3
unde_ 3 ove_ P3f over sw
Rphase 2 :_(3)809-]_(3)708_ + 0(3)292_9(6)524)4(9(6)440)4(9(3)877)_
R _ 0.9995170558 + 0(3)292 (9(3)8728565)
phase 2
R : 9(3)809
phase 2
Rphase 3 : (3)42 (3)128j+ 0(3}872 (6)5Z4)I(9(6)440
R = 0.9985515031 + 0"3"8719991( _
phase 3
R : 9(3)4Z4
phase 3
!
!
'_R = 9(3)809| mono
,'conflg
!
Rbi :.VRphase3]_pha.e-3"J = (9(3)809)(9(3)424)
config
!
!
Rbt = 9(3) Z33
',conflg
m
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This particular configuration offers protection from both the underpressurization
and overpressurizationmodes of failure. H the pressure of the system attempts
to go over 330 psi, the high pressure switch picks up and closes the normally open
solenoid valve. The high pressure switch keeps c_cling until the system again
regulates at the nornirml pressure of 310 psi. If the pressure of the system attempts
to decrease to a value below Z90 psi, the low pressure switch picks up and opens the
normally closed valve or, the left. The regulator in this branch then regulates at
290 psi.
DERIVAT_[ON OF RELIAB_]_T" _
I. The failure modes and probabilities of failure associated with the
regulators are equal to the values shown in the "Failure Mode
Probability Summary" of DAC-Voyager Memo DAC-VM-28, dated
6-Z4-65.
2. Assume 100 cycles of operation for each pressure switch. Of these,
4 actuations will be applicable to phase 2 and I actuation will be
applicable to phase 3.
3. The probability of failure of the pressure switch shall be
0. Z8 x 10"6/actuation._Pf
pr
SW
4. Phases I and 4 are not applicable for eithe," the bipropellant or mono-
propellant configuration except for the solenoid leakage of Phase I.
Phase 3 is only applicable for the bipropellant configuration.
Therefore: Reliabilitysystem = _under 7_over 7" [l'PftA]_'IOf_L pressureJLpressurej
Pf2u = Probability of failure associated with the underpresaurization mode of theregulator for phase 2.
Pf2u " 191 x 10 "6
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H-3 (continued)
Pf20 = Probability of failure associated with the., overpressurisation modeof the regulator for phase 2
Pf20 " 292 x 10.6
Pf3U = Probability of failure associated with the underpressurisation modeof the regulator fo ph e 3
Pf3u = 577 x 10.6
Pf30 = Probability of failure associated _ ith the overpremmurisation modeof the regulator for ph e 3
Pf30 = 872 x 10-6
o
S • Probability the solenoid will open and stay open = 0. 42 x 10 .6O
S = Probability the solenoid valve does not cycle successfully
cycle
S • O. 476 x 10 .6 (fo_lr cyclbs are reqttired for phase 2 and one
cycle cycle is required for pl_se 3. )
n = number of cycles
5| = Probability the normally open solenoid leaks after closing
J_ • 8.58 x I0 "6
phase I
IZ3 x I0-6
S_phlse Z =
319
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Rphase l = Probability the normally closed solenoid valve doesn't leak
Rphase I • 1 - S_phase = I - 8.58 x I0 "6 = 9(5)1421
I oTIu7 ?+Rphas e 2 Pf2= Pfz Jw" " + Pfzo phase
PfZU ._/L 1"Pf20 "PfZUl+
Pf3 U"
_I-%) (l-So)(i- ) (I-Pf3U_
'_ Pf]o
r_,--l,, .,,.o.,,.,o-t.
[,,,,o,--,o-1E- [ :]- x 123 x I0" 191 x I0"6 I-(I)(0.14x I0"
[{I-0.42 x 10.6 )(l-Zq2 x 10.6){I-191 x I0"6)_
L J
Rphase 3 = - 872 x I0" - 577 x I0"
I-<'><o.,,_.,o-_]+<_,,.,o-_>[,.<,> .o., .,o-1,,.o.,,., -_,
x (1-872 x 10"6)(1-577 x 10"6)
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Rphase 2, = 9(3)708 9(3)809 _ 0(3)2"92 (9(5)888) (9(5)8096) (9(3)877 +
0(3)191(9(6)860)(9(6)580)(9(3)708)(9(3)809)
Rphase Z " 9(3)5170558+ (0(3)zgz)(9(3)8733976)+ (0(3)191)(9(3)5164959)
R = 9(7)2,67phase Z
Rpha_e 3 = 9(3)1289(3)4Z3+ 0(3)872(9(6)780)(9(6)52"4) +
0(3)577(9(6)840)/9(0)580)(9(3)128)(9(3)423)
Rphase 3 = (9(Z)8551503)+ (0(3)87Z)(9(6)304)+ 0(3)577(9(Z)855)
}_ = 9,61
phase 3
i_ = _v R = ,:9,5t)1t2 9,7t )Z67
n_ono phase: I phase 2
config
k = 9_:'q 35
rnono
config
= 9 (5_
Rbi = Rph_se 1 i_phase 2 Rphase 3 '142 9(7)Z67 9(6)666
config
!
config I
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APPENDIX C
MICROELECTRONICS PLANNING AND CONTROL
1. INTRODUCTION
A continuing study is in progress at TRW to determine the state
of the art of monolithic integrated circuits and to justify the replace-
ment of discrete parts with integrated circuits on a reliability basis.
In general, it is felt that this point has been reached for low
power level repetitive digital functions such as are typified by digital
operations, excluding memory, in the central sequencing and command
subsystem. For this function approximately five and certainly no more
than eight individual monolothic integrated-circuit types are required
and are currently available. This small number makes it feasible to
qualify such circuits on a timely basis for Voyager use. In addition to
this class of digital circuits we have tentatively proposed the use of the
Fairchild p A702 analog DC amplifier in the stabilization and control
subsystem. This circuit is _n an advanced stage of verification for
Vela and Apollo and promises improved reliability over its discrete-
part equivalent.
Particular attention has .been given to the Voyager mission
specification which states:
"Attempts to advance technology by using parts, materials,
and processes which cannot demonstrate a history of re-
liability shall be prohibited {unless such advances are clearly
necessary to meet minimum performance requirements). "
Except for this prohibition, TRW would have proposed more extensive
use of integrated circuits than the very limited set indicated above.
The following discussion justifies the position that the selected
integrated circuits are compatible with the mission specification con-
straint. It should also justify the position that as the Voyager space-
craft evolves through the various flight opportunities the reliability
can be improved by expanding the use of integrated circuits.
32Z
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2. TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The advent of silicon planar epitaxial passivation technology in the
manufacture of semiconductor devices produced transistors and diodes
whose reliability and versatility achieved unprecedented levels of suc-
cess. In the "language:' of part failure rates*, this generic class of
devices has reached a well documented level of success characterized
by:
Transistors Z0 bits (i.e., 20 x 10 -9
failures per hour)
Diodes 4 bits
In addition, this silicon planar technology made the monolithic integrated
circuit a practical reality, which, for selected functions, is rapidly re-
placing its discrete counterpart. Integrated circuits can be viewed,
therefore, as part of the continuum of the materials and processes of
transistor technology. Their counterpart is the typical circuit "module"
(such as welded circuit modules and sectors of printed circuits) cur-
rently used in electronic equipment. As shown in Figure C-l, a compari-
son of the technological tree of circuit module manufacture versus that
for integrated circuits clearly demonstrates that:
a) The cumulative quantity of technological steps required
by integrated circuits is considerably smaller than that
required for circuit modules.
b) The variety of technologies required by circuit modules
(i.e., resistors, capacitors, semiconductors) is much
greater than that for integrated circuit_.
c) The number of physical locations of fabrication activities
for circuit modules is greater than for integrated circuits
(i. e., the creation of a circuit module requires fabrication
and procurement of a diverse array of parts and materials
to be further fabricated into a module by the user, while
an integrated circuit is essentially completed at a single
manufacturer's facility).
,:,Failure rates were computed at an ambient temperature of Z5°C and
Z5 per cent rated power.
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Figure C-I. Comparative Manufacturing Technology, Discrete
Component Versus Integrated Circuit
Practical equipment production normally requires multiple sources
for critical components. As Figure C-I shows, the diversity of parts
required for a typical welded module greatly increases the complexity
of the multiple source problem in comparison with the relatively simple
requirements for integrated circuits. The integrated circuit is a much
more homogeneous product than the welded module; although both units
have the same functional mission, the dispersion of physical and elec-
trical properties of the module is far greater.
In considering the comparison of the two manufacturing technolo-
gies, the factor of declining versus ascending production lines is a
significant consideration. This is illustrated by recent experience with
3Z4
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the family of military parts specifications identified as the "38100
Series, " which described the devices in the guidance computer of _-
major weapons system. The reasons for the release of these specifi-
cations were apparently quite valid: there had been a multi-miIlion
dollar program to "prove" these devices and issuing military specifi-
cations would make the parts available to general industry, thus in-
creasing the benefits to be derived from past expenditures and efforts.
However, attempts to purchase these parts from suppliers were largely
futile because production lines had been closed down or were declining
since the weapons system had moved on to a new design using integrated
circuits. Many of the suppliers, of course, were willing to sell the
devices at the cost (amortized in parts prices) of reopening closed pro-
duction activities. Therefore, a decision based solely on the use of
"proven" parts requires careful consideratlon of technological dynamics.
Specifically, the choice of discrete electronic parts for digital elec-
tronic circuits to be produced during the 1966 to 1970 period is apt to
require procurement of devices from declining production activities and
technologies, while the choice of integrated circuits will permit pro-
curement from ascending production Lines.
3. HUMAN FACTORS
The consequences of the technological differences between
integrated circuits and circuit modules identify tabulations of human
factors which are distinctly different:
Integrated Circuit Circuit Module
Handling and produc- Approximately Cumulative of
tion fragility 1 semiconductor resistors  capaci-
tors + diodes +
transistors +
assembly + modules
Testing errors Ratio of probabilities indeterminate but
considered clearly in favor of integrated
circuits e.g., chances of surge damage
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Surveillance of Concentration can Concentration re-
sources of supply be effected on quired on many
fewer suppliers more suppliers,
including "in-house"
production facilities
The RFP for the Voyager Phase IA study required an answer to the
following:
"Describe your approach to life-test verification of flight
spacecraft hardware as a function of funding available and
define criteria for successful completion of life tests. "
Let us assume a hypothetical subsystem of spacecraft hardware com-
prised of a family of digital hardware. We can assume a fixed funding
situation in which an attempt is made to provide the system with its
family of hardware as reliably as possible. Consider an equation based
upon the query,
n m
( _, $ process steps)+( X_ $ control steps) = constant funding
1 1
n I n 2
clearly Y, $fprocess steps_ Y, Sfprocess steps_
1 Ifor circuit / > 1 _for integrated I
kmodules J Vir cults j
m 1 m 2
thus E _controlsteps_ Y. $fcontrol steps_
1 I forintegratedJ > 1 I for circuit J
The funding available for controlling the fewer process steps of
integrated circuits configuration under a constant total funding situation
is far in excp.ss of that available for circuit modules using discrete parts.
4. DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING
Referring to Figure C-Z the following general observations may
be tabulated:
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Activity Circuit Modules Integrated Circuits
Circuit and Order and evaluate parts: Evaluate integrated circuits
breadboard develop digital circuits;
development fabricate and evaluate
circuit modules
Margins Worst case parts inser- Worst case power supply
testing tion (limit devices); and thermal variations
worst case power supply
and thermal variations
Packaging Parts selection; packag- Package predefined and
ing design, layout; ma- qualified
terials and processes
evaluation; prototype
package tests
Misapplica- Circuit misapplication of Standard integrated
tion proba- parts; physical mis- circuits less likely to
bilities applications of parts contain misapplied
elements due to Voyager
standardization of inte-
grated circuits
In general, development engineering factors indicate an oppor-
tunity (analogous to the _ase cited in Section 3) to effect greater
visibility to fewer activities needed to arrive at comparable levels of
assembly. The tangible results appear to favor a significant reliability
advantage for integrated circuits.
5. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FACTORS
5. I Redundancy
In a given application where the available power and weight
allowances are permissive of the utilization of either discrete elements
or integrated circuits, a distinct advantage is stillobtained by the use
of integrated circuits via the use of redundancy. TRW studies indicate
this advantage to be applicable to Voyager.
5.2 System Mechanical Design
The over-all physical design of a digital subsystem, being
drastically simplified and reduced in size by the use of integrated
3Z8
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circuits, has "simpler" mechanical and thermal properties. Thus the
analyses of shock and vibration transmissibi_ities and thermal patterns
are drastically reduced and available to increased scrutiny. This ad-
vantage is also available for selected analog circuits where residual
effects are low, matched characteristics are critical, and functions
are highly standardized. Certain operational amplifiers are in this
category but must be expected to have somewhat lower confidence or
higher failure rates for equal complexity.
6. LOGISTIC FACTORS
Referring to Table C-1 it should be noted that the simplification
of the problems of acquisition of parts and materials via the reduction
of variety of required sources of supply again permits mor _. intense
concentration on fewer activities. Associated with this is simplifica-
tion of parts traffic patterns (shipping, receiving, handling), specifi-
cation negotiations, and vendor surveys.
Table C-1. Logistics Comparison, Discrete Component
Versus Digital :ntegrated Circuit
Resistor Suppher A Ft_cxli_/ _,,o'.'ey
Ressstor Supplier nL
Specificatxon DISCRETE PARTS
NegoUatlon
Ca1_cltor Suppher A 40 steps to
receipt of parts
Capacltor Supplier B Qu_hfication for flight hardware
Test
Diode Suppher A
_roduction
Diode Supplier B Monitor
Transistor Supplier A Lot Acceptance
Test
Transistor Supplier B
F&cility Survey INTEGRATED
SpeciflcaUon CIRCUITS
NesotiaUon
Integrated Circuit 10 steps to
Supplier A {:_talification receipt of complete
Test flight circuits
Integ r&ted Circuit P-eduction
Supplier B Monitor
Lot Acceptance
Test
3Z9
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7. STATISTICAL DATA
Statistical rel._bility data for integrated circuits is divided as
follow s:
a) Table C-2 is a tabulation of the failure rates for integrated
circuits experienced in four digital configurations; these
rates were reported to the TRW Systems Reliability Staff.
It should be noted that the composite "laboratory" _x-
perience indicates a failure rate of about 87 x 10 -9-
failures/hour of integrated circuit technology of the 1964
vintage.
b) Figure C-3, taken from a TRW Systems Reliability Staff
study, illustrates the anticipated change in k for integrated
circuits to 1970. This study estimates that digitalinte-
grate_ circuit technology will be characterized by k =_40
x I0- failures/hour by 1965; about 1970, a figure ofkT15 x I0- failures/hour will be approached (i.e., 15 bits).
c) Table C-3is a tabulation of the failure rates under two
reference conditions for the discrete circuit elements
commonly found in computer logic.
Table C-Z. Tabulation of Digital Integrated Circuit Life Test
Data and Resulting Average Bit Failure Rate Estimate
System Circuit Te_t Hours No. No. Observed in
Devices Failures %/1000 hours
Apollo Gu,dance Fairchild RTL 19 x 106 -- 1 0. 0053
Magic I Airborne Fairchild RTL 15.25 x 106 -- Z 0. 0131
Computer
Airborne PCM Texas Instrument -- _30 -- 0.0711
Computer Series 51 and 52
Grumman E-ZA Texas Instrument -- 30,000 -- 0.089
Aircraft Tactical Series 51
Early Warning
System
Nominal Average Digital Integrated Circuit Failure Rate 0. 0087
(including additional sources)
Pr._dicted Average Digital Integrated Circuit Failure Rate for 0. 004
January 1965 (SeeFigure C-3)
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Table C-3. Tabulation of Bit Failure Rates for Discrete Components
in a Digital Application (Hi-Rel Procurement)
Bit Failure Rate
Part Type T A = 50°C and 40% T A =,25°C and 25%
Rated Power Rated Power
Silicon diode 8 4
Silicon Transistor 30 20
Resistor, carbon I 1
composition
Resistor, metal I0 5
film
Capacitor, fixed, 20 6
ceramic
Capacitor, fixed, 20 4
glass
Connection, welded O. 5 O. 5
Connection, soldered 0.5 0.5
_0
I
i I
I NOTE: GROWTH CURVE BASED ON A /
STUDY MADE BY TRW SYSTEMS
RELIABILI[Y STAFF
I ....... L--
_0._
-- _ PItOJECTED0.01 -- J
\
0.1_1
1970
i I
Figure C-3. Integrated Monolithic Circuits Reliability Growth
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d) Figure C-4 cantains two representative logic circuits
for which ,khad been compared based on the preceeding
data. Using the assumptions in Paragraphs a, b, and
c above, the comparative reliability of an integrated
circuit versus its circuit module counterpart is indi-
cated to be:
EXAMPLE A EXAMPLE B
FLIP-FLOP 4 INPUT DTL GATE
e ,N *
ESTIMATE OF DISCRETE COMPONENT ESTIMATE OF DISCRETE COMPONENT
FLIP-FLOP RELIABILITY* 4-INPUT GATE RELIABILITY*
COMPONENT N BIT RATE TOTAL COMPONENT_ 1 NOe BIT RATE TOTAL
• EACH BIT RATE I . EACH BIT RATE
RESISTORS 14 I 14 RESISTORS 3 I 3
CAPACITORS 2 4 8 DIODES 6 4 24
DIODES I0 4 40 TRANSISTORS I 20 20
TRANSISTORS 4 20 80 CONNECTIONS j I0 0.5 5
TOTAL 30 j 142 TOTAL J 20 52m
AVERAGE DIGITAL IC BIT RATE** 40 AVERAGE DIGITAL IC BIT RAI'E'* 40
IMPROVEMENT WITH IC (1965) 102 IMPROVEMENT WITH IC (1965) 12
*COMPONENT BIT RATES TAKEN FROM TRW SYSTEMS RELIABILITY MANUAL
**AVERAGE DIGITAL IC BIT RATES TAKEN FROM "MICROELECTRONIC RELIABILITY" BY
THE TRW SYSTEMS RELIABILITY STAFF _EPORT NO 4303-6001-TU000)
Figure C-4. Comparison of Estimated Failure Rates, Digital Integrated
Circuit Versus Discrete Component Equivalent Circuit
Example A, Flip Flop
k(circuit module, 1965 projected) =_ 142 x 10 -9 failures/hour
\(integrated circuit, 1965 projected) =_40 x 10 -9 failures/hour
Example B, 4 Input DTL Gate
k(circuit module, 1965 projected) _ 5g x 10-9 failures/hour
k(integrated circuit, 1965 projected) =_40 x 10 -9 failures/hour
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e) Referring again to Figure C-3, it should be noted that
the slope of the integrated circuit reliability curve is
expected to show significant reliability improvement
throughout the remainder of the 1965- 1966 period.
The projection of its circuit module counterpart is
expected to remain substantially constant during this
period thus assuring an increasing margin of improve-
ment.
f) Reliability bit failure rate data with its basis on highly
variable information has, nevertheless, a reasonable
pattern of consistency and agreement with systems
experience. Using the rationale of bit failure rates,
it is indicated that technology has currently reached a
reliability crossover point in the assessment of inte-
grated circuits versus circuit modules for digital
applications; in the future, integrated circuits will be
favored for selected functions.
8. QUALITY ASSURANCE DATA
8.1 Comparison of "Strengths" and Fragilities Profiles
Table C-4 tabulates some comparative strengths of integrated
circuits versus circuit modules. Although no attempt can be made to
translate these differences into reliability estimates, the profile in-
dicated for integrated circuits is in excess o( that for circuit modules.
Table C-4. Comparison of Stress Capabilities of Discrete Component
Circuit Modules Vs. Integrated Circuits
Circuit Module integrated CircuitSTRESS
Capabilities Capabilitie s
• Mechanical shock 200 g 20,000 g
Vibration 5 to 15 g, 2000 cps 206 g, 5 to 2000 cps
Constant acceleration 200 g 40,000 g
Thermal cycle -40 to )8œto +150°C
High temperature 70°C 200°C
storage
Moisture resistance 10 days per 10 days per MIL-STD-
MIL-STD-202_ 750, Method 1056.1
Method 106
Hermeticity Non-hermetic Leak rate: 5xi0-8 cc/sec
Vibration fatigue 15 g, 60 cps 20 g, 60 cps
(96 hours)
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8. Z Industrial Quality Assurance Levels
Through detailed specificatioL negotiations and vendor commitments,
TRW Systems has confirmed that the semiconductor industry can and will
supply integrated circuits to quality assurance specifications substan-
tially equivalent to high reliability discrete transistors and diodes. Pri-
marily because integrated circuit technology is an extension of transis-
tor technology, both classes of devices are available to the following
composite requirements:
Load life tests (maximum ratings) k = 5%
Accelerated storage life tests _= 5%
(maximum rating s)
Shock, vibration, centrifuge LTPD = 10%
(per MIL-S- 1950 0 C) cumulative
Thermal shock, moisture resistance, LTPD = 10%
temperature cycling, (per MIL-S- cumulative
19500 C)
It should be noted, however, that typicalqualityassurance life
testing of integrated circuits is currently performed at considerably
lower thermal or dissipative levels than those used for discrete diodes
and transistors. Consequently, industrial quality assurance levels
which certify performance to k= 5%/1000 hr for integrated circuits
should be interpreted as corresponding to a more conservative estimate
of "in use" reliability.
8.3 Screening Techniques and Capabilities
Figure C-5 and Tables C-5 and C-6 illustrate the screening
techniques required for 100 per cent inspection in TRW Systems inte-
grated circuit specificatioDs, together with their relationship to the
current tabulation of failure modes. As with other devices, screening
techniques for integrated circuits have their basis in well-founded
experience and reasoning with failure mechanisms, coupled with the
techniques of electrical burn-in, environmental testing, and parameter
selection. The practice of coupling parameter selection with monitor-
ing degradation sensitive parameters forms the foundation for highly
effective parameter drift screening requirements.
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Figure C-5. Integrated Circuit Screening Flow Chart
Table C-5° Description of Integrated Circuit Screening Steps
Prescal wsual inspection All circuits are carefully inspected under 20 and 80X magnification and
defective circuits eliminated. Detailed inspection criteria shaU be gen-
erated for defective circuits.
High tcrt_perature bake 150 to Z00°C for 168 hours minimtu_:'..;clrcu_-tnoneperating.
Thermal cycle -55 to  150°C,3 cycles minimum per MIL-STD-750_ Method 1056,
Condition B or equivalent.
Centrifuge (Yl or Y2 Axis) MIL-STD-750, Method 2006 or equivalent for specified axis; A = 40D000 g
Leak test As verified by boJ_ha gross and fine leak test, the leak rate shall be less
than 5 x I0"_ cm_/sec.
Electrical Test No. 1 Read and record all specified electrical parameters.
Electrical Tests No. 2, Read and record certain degradation sensitive parameters.
3, 4, and 5.
Variables data from Tests Variables data identifiable to specific devices will be taken for each
No. 2, 3, 4, and 5 and device at each test and for each parameter, and the delta in each pars-
Delta Computations meter will be computed and recorded for successive tests. The distri-
bution of deltas wiU be determined at each test and deltas will be con-
sidered failures. An a11owable defect rate of 5% wiU be imposed on a
cumulative basis.
Rated power and tempera- At an ambient temperature of 125°C with maximum rated supply voltages
ture operation No. I applied, the circuits will be operated in a ring counter configuration for
240 hours.
Rated power and tempera- Same operating and ambient conditions as Operation No. I above except
ture operation No. Z operating time will be 760 hours.
Back bias at maximum Apply rated Dc voltages to selected terminals in such a way as to back
ambient operating bias the largest number of junctions in the circuit. Store at IZ5°C for
temperature 168 hours.
Open and inspect Open circuits and inspect for deterioration as a result of previous
screening steps and for workmanship defects.
Failure analysis on All opens, shorts or otherwise seriously aegraded circuits which have
catastrophic failures failed during the screening process will be thoroughly analyzed and
their failure mode cataloged. The appearance of unpredictable and/or
previously unidentified failure modes shall be cause for lot rejection.
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Table C-6. Tab,dation of Integrated Circuit Failure Modes
Major Failure Modes in Effective Screens
Integrated Circuits
Open Bonds to Chip
Caused by: Poor metalization adherence Preseal visual inspection
Under-bonding High temperature bake
Over-bonding Thermal cycle
Gold-aluminum eutectic Centrifuge (Y1 axis)
Open Leads
Caused by: Nicks or cuts in lead Preseal visual inspection
Thiniling of lead at bond Centrifuge (v and "f axis)1 Z
Vibration
Leads Shorting
Caused by: Excessive lead length Preseal visual inspection
Centrifuge (Y2 axis} and
electrical test-
Centrifuge (Y1 axis) and
electrical tes[
Vibration noise
Open Bonds to Terminal
Caused by: Poor bonding technique Preseal visual inspection
Centrifug e
Opens in Chip Metallization
Caused by: Scratches Preseal visual inspection
Gold-aluminum eutectic High temperature bake and
Metallization deterioration at electrical test
oxide steps Extended operation at rated
Deterioration of aluminum to power and ambient tempera-
silicon contact at oxide window ture and electrical test
Metallization corrosion
Shorts on Chip
Caused by: Oxide breakdown Preseal visual inspection
Metallization smear Extended operation at rated
Poor bond placement power and ambient tempera-
Misregistration of marking ture and electrical test.
Metallic particles in package
Catastrophic Failure
Caused by: Cracked chip Preseal visual inspection
Thermal cycle
Centrifuge
Severe Electrical Degradation
Caused by: Surface channeling Extended operation at rated
Surface contamination power and ambient tempera-
ture.
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TRW Systems' capabilities for performing screening inspection
of integrated circuits and for developing the experimental foundations
of screening formulas are necessary mea3ures to insure the continuous
confirmation of the receipt of integrated circuits commensurate with
reliability as ses sments.
At the present time, discrete parts probably have an advantage
over integrated circuits ,with respect to screening efficiency. This is
primarily due to the accessibility of each electrode of each circuit
element, which makes incipient drifts and circuit element parameter
variations more discoverable. Improved screening techniques for
integrated circuits require development of methods to circumvent this
disadvantage. Analogous test equipment for discrete parts has a more
detailed diagnostic capability than integrated circuit test equipment;
again compensatory techniques are required. Since such techniques are
not fully established, screening methods for discrete parts are currently
probably more sophisticated. To some extent, the greater sensitivity
of present screening techniques for discrete parts probably yields an
advantage in identifying failure modes and corrective action procedures.
The assembly of discrete parts into a circuit module, however, tends
to remove this inequality to the extent that electrode inaccessibility is
re-established.
9. CONCLUSIONS
The use of selected integrated circuits in modern electronic
hardware is rapidly becoming consistent with the most advanced design
techniques and with stringent requirements for a demonstrated history
of reliability. It is necessary, therefore, that any planning for elec-
tronic equipment to be designed and manufactured during the 1966 to
1970 period include utilization of integrated circuits. Conversely, it
is strongly believed that if such planning were to prohibit the use of
integrated circuits and enforce the use of discrete parts only, equip-
ment design and manufacture would be seriously hampered by declining
production lines, technological obsolescence, and increasingly limited
reliability.
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APPENDIX D
NOMINAL 1971 TRAJECTORY AND ORBIT
This appendix serves to define and describe sample earth-Mars
trajectories for the 1971 mission, and a sample spacecraft orbit about
Mars. These samples are used throughout this report as background
for many different analyses.
i. INTEKPLANETARY TRAJECTORY
Figure D-i shows the basic interplanetary trajectory constraints
imposed by the Preliminary 197i Voyager Specification against the co-
ordinates, launch date, and arrival date. These constraints, indicated
by shading, represent these parameter limits:
• Launch energy C B _-- 18 krn2J sec 2
• Arrival asymptotic velocity Vco_ 5 krn/sec
• Declination of launch 5°_- IDLAI 33 °
asymptote
• Inclination of transfer INC _>0. I°
plane
Sanlple transfer trajectories, No. i through No. 6, are also indicated
in Figure D-I. The launch and arrival dates for these six trajectories
are listed in Table D-I. in this appendix, when "the nominal trajectory"
or "the sample trajectory" is used, the one specified is No. 3, with
launch date May 19, 1971, and arrival date November IZ, 1971.
The geometry of this interplanetary trajectory is shown in
Figure D-Z, and the variation of geometrical quantities with time is
shown in Figure D-3, for the spacecraft in interplanetary transfer
and in orbit about Mars. Trajectory No. 3, compared with others
of the 1971 opportunity, exhibits relatively low launch energy require-
ments and low arrival Vco. Other characteristics are given in Table
D-2.
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Figure D-I. 197L Earth-Mars Trajectories
Table D-1. 1971 Earth-Mars Trajectories
Trajectory Number Launch Date Arrival Date
1 May 11, 1971 December 17, 1971
Z June ZS, 1971 December Z8, 1971
3 _v£a.y19, 1971 November IZ, 1971
4 June Z8, 1971 March 1, 197Z
5 May 11, 1971 October Z3, 1971
6 June 18, 1971 November Z, 1971
| i i m i J , • ! i i | i w
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VOYAGER
ARRIVAL TRANSIT
NGJ 12, _971 TRAJECTORY
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Figure D-2. Voyager Sample Trajectory
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Figure D-3. Geometrical Quantities Versus Time
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Table D-2. Characteristics of Earth-Mars Trajectory No. 3
Launch date May 19, 1971
Arrival date November lZ, t971
Time of flight 177 days
Departure asymptote
(from earth)
Voo 2.92 kin/see
C 3 8.53 krn2/sec 2
Angle to ecliptic -16 deg
Angle to sun-earth line 88 deg
Approach as ymptote
(toMars)
V 3 25 kin/seeOO
Angle to plane of Mars' -3 deg
orbit
Angle to Mars=sun line 119 deg
Interplanetary Orbit
True anomaly at arrival 142.5 deg
True anomaly at launch 4. S deg
Heliocentric central angle t38 deg
Inclination to ecliptic 1.5 deg
Perihelion distance from sun 151. Z x 106 km
Aphelion distance from sun 2ZO. 5 x 106 km
Eccentricity O. 1853
i i
2. ORBIT ABOUT M&RS
The nominal orbit about Mars, used throughout Lhis report, is
entered by a periapsis-to-periapsis transfer from interplanetary
trajectory No. 3. It has this basic definition:
Inclination to M_rs' equator 45 deg
Altitude at periapsis 2,000 km
Altitude at apoapsis ZO, 000 km
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The nominal orbit proceeds in an easterly direction, and the initial
passage takes place over the sunlit side of Mars t southern hemisphere.
To determine the characteristics of this orbit, the following constraints
were assumed:
Radius of Mars 3,330 km
Gravitational constant 42,920 kin3/ sec 2
of Mars
Figure D-4 shows the geometry of the hyperbolic approach trajectory
and the elliptical orbit. For the approach, the following quantities
apply:
Periapsis distance from Mars'
center, r 5,330 km
P
Asymptotic approach velocity,
V 3. 250 km/sec
co
Velocity at periapsis (areocentric) 5. 163 km/sec
Eccentricity, eh 2.312
E (see Figure D-4) 64.37 dog
"_h(see Figure D-4) 4,063 km
Ixnpact parameter, B 8,472 km
For the elliptical orbit, the following quantities apply:
Periapsis distance from Mars'
center, r 5,330 krr,
P
Apoapsis distance from Mars'
center, r 23,330 km
a
Semi-major axis, a i4,330 km
Eccentricity, e 0.6280
Velocity at periapsis 3. 620 km/sec
Velocity at apoapsis 0.827 krn/sec
Period of orbit i4.46 hours
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APOAP = 14,330
ra - 23,330 KM
\
ll = 64.37 ° F "_
B - 8473 KM 4063 KM
HYPERBOLICTRAJECTORY PSIS
APPROACH ASYMPTOTE
Figure D-4. Nominal Approach Trajectory
and Orbit r3eometry
The impalsive retropropulsion required for periapsis-to-periapsis
insertion has these characteri._tics:
Specific impulse (assumed), I 300 sec
sp
Velocity increment, _V I.543 krn/sec
14ass ratio (initialto final) I.690
The orientation of the orbit plane is described by these an_ular
measurements of the direction of its nort/u pole (as of the arrival date):
Cone angle _sun-Mars-orbit pole) 69 deg
Clock angle (from Canopus refer-
ence, clockwise about Mars-sun
line) 176. I deg
Inclination of orbit plane to
Mars' equator 45 deg
Inclination of orbit plane to
Mars' orbit plane Z6.7 deg
Figure D-5 illustrates the orientation of the orbit plane and other
characteristics of the orbit on a Mercator projection of the celestial
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sphere referencea to Mars' equatorial coordinates and gives these
characteristics at the time of arrival. Figures D-6 and D-7 show the
same properties 90 and 180 days later, respectively. For Figures D-6
and D-7, the sun and earth (indicated by S and E) have progressed
eastward along the Martian "ecliptic, " and the orbit plane has regressed
westward. Apsidal advance has not changed the right ascension of
periapsis significantly, but its declination has progressed northward
from -27.7 degrees at arrival to -4.9 degrees 130 days later.
60
30 7
Z
0
Z
_ -30
-180 -90 0 90 180P
RIGHT ASCENSION (Mb,RS) (DEG)
]_igure D-5. Nominal Orbit at Arrival
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after Arrival
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APPENDIX E
DOPPLER AND DOPPLER I_ATE LIM!T£ FOR
VOYAGER ORBITER-TO-EARTH COMMUNICATIONS
Doppler frequency shift and the rate of change of the doppler fre-
quency shift for one- or two-way communication between two points are
proportional to the first and second time derivatives of the distance be-
tween the two points, i.e., to the components of relative velocity and
relative acceleration along the line connecting the two points. This appen-
dix determines limiting values for the relative axial velocity and accelera-
tion for the communication path between the Voyager spacecraft in orbit
about Mars and a DSN (Deep Space Network) station on the earth.
The orbiter-ground station distance is the sum of three parts:
a) (Due to the orbit) The component of the vector r from
the center of Mars to the orbiting spacecraft which lies
along the earth-Mars line.
b) The distance from the center of Mars to the center of
the earth.
c) (Due to the ground station) The component of the
vector from the center of the earth to the DSN station
which lies along the earth-Mars line.
The contributions of these three sources to the corresponding velocity and
acceleration are evaluated separately.
1. DUE TO THE ORBIT
The coordinates describing the spacecraft in orbit are shown in
Figure E-1. It can be shown that the component of _ along the z-axis
(the earth-Mars direction) is
a ( 1 - e 2) sin i sin (_o + v)
Z = COS _=
1 + e cos v
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and that the derivative of z is
z - cos (¢o + v) + e cos 0_
VV-- Z
1 - e
Z
SPACECRAFT ORBIT ABOUT MARS-
I - e2
r : a ] +e'--+-'_-'-'-'-'_v A = APOAPSIS
i = INCLINATION OF ORBITAL PLANE
a = SEMI MAJOR AXIS OF ELLIPSE TO REFERENCE PLANE (REFERENCE
PLANE 15 PERPENDICULAR TO Z
• = ECCENTRICITY AXIS)
v = TRUE ANOMALY _ = ARGUMENT OF PERIAPSIS
P : PERIAPSIS _ = ANGLE BEI"WEEN Tand Z AXIS
10
EARTH
Figure E-I. Geometry of Orbit
about Mars
is the gravitational parameter of Mars, and equals 42,920 km3/sec 2.
Of interest here are the maximum value of _. and the range (Zma x- _min)
as v varies through 360 degrees. These are related to the maximum
doppler shift from the mean frequency, and the maximum total doppler
frequency range, respectively, and are given by
]Z]max:_._a sini (1+ [e cos to I ),V '• 1 - e
max - _1 Z\ -e/
A second differentiation results zn
z : - IA sin i sin (_ + v) (1 + e cos v) 2
Z - Z
a (1 - ez)
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Again we are interested in the maximum value of z as v varies through
360 degrees.
z = _ sin i F (0a,e) ,
max 2(. 2a I _e 2)
where F (_, e) is the maximum value attained by
I
2i
f (o_,e,v) = sin (o_+ v) (I + e cos v) 1
as v is varied. The function F (¢0,e) is illustrated in Figure E-2.
5
NOTE:
F(w, e) IS THE MAXIMUM VALUE ATTAINED BY
f(w, e, v) = SIN (w+ v)(I + e COSy) 2
AS v VARIES THROUGH 360 DEG
4
\
\
e=O
0° 30° 60" 90° 120= 150° 180°
360° 330= 300= 270° 240= 2| 0" 180=
ILl
Figure E-2. Function F (¢o, e)
z" is proportional to the maximum rate of change of doppler frequencymax
which must be accommodated by the telecommunications link.
The functions IZlmax, (z max- Zmin)' and IZlmax have been
evaluated for the following conditions:
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a) The spacecraft in a nominal orbit (2000 and 20,000 km
minimum and maximum altitudes, inclined 45 degrees
to Mars' equator) shortly after encounter, November lZ,
1971. i = 85.0 degrees, co = Z8.0 degrees.
b) The same orbit February 10, 1972. (90 days after en-
counter), i and co are changed by orbit perturbation
and by rotation of the earth-Mars line. i = 71. Z degrees,
co = 36.1 degrees.
c) The same orbit May 10, 197Z (180 days after encounter).
i = 91.Z degrees, ¢o = 101.0 degrees.
d) The spacecraft in an orbit of the same size (2000 by
20,000 kin), but with i and co taking worst-case values.
e) The spacecraft in an extreme orbit (minimum altitude,
1600 kin, maximum altitude approaching co), i and co
taking worst- case values.
a), b), and c) are orbits entered from an earth-Mars transit trajectory
with launch date May 19, 1971, and arx-ival date November 12, 1971. (See
Appendix D.) The results are:
I_'max (7'max-Zmin)[i[maxz
(kin/sec) (kin/sec) (m/see)
Nominal orbit, encounter 3.444 4. 431 I. 161
Nominal orbit, encounter + 90 days 3.17Z 4. ZI0 I. 173
Nominal orbit, encounter + 180 days Z. 491 4. 444 I.497
Same size orbit, worst orientation 3.6Z0 4.448 1.510
Extreme orbit, worst orientation 4. 170 4. 170 _ 1.763
*Wheroasl Imaxaodl Imaxrogreatestforthohi,hlyeccootric
orbit (e), (_. - &. . ) is greatest for smaller, more circular orbits.max ml,_
For orbits satisfying the 50-year lifetime requirements, (z -&,min )
has its greatest value of about 4.53 km/sec for a circular orn_%_of
5000 km altitude.
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2• EAR TH- friARS DISTANCE
I1Variation in the earth-Mars distance leads to large vaiues in z max'
but, as the period of (approximate) cyclicai repetition is the synodic
period of Z5.5 months, this contribution is very predictable, and changes
so slowly that I_'lmax is almost 1,egligible. The values
I D
are."
[ Zlmax [ Zlmax
(km/s e c) (m/s e c 2)
Maximum value 15.02 0. 0024
Time of maximum values During the opti- At opposition,
mum period for Aug. 10, 1971"
encounter, Nov.
1971 through
Feb. 1972
3. DUE TO THE GROUND STATION
To determine the worst-case contributionof the effectof the earth's
diurnal rotation on the doppler data, we assume the latitudeof the DSN
stationand the declinationof Mars are each 0 degrees• Taking R = 6378 km
2_
@ = 86,406 = 0.00007277 rad/sec, we obtain
Z[max = R $ = 0. 464 km/sec
(z max "Zmin} - 2 R _ = 0.928 km/sec
/]max = R 62 = 0.034 m/sec 2
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APPENDIX F
CELESTIAL OBJECTS COMPETING WITH CANOPUS
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this appendix is to examine possible ambiguity in
the use of celestial references for attitude control due to competing
celestial objects. For the selected Voyager spacecraft configuration
and modes of operation the sensor which is most susceptible to this
sort of ambiguity is the Canopus sensor. There are two phases in the
mission in which the Canopus sensor would be subject to this sort of
ambiguity:
a) In the Canopus acquisition mode, when the roll
axis is pointed toward the sun, and the space-
craft is in a controlled roll which is to be termi-
nated when the Canopus sensor recognizes the
star Canopus. In this mode, other celestial
objects appearing in the same band of cone angles
swept out by the Canopus sensor may cause a pre-
mature lock if the brightness and spectral charac-
teristics of the object are sufficiently close to
Canopus.
b) In the interplanetary cruise mode, when both the
roll axis and the roll orientation have been estab-
lished, a second object appearing within the same
range of cone angles and clock angles covered by
the field of view of the Canopus sensor may cause
the roll reference to be diverted from Canopus.
In addition, very bright objects, not within the
field of view but close to it, may introduce enough
light by scattering to cause loss of lock on Canopus.
2. CANOPUS SENSOR MECHANIZATION
The Canopus sensor and the mechanization proposed for its use
on the Voyager spacecraft are both based on the Mariner C approach. (See
Section IV-l, Volume 5.) The means by which the sensor discriminates
against celestial objects which may compete with Canopus are the following:
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a) By establishing upper and lower brightness
thresholds, the sensor discriminates against
objects which have a brightness 2. 5 times
that of Canopus or greater, and against objects
wh.ch have a brightness of less than 0.4 times
that of Canopus. This discrimination alone
restricts the number of possible competing
objects to the earth, Mars, Venus, Jupiter,
Saturn, and approximately II stars.
b) Because of the characteristics of the spectrum
of Canopus it is possible to employ discrimina-
tion against celestial objects which have substan-
tially different spectral characteristics from
Canopus.
c) The Canopus sensor has a field of view in the
cone angle direction of II degrees. Because
the cone angle of Canopus as seen from the
spacecraft during the transit and orbital phases
of the Voyager mission encompasses a range from
75 to 103 degrees (in 1971), the ll-degree field of
view is insufficient for the whole mission, and it
must be updated several times during the course
of the mission to accommodate the range. (The
change of cone angle during transit for several
representative earth- to-Mars trajectories and
during orbital operations is given in Figure F-l.
110 [THECONEANG_E OF CANOPUS IS%IVEN-FOR SEVERAL
JINTERPLANETARYTRAJECTORIES(NUMBEREDAS IN APPENDIXDI
lAND WHEN IN ORBITABOUTMARS.
< lOO
u 3-.._
z 4-,_ _
_ 3
' 2_ _
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u 8o -_
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7o I I I
4-26 6-5 7-15 8-24.10-3 11-12I?-22 1-31 3-11 4-20 5-30 7-9 8-18 9-27
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Figure F-t. Spacecraft-Sun-Canopus
Angle (Cone Angle of Canopus),
1971
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An updating scheme is not chosen in this appendix,
because it would be a different scheme for each
trajectory. ) At a given time in the mission only
objects whose cone angles are within the same
11-degree band carrently in use by the Canopus
sensor would be capable of conflicting with the
lock on Canopus.
d) In the Canopus acquisition mode, the clock angles
which must be traversed by the Canopus sensor
depend on the relation of the initial spacecraft
roll attitude to the desired attitude. This range
could be anything from a small angle up to almost
360 degrees, if the programmed roilis always in
the same sense. Therefore, in the Canopus acqui-
sition mode the clock angle range does not discrim-
inate against competing objects. However, in the
cruise mode for a competing object to displace
Canopus for the attention of the Canopus sensor it
would have to be within the 4-degree field of view
of the sensor in the clock angle direction.
3. OBJECTS COMPETING DURING CANOPUS ACQUISITION MODE
For the purpose of this analysis, objects were considered as
potentially competing with Canopus if the apparent visual magnitude
(as would be measured at the location of the spacecraft) is between
+0.6 and -Z. 4. No discrimination has been introduced for different
spectral characteristics.
Figure F-2 presents a map, essentially in the plane of the ecliptic,
indicating a sample earth to Mars trajectory in 1971, the cone angle band
which would be swept by a spacecraft in the Canopus acquisition mode at
several representative locations on its trajectory, and the approximate
directions to the principal competing celestial objects. The directions
to stars brighter than +0.6 in magnitude are shown by ar o_s and an
indication of the out-of-ecliptic component. (It is noted that the apparent
magnitude of a star is normally listed as seen through the earth's atmos-
phere; outside of the atmosphere most stars are brighter by approximately
O. 3 magnitude. )
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APPAREN1
NAME OF VISUAL
IDENT STAR MAGNITUDE
I. SIRIUS -1.7
2. CANOPUS -0.9
3. CICENTAURI -0.6
4. ARCTURUS -0.4
ARRIVAL 5. VEGA -0.3
NOV 12 a]_ TYPICALCONE ANGLES 6. CAr'CLLA -0.2SWEPTBY CANOPUS SENSOR
i_._. DURING SPACECRAFTROLL 7. RIGEL -0.1
DEC 10 8. PROCYON 0.1
197 . 20 9. ACHERNAR 0.2
----'___ SATURrJ 30 I0. AGENA 0.4
2_i]_ (9.JAU) JAN 11. BETELGEUSE 0.4
197 20 12. ALTAIR 0.5
3. ALD BARAN .6
14. ACRUX 0.6
FEB
1972
MAR _ 1972
JUPITER
APR20 (5 2
)f_ 3-DOWN 24°
3o,_\
,o/_ _J / _AMJJ 197.
STELLARMAGNITUDES JULY 20 30/ADJUSTEDFOROBS RVATION
OUTSIDEOF EARTH'SATMOSPHERE MARSORBIT
Figure F-Z. Celestial Objects Competing
with Canopus
Examination of Figure F-2 indicates that the sun and Venus, while
substantially brighter than Canopus, will never appear in the field of view
of the Canopus sensor in the Canopus acquisition mode. The earth and
moon may appear in the field of view, but such appearance can only be
early in the mission, and the magnitude woul be considerably above the
upper threshold, and therefore would not cause the Canopus sensor to
lock. Similarly, the planet Mars may be in the field of view, depending
on the approach geometry of the trajectory, but if so it is only when the
spacecraft is close to encounter or in orbit about Mars, and again it8
magnitude would be considerably above the upper threshold. Jupiter and
Saturn have apparent brightnesses in the range which could cause ambi-
guity; Jupiter is very close to the upper brightness thzeshold and Saturn
to the lower brightness threshold. No other planets are bright enough
to cause conflict.
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For the stars and planets mentioned above as competitors for the
attention of the Ganopus sensor, Figure F-3 shows their brightness in
comparison with the band of magnitudes accepted by the Canopus sensor
and it also indicates the time intervals during tP,e mission in which the
objects have cone angles close enough to that of Canopus to cause poss-
ible conflict. As a specific updating schedule _or the Ganopus sensor
was not assumed, the criterion adopted for cone angle conflf_t is that
the object remain within +5.5 degrees of the cone angle of that object
when it equals the cone angle of Canopus. Depending on the actual up-
dating schedule, these periods of conflict would vary somewhat. The
primary value of Figure F-3 is to indicate the approximRte timing and
duration of possible conflicts.
o _
o- J - ARCT0,0S
LAUNCH ENCOUNTER
MAY JUN JUL AL_ SEP OCT NOV D-cC JAN FEB MAR AI_ MA'_ JUN JUL
1971 1972
OBJECTS 5RIGHTER THAN * 0.6 MA_IglTUDE (THE LOW THRESHOLD
OF THE C_NOPUS SENSOR) AP.I _HOWN. WITHIN THE TI#/,@_
INTERVAL INDICATED, THE CONE ANGLE OF EACH OBJECT
ENCOMPASSES THE RANGE ± ._ 5°ABOUT THE CONE AI',GLE OF
THAT OBJECT WHEN IT IS THE SAME AS THE CONE ANGLE OF
CANOPUS.
Figure F-3. Celestial Objects Competing
wlth Canopus
4. OBJECTS COMPLETING DURING CRUISE MODE
When the spacecraft is in the cruise mode---that is, the roll axis
points at the sun and the -oll attitude is controlled by locking of the
Canopus sensor on the star Canopus--loss of the roll reference can
occur for one of the following reasons:
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• Occultation of Canopus by an obstructing body
• Appearance of an object in the 4 by II degrees
field of view, other than Canopus, with brightness
greater than magnitude +0.6.
• The existence of a bright object nearby (not in the
field of view) whose scattered radiation causes
loss of lock on Canopus.
If the possible source of any of these incidents is Mars, the third cause
is likely to be the one which ensues. It is not likely to be a stellar
source, because there are no bright stars close to Canopus. For simi-
lar reasons planets other than M_rs will not compete during the cruise
mode. Another possibility is that the conflicting light sources come
from dust particles near the spacecraft, in which case the second
cause of loss of Canopus would ensue. Further possible sources are
Phobos and Deimos, which, depending on proximity to the orbiting
spacecraft, could induce either the second or third reasons for loss of
lock.
As to loss of lock on Canopus caused by scattered light from Mars,
this subject has been covered and summarized in Reference l, page Z2,
which outlines the field of view (relative to the spacecraft) in which the
appearance of Mars acts as a conflict. It is not examined further in this
appen _ix.
5. SUN AND EARTH SENSORS
All of the spacecraft configurations which were considered by
TRW for the Voyager employed two-axis sun sensors for the purpose of
pointing the roll axis of the spacecraft toward the sun. (Configuration C,
which is earth-oriented to achieve the communications link with greatest
data capability, is sun-oriented during the earlier phases of the mission
when commur.ications requirements are not so great. ) Because of the
great brightness of the sun, in comparison with all other celestial
objects, there is littledifficulty in avoiding any ambiguity by establishing
a sufficiently high threshold.
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Spacecraft concepts based on Configuration C require a means to
maintain the roll axis in an attitude pointing towards the earth. Although
this means may be open loop, based on the use of other references, or
may be by a loop closed through an tLF tracking antenna, the optical earth
sensor has been proposed as the means of achieving this attitude control.
This appendix does not present an analysis of conflicting objects for the
earth sensor in the detail given above to the Canopus sensor. However,
it is worth pointing out that the earth sensor would operate under several
handicaps, in comparison with the Canopus sensor:
a) _:he apparent magnitude of the earth as seen from
1he spacecraft covers a wide range, from very
bright to as low as approximately magnitude +0.5.
Therefore discrimination against competing objects
by brightness selection must either be less effective
than that for a Canopus sensor or complicated by
some updating scheme. (Delaying the shift from sun-
orientation to earth-orientation will alleviate the
wide brightness range which must be accommodated,
howe ve r. )
b) In the course of the trajectory between the earth and
Mars, the earth would pass quite close to the space-
craft-sun line. The minimum value of the earth°
spacecraft-sun angle can be anywhere from 0 to 14
degrees for reasonable trajectories. It is obvious
that when the direction to the earth is very close to
the direction to the sun it would be difficult for an
optical tracker to maintain lock on the earth. How-
ever, it is noted for Configuration C that the space-
craft would not make use of the earth orientation
until this point in the transit trajectory had been
passed.
c) Eight to 10 months after arrival in orbit the direc-
tion to the earth again approaches the direction to
the sun, as seen from the spacecraft, and the effec-
tiveness of the earth sensor is once again doubtful.
REFERENCES
1. JPL Project Document No. 46, V-MA-004-002-14-03, "Voyager
Mission Guidelines, " May 1, 1965.
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APPENDIX G
APPROACH GUIDANCE SENSOR
During Phase IA, consideration has been given to the use of an
approach guidance sensor to provide greater accuracy in the capsule
descent trajectory than is possible using the DSIF along. This instru-
ment would be used prior to capsule separation. The approach is to
detect the position of Mars relative to its star background by use of a
television camera and to transmit the composite pictures to earth for
use in the orbit determination programs. Such an instrument is not
required for the t971 mission and hence is not included in the selected
design. It might be required for later missions however, which is the
justification of this appendix.
l. SENSOR CONFIGURATION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
The terminal guidance sensor would consist of a high sensitivity
image orthicon television camera equipped with an optical system suit-
able to cover a t5 x 15 degree field on the tube photocathode. The
raster will be digitally scanned and the planet outlines and star posi-
tions designated in the output by positlon only with amplitude unpre-
served. To insure the desired accuracy, a reference reticle will be
etched or projected upon the photocathode. The black-white, start-
point, stop-point only requirements of the transmitted video insure
that data compression may be atilized if necessary.
Analysis of the task to be performed by the terminal guidance
sensor indicates that the most stringent performance requirements
lie in accuracy and target brightness accommodation. Other less acute
requirements related to sensitivity and environmental resistance. Accu-
racy in sensing the line-of-sight orientation is determined by the reso-
lution in the planet-center, star separation angle measurement. For
useful terminal guidance it is required that the _ine of sight orientation
be sensed with an accuracy of at least 0.75 milliradian (3¢).
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One of the well known limitations of the image orthicon is bright-
ness accommodation. The usual image orthicon, when set up for optimum
performance, operates over a brightness range of approximately 50:1 on
the photocathode without loss of grey scale or blooming. It is shown be-
low that the brightness ratio between the Mars image and the star image
op the photocathode is:
2790:t for +4. 0 star magnitude
17,450:1 for +6. 0 star magnitude
A solution to this problem utilizes a camera with point-to-point-beam
current control allowing a range of t0,000:l. Prototype devices have
been made. A simpler solution, however, has been found which depends
(t)
instead upon a compromise between accommodation and signal linearity.
If the camera voltages are not set to maintain signal linearity at all illum-
inance levels present it was found that the simulated planet and stars
dimmer than magnitude +4.0 could be resolved well. Since the terminal
guidance sensor does not depend upon measurement of target intensity,
this solution is acceptable. A second problem associated with the simul-
taneous detection of targets of grossly different total power is light-
scattering in the optical system. The analysis of section 2 of this appen-
dix shows that this effect is tolerable at the range of 500,000 kin, becoming
a possible limiting sensitivity factor at this point for stars of magnitude
In order to utilize the terminal guidance sensor at significantly
closer ranges, separate optical paths for the star and planet images is
required.
Examination of the star field in the area of Mars as seen from the
approaching spacecraft reveals that a sensor detection threshold of from
+4. 0 to +6.0 visual magnitude will be required to provide a sufficient
number of stars for data averaging. For instance, with a January 1969
(['Woestemeyer,_ F.B., "Approach Phase Guidance for Interplanetary
Missions", AIAA Paper No. 64-655; AIAA/IONAstrodynamics
Guidance and Control Conference; August, 1964.
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launch date, assuming a 15 x 15 degree sensor field of view, i5 stars
brighter than 5th magnitude are visible. Although for this case a sensi-
tivity of +5.0 magnitude or even +4.0 would be sufficient, a sensitivity
goal of +6.0 magnitude for all missions is desirable. The illuminance
levels at the optical entrance aperture corresponding to these two latter
(z)
star visual magnitudes are:
E = 6.27 x l0 -9 lumens/ft z, m= +4.0
E = 9.86 x l0 -10 lumens/ft 2, m = +6.0
A brief decription of the recommended instrument is provided in
Table G- 1.
2. APPROACH GUIDANCE SENSOR DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Z. i Sensitivity
The over-all accuracy obtained in terminal guidance sensing is in
part dependent upon the number of stars used to identify the field. To
assure that a sufficient number (_10) of stars are detected, a sensitivity
goal of +6.0 magnitude has been established. In the example presented
(January 1969 launch) a total of 15 stars of magnitude +5.0 or brighter
are available. It is possible, however, that different launch dates would
require detection of stars in the increment +5.0 to +6.0 for adequate
coverage.
The illumination on an orthicon resolution element may be calcu-
lated by assuming that all of the energy focused in the central disc of
the star image falls upon one element. Then, assuming that 50 per cent
of the collected energy is focused in the central disc, and that resolution
in the horizontal direction is equal to the vertical scan line number:
(2)Allen, C. W. , Astroph.y.sical Quantities, University of London, the
Athlone Press; 1963.
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Table G-I. Instrument Description-Terminal Guidance Sensor
General (Approximate Physical Dimensions)
Volume 1 ft J
Weight t5 ib
Power 25 watts (operating)
Optical System
Lens 114 mm, f/2.0 (refractive)
Field of view 15 x 15 deg
Reticle grid Etched or projected, 8 x 8
Pickup Tube
Tube type image orthicon (3 in. diameter)
Exposure time 30 msec
Frame period 5 min (data transmission limited)
Scanning lines t000
Raster dimensions 1 x t in.
Pe rformance
Minimum detectable
star +6. 0 magnitude
Accuracy 0. 50 mr (3_)
Nominal operating
range 500,000 km
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(9. 80 tO 10) .1TdZ,× - (o. 50)E --
re (i/12) 2 (1000) -2
fl
where d = entrance aperture diameter and f--7_ = 57 mm : 0. 187 ft
SO
-3
E = t. 95 x l0 foot-candles
re
Illumination at this level in the stellar image is readily detectable by
the orthicon camera. Figure G-I shows orthicon signal output current
as a function of photocathode highlight illumination for two image orthi-
cons. Note that the illumination level computed above falls on or above
the high end of both curves shown. A detailed computation of the signal
10,0 I I I I I I I I I I l I
8
6
4
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HIGHLIGHT PHOTOCATHODE ILLUMINATION, FOOT CANDLES
Figure G-1. Typical Image Orthicon
Transfer Curves
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to noise ratio expected in ti_e signal output can be made (3) but a brief
consideration of Figure G-I indicates that accuracy and illuminance
range accommodations are greater problems than sensitivity.
It will be shown below that the photocathode illumination due to
the Martian planet is many times that of the star image, so sensitivity
is not a problem in detection of Mars.
z. 2 Accuracy
Two sources of uncertainty will be present in extracting the termi-
nal guidance information from the transmitted picture:
• Uncertainties in the exact location of the planet and
star centers
• Uncertainties in the distance between the two centers
Other usual sources of error such as mechanical alignment and process-
or noise are circumvented by this simplified sensing mode.
The resolution and image spreading ("blooming") encountered in
scientlfic applications of image orthicons have been the subject of con-
siderable study. (4) For the purpose of this analysis a horizontal reso-
luation of t000 elements will be assumed. Due to pulling of the beam
toward the charged element the electronic start image will cover several
elements, even though it is optically confined to one. If the image center
is taken to be the geometric center of the apparent star image an ambi-
guity of +0. 5 resolution element occurs. This is equivalent to +0. 0075
degree in the field of view and is a worst case error for star position
determination in that the ambiguity may be partially resolved as the star
field becomes recognized since the proper separation angles between
stars are very accurately known.
(3)'_The Comparative Performance of Electron Tube Photodectors in
Terrestial and Space Navigation Systems"; N. P. Faverty, IEEE
Trans, in Aerospace Navigational Electronics, ANE-I0, 3, 9/63.
(4)"Resolution Capability of the Image-Orthicon Camera Tube Under
Non-standard Scan Conditions", W. C. Livingston, J. SMPTE, 72,
tO, t. 77t, t0/63.
363
"1
1966011762-385
If a continuous semicircular planet crescent were provided in the
image orthicon picture the center of the planet could be exactly located.
Since the crescent is instead represented by a semicircular array of
points, each with a +0.0075 degree uncertainty: the precision in center
determination is instead +0.0075 deg/_,/'Nwhere N is the number of
edge picture elernents, 25 being the minimum number at 500,000 krn.
The uncertainty in planet center is then +0. 0015 degree.
The second source of uncertainty in measurement of the separa-
tion between star and planet may be reduced by projection (or scribing)
of a grid reticle on the orthicon faceplate (see £1gure G-2). An eight
by eight grid, for instance, will insert a reference signal every 125
elements in the horizontal direction and one per 125 vertical lines. A
good deflection system will be able to control the beam position d_,ring
___ 25 TO 50
SCAN LINES FOR
PLANET
ILLUMINATED RETICLE
GRID LINE
Figure G-2. Expanded Scale Drawing of Roster
Area Containing Planet and Star Image
364
1966011762-386
readout to I per cent across the tube face; therefore, for the worst
case (star or planet in the center of a grid element) an ambiguity of
0.63 resolution elements or +0. 0094 degree will occur in the position
of either star or p.lanetpoint relative to the grid. The net center-to-
center distance uncertainty for a single star-planet measurement is
then +0. 019 degree.
The maxlmum uncertainties specified above may be designated as
the 3_ value and summed by the root squares method giving a single axis
error of 0.0204 degree. The net error resulting from the two axes of
uncertainty may be described by a circular error of radius 0. 029 degree
or 0.51 milliradian. This error is less than the rt.quired value of 0. 75
milliradian.
A detailed error analysis has been made for the case where no
reference grid is introduced. Acceptable results were obtained, assum-
ing.multiple star detections and a random star distribution in the field.
The results of this analysis, shown in Figure G-3, indicate that con-
stderation might be given to camera operation without a reticle! 5)
1.2
|.0 i
"_ 0.8
X,.
o.4 __
0.2
0
0 2 6 8 10 12
NUMBEROF DETECTEDSTARS
Figure G-3. Probable Error Versus
Number of Detected Stars
(5)Woestemeyer, op. cit.
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2. 3 Accommodation and Scattering
Two major problems in the design of an imaging electroooptical
device relate to the presence of two targets of widely different power
content in the same frame. The first, scattering, is an increase of
the entire frame illuminance due to stray light from the bright target.
The second, accommodation, results from the necessity for the pickup
tube to satisfactorily reproduce highlight intensity differences present
in the frame.
In order to assess the effect of either of these problems on sys-
tem performance it is necessary to calculate the relative brightness of
Mars and the stellar target. The average illuminance of the Martian
image may be estimated using the visual magnitude of the planet and its
image area. For simplicity the calculation is done as though the phase
angle is zero since image illuminance is essentially independent of
phase angle (for a < 90 deg). The visual magnitude of Mars at the nomi-
nal terminal guidance range (500,000 km) is given by: (6)
m = -1.45 + 5 log rAv
where
r = sire-planet distance, 1.5237 AU (mean opposition)
A= spacecraft-planet distance, 3. 3445 x 10 -3 AU
SO
m = t. 45 - (2.29)(5)V
m = -t2.90
V
Alien, op. cir.
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In order to compute the image illuminance of Mars it is necessary to
determine the area of the image. The half-angle subtended by the
planet at 500,000 km is:
3, 39Z
- 500, 000
= 6. 784 mrad
For the proposed focal length of 114 mm or 0.376 feet then, the image
area is:
Am = _"[(6. 784 x 10 -3) (0. 376)] z
A - 2.04 x 10-5ft 2
rn
The star image may be assumed to fill one resolu+ion element, therefore,
A = (0. 376) tan 7. 5°
s (lOOO)Z
A - 9.89 x 10-9ft 2
S
The illuminance ratio R between the two images may now be calculated
from magnitude and image area:
lZ. 9o(z. 51)
Z. 04x i0 "5 (Z. 51) 18" 90 3.6Z x 107R- =0 ..y.
(2. 51) -6. Z. 07 x I0 _ Z. 07 x 103
9.89 x 10 -7
R-- 17,450, m= +6.0
or R = 2790, m= +4.0
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This ratio may vary somewhat for different martian seasons, depending
upon the planet-sun distance. Itwas stated previously that a normal
image orthicon camera would be unable to reproduce a scene containing
a brightness range of this magnitude. Evidence reported, (7) however,
indicates that a camera can function with a scene of this type if the
planet image is grossly overexposed. This mode of operation permits
accurate readout of the planet edge location but provides no measure of
intensity. This solution is quite compatible with the terminal guidance
sensor mode of operation. A less desirable solution would be a servo
loop controlling the camera beam current according to the signal inten-
sity. The frequency response of such a system would have to be suffici-
ently rapid to permit accommodation from element to element.
The presence of the bright planet in the field of view will raise
the average illumination level over the entire photocathode due to scatter
light in the optical system. It is known from extensive experience that
a well designed optical system will scatter in the order of I per cent of
the "in field" light. £he ratio of the average scatter illumination to star
illumination is then readily calculated from the brightness ratio derived
above, thus
E = 17450 E
nl s
F = 17450 E A
m s m
Fscat = (0.01) F m
and
F
scatE
scat A
P
174.5 E A
s m
E
scat A
P
%
(7)Woestemeyer, op. cit.
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whe re
-3 2
A = photocathode area = 9. 89 x t0 ft
P
A = Mars image area = t. 02 x t0-5ft 2m
(only one-half of planet illuminated)
SO
E - 0. t75Es
scat
Th_.r_.f_rc th,. axerage scatter illumination in the field of view is equal
t_, t7 })or ce,_t of tl,e +6. _q cnagnitude star image illumination. This
ratl_) ,tssurcs ti_at the scatter light will not prevent the detection of a
_,_. () ma_,_ltudc star, even when some latitude is permitted for bright
Z. 4 .\ltcrJlat ryes
i he preceding discussion has been concerned with outlining a
rec,,n_m,_.ndcd sensor configuration. Several alternatives are discussed
_n th_s section.
2.4. t Detector
The decision to utihze an image orthicon pickup tube was pred'i-
cated upo_ the need for high sensitivity and a relatively large photo-
cathode area. Other detectors offer tradeoff possibilities which are
summarized in Table G-2.
The linage intensii'ier orthicon was rejected because it offers
unnecessar} sensitivity at the expense of resolution and size. With
this device an extremely large number of stars would be detectable,
addipg little to the terminal guidance accuracy at a large cost in equip-
ment weight.
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Tdb[c (3-2. Comparison of hna,,c_ Tutoe Characteristics
T}pl. dnd J_llll- I'Vf,tXII_I_LIInll D1FIII?II_,I{HIN
IlalllIl Operating Limiting Cathode Length x
i),'tt'_ t_;r Ll_ht i.t.\ul i{¢ s_lutl_m l)14meter Diameter Sputtral Model .lnd Malm-
(_ut_t-_andh. s) TV l,mc', (m.) (tn) t(_ _ponse tacturer
lm_e _,_'hl¢ _m 10-%/IU -O 650/350 l, 8 15. 45 x _. Ub S-,J,0 7qb7 RCA
hn, at' lntcnsdler crthlt,m t_ x l0 -b 500/380 Z 0 22 4 x 4. 150 S-Z(I G74093A RCA
b x t0 -8
\ldlCu_, t0-1/10 -Z 750 0. bg5 6.5 x I 1_5 7735A RCA
intel miller 'vldlct)n (|) _ \ 10-3 t_UU U t)_5 '_. 5 X 1, 75 }qG.\ dt_%t"i,;])ll.t'tlt
q x l0 -4
512G xld,con (1} 5 \ 10 .3 650 (1. bZa it. Z5 x 2 75 S-20 Westlngh,mse
5 x t0 -4
image dlssecD_r not a_allable 1500 1. I 8 Z x I. 5 S-g0 F4011, ITT
t. Intensifier and SGC _ldlcun perlormance is __alculated
2. All illumtnatton data referred to 3b frame/see operation
The conventional vidicon has insufficient sensitivity and sensiti\e
area dim,_nsions to perform the required task without penalties in at
least two areas, in order to extend the detection capability of the vidl-
con tlJe exposure t',me would have to be increased, at least by two orders
of rr, agnitude or to three seconds. This increase in exposure time in
turn increases the threat of accuracy loss due tc vehicle m'_tion during
exposure. To cover the same angular field the v_dicon camera _\ould
have to be equipped with a 1. 6 in. focal length optical system requir_n_
a drastic decrease in f number and entrance aperture. The small size
of the vidicon has made it the choice for use with the attitude verifying
television camera aboar_ OAO. This device has poorer accuracy and
requires longer exposure than the subject instrument.
I"
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Some of the disadvantages of the conventional vidicon are overcome
in the image intensifier or secondary emission conduction (SEC) vidicon.
These devices are theoretically capable of good resolution at the required
illumination level. The second objection to the conventional vidicon
applies here also, namely a relatlvely small photocathode. It is poss-
ible, however, that a reduced entrance aperture could be compensated
for by a relatively slight exposure time increase. Although not the pre-
ferred choice at this time the intensifier SEC vidicons are a promising
future consideration.
The imag_ qissector, the only nonstorage device listed in Table G-l,
suffers a fundam_.ntal disadvantage in a wide field detection task requir-
ing short exposure. The detection dwell time for the image dissector is
only the scanning period for a single picture element in contrast to the
storage case where the dwell time occupies an entire frame. Assuming
that the limiting noise source is cathode emission shot noise, the orthi-
con and vidicon possess a _ sensitivity advantage over the image
dissector where N is the number of picture elements in the frame. It
is unlikely that the image dissector will be given further consideration
for this task.
The image orthicon is recommended for the terminal guidance
sensor in preference to the detectors described above. In summary the
following characteristics are pertinent:
Advantage s
• High sensitivity and resolution
• Large field of view coverage
• Proven environmental resistance
• Favorable spectral response
Disadvantage s
• Over-all dimensions
• Numerous regulated voltages and adjustments
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2.4.2 Optical System
A single field of view refractive optical system is chosen at this
time on the basis that it would provide the necessary field coverage and
light collecting power without excessive scattering. Image quality and
resolution are not of great concern in selection of the optics, since the
image orthicon will limit system image quality. It is important, however,
that aberrations and distortions not be excessive since they cannu_ be
eliminated by reference to the reticle grid.
The major consideration in discussion of an alternative optical
configuration is the possible need to obtain terminal guidance data sig-
nificantly closer than 500,000 kin. For instance, if a range of i25:000 krn
were desirable, a I per cent scatter of planet flux by the optical system
would illuminate the cathode 2. 5 times the level of a +6.0 magnitude star.
This problem might be overcome in two different ways, design refine-
ment to eliminate excessive scatter or utilization of a dual field of view
device. The former approach could lead to a reduction of scatter light
of less than an order of magnitude. The operating range might be re-
duced to i25,000 km in this way at some additional expense in optical
design.
The second solution would call for the design of a device having
two fields of view imaged either simultaneously or sequentially on the
camera face. A sequential device, either turreted or switched by means
of a mirror, requires a moving part and an additional source of align-
ment uncertainty. The two fields might be imaged simultaneously with
a neutral density filter reducing the intensity of the planet. One sugges-
tion is to replace the entrance apertures of a Thompson-Starling photo-
meter head with objectives of the proper focal length.
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/ -i AUG 795S
SIGNIFICANT ERRATA. TRWSystems, Phase 1A
Study Report, Voyager Spacecraft
August ll, 1965
Volume 1. Summary
Substitute new p. 79 attached.
Volume Z. 1971 Voyager Spacecraft
_. 18. Item h) "necessary landed operations" should read "necessary
lander operations."
,,,,_ 143. Section 3.4.1.a. second line should read "threshold of 0.Z5 gamma"
_. "28Z. Lines 3 and 4. Delete "or incorrect spacecraft address"
p. 5'.84. Figure 5. Change "lZ8 Word DRO Core Memory" to "Z56 Word
_j.-" DRO Core Memory"
./zp. 3Z7. Denominator of second term on right hand side of equation should
read
_1_. 351. Figure l, Section F-F. "separation nut" should read "bolt catcher"
Volume 3. Voyager Program Plan
Substitute new p. lZ attached.
p. 13. Figure 2.-3. PTM Assemblies in item 7 move 1.5 months to right
p. 16. Figure Z-6. First milestone date should be September 1, 1969,
instead of mid-January 1970, and all subsequent dates should be
correspondingly adjusted 4.5 months earlier.
p. Z0. Table 2-Z. Third item in 1969 column should read "coincident
with completion of proof test model assemblies. Fifth item in
this column change "Z weeks" to "3.5 months." Fourth item in
1971 column, change "4 months" to "5 months."
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|
,_. 67. Figure 5-2. Under Intersystem Interface Specification add ablock entitled "Spacecraft to OSE Interface Specification"
_120. Last line of paragraph c should read "shown in Table 5-2."6. Figure 5-13. Year should be 1966 instead of 1965.
_j_. 153. Figure 5-18. Ignore all numbers associated with lines in figure.
p. 167. Figure 5-21. In line Z0 change "design revisions" to "design
reviews"
_p. 254. Second paragraph, third line, "The capability of the transmitter
to select" should read "The capability o;.'thetransmitter selector
to select."
_8. Section heading n.should read Experiment Data Handlin$
._. 604. Section 3.2.1 beginning of "econd paragraph should read "The
hydrazine fuel ... "
Volume 4. Alternate Designs" Systems Considerati,ms
_, Figure 3-19. Caption should read "Radial Center of Mass... "
l_._. Last paragraph, second line, "For the baseline, the reliability..."
should read "The reliability ... "
_.p__- 8th line, replace "0.06 pound/watt" by "0.6 pound/watt"
Figure 3-50. Dot in ellipse at right should be 0.
"_-_. Section 5.3.2, secona paragraph, 7th line, should read "Figure 3-52.
_Jk Second line, "with a variable V" should read "with a variable AV"
/_._. First line, "3250 km/sec" should read "3.250 km/sec"
17../ p. 261. Figure 3-(_4. Interchange coordinates, clock angle and cone angle
_.p. 293. Figure 3-81. An arrow should connect "Low-gain spacecraft
antenna" and the dashed line at 73 × 106 km
Volume 4. Alternate Designs" Systems Considerations Appendix
/
p._. Figure A-2. The shaded portion under the lower curve should
extend to the right only as far as 325 lb.
2
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p. 9. Tabh A-I, part (I). In last column heading change "W3" to
"Wl". In part (4) last column heading change "W3" to "W4"
p. Z2. Second line below tabulation, replace "5?5 X 35" by "5?0 × 35"
p. Z9. Tabulation at bottom of page, change "18" to "30" and "400"
to "240"
p. 207. Numerator of equation for k best at bottom of page should read
"0.0Z01," and numerator of equation for k worst should read
"9.21"
p. 209. Table 5B, fifthline. Delete " X 10- " Also p. 213, Table ?A,
seventh line, and p. 232, Table 3B, fifth line.
p. 217. Top portion of Table 9B should be labeled "primary mode"
instead of "other modes"
p. 326. In equations following words "clearly" and "thus" insert " >"
before second summation.
Volume 5. Alternate Designs: Subsystem Considerations
p. 3-15 Fifth line, "... is extended, spacecraft" should read "... is
extended, two spacecraft"
p. 3-38 Last line, change " - 45003Z = IV[" to " I 3Z ) (M) ''
p. 3-51 Two equations at bottom of page should read
D = 4_A/k z
Dk g 1000k z
A = "_1_" - 4_r
p. 3-67 Third line, last parenthesis " (_ +6) --"
p. 3-8g 6th line should read "50 degrees" instead of "50-140 degrees,"
and seventh line should read "140 degrees" instead of "50-140
degrees"
p. 3-I11 Last line, change "50 Mc'7 £o "I Mc"
p. 3-137 Item g) for "... followed by 5 frames of real time" substitute
"... followed by 11 frames of low rate science data and 5 frames
of real time"
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pp. 3-150 and 3-151 are interchanged.
p. 3-i56 Last line, should read "gates, a 7 bit"
p. 5-21 Second paragraph, third line, for "others since they are"
substitute "others which are"
p. 5-33 Bjork equations should identify 0.18 as an exponent, and the
exponent for (pp/Pt) in the Hermann and Jones equation
should be 2/3 in both cases.
p. 5-33 Figure 5-12 should be replaced with Figure G-7 of Appendix G.
p. 5-40 Three lines above Table S-f0 substitute "permanent set" for
"experiment"
Volume 5. Alternate Designs: Subsystem Gonsiaerations. Appendix I
p. B-ll Bottom of page, for "r 2/3'' substitute "(V/G) 2/3 r"
p. G-4 The title of Figure G-Z should read "Figure G-2. Meteoroid
hnflux Rate Gircular Orbit Mars", and the title of Figure G-3
should read "Figure G-3. Meteoroid Influx Rate Gruise"
p. G-5 At bottom of page, add the following: "_Within 50,000 km
of Mars"
G-6 Line 13 should read: "... of low density (pp <_ 2.4 gm/cm 3...''p.
p. G-6 Figure G-4. The ordinate "2" should read "100"
pp. G-t7 The figures G-6 and G-7 on pages G-17 and G-21 should be
G-21 reversed_
p. C-28 The title of Figure C-8 should read "Meteoroid Shield Test
Specimen"
p. G-29 The title of Figure G-9 should read "Gutaway of Meteoroid
Shield Test Specimen
p. C-34 In Section i.8 the first sentence should be replaced by the
following two sentences: "Preceding sections of this appendix
contain derivations of the probability of penetrations of the
spacecraft outer skin by meteoroids. It is clear that to design
,_ an outer skin of sufficient thickness to reduce the probability
of no penetrations to a low level, such as 0.05 to 0.01, would
be prohibitive in terms of the weight required."
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p. C-35 In the first equation, the expression "(t in m2) '' in two places
should read "(t in cm)" and ".A" in two places should read
"(A in m2) ''
p. C-38 In Table C-Z, all values in inches should be in centimeters.
A zero should be inserted irr_rnediatelyfollowing the decimal
point, for example" (0.0Z0-inch) = 0.05080, (0.0Z0-inch) =
0.06096, (0.0Z0-inch) = 0.04064, etc.
p. C-40 In Section 1.8.7 Computation of Ris, the sixth line should
read "... than 10b are neglected"
p. C-45 In listing under "Values of t Used for Extreme Environment
Analysis," under Inch, the first number should read 0.0Z0
instead of 0.Z0Z
p. C-52 In l.iO NOMENCLATURE, "Kz" should be defined as
"K "Z/3(4 ±Z)" and "B" should be
1000 9t V z
9.806 H t
pp. C-150 and C-151 should be reversed.
p. C-Z08 Along the ordinate in the graph, "Stress X 10 -3'' should read
"Stress X I0 "2''
Volume 5. Alternate Designs: Subsystem Considerations. Appendix II
p. F-Z3 Lines 7 and l0 change all subscript T to T
p. F-Z4 Line 14, change "ME " to "mE "l I
p. F-Z9 Figure F-9 title should be ':Reflection Phase Angle _b(deg)"
and Figure F-10 title should be "Reflection Magnitucie R"
p. F-30 Last line, change "0.Z7" to "0.175"
p. F-31 Lines 14 and 15, change "14,700 ft/sec to 460 ft/sec" to
14,700 ft/sec minus 460 ft/sec" and "14,700 ft/sec to
I0,000 ft/sec" to "14,700 ft/sec minus 10,000 ft/sec"
p. F-3Z Last line in item 4), change "Z7 per cent" to "17.5 per cent"
p. F-35 Table F-4, under Assumed Parameter for item 2 insert
":h2X 10 -5,, for item 3 insert "_3 X 10 -5,,, and for item 4
insert ':_ZX 10 -5''
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p. F-53 Item d. Noise Figure, change "4 -Ib" to "3.5 db"; Gain,
change "20 db" to "10 db", last line change "10 db" to
"4 db"
p. F-58 Figure F-21. Change 102 kc to 112 kc.
p. F-59 Line 22 change to "M = 21.5 deg or 0.375 radians (rms
' 1
peak)"
p. F-60 Line 2, change to
"M2 = I (I'I)Z -- (0"375)2 "
p. F-60 I,ine 3, change to "M z = 1.03 radians (rms' or 1.46 radians
(peak)"
p. G-6 Paragraph 1.4, second line, change "from E M = I0' E to
04
O
• .." to read _._ n E M = I0-I E to 104 E
I E I!
O O O "''
Volume 6. Operational Support Equipment
p. Z5 Figure 6. Caption should be "Typical Grounding Scheme"
p. 39 Section 1.3.3, change opening of first sentence to read "Launc
pad equipment consists of the ground power and RF consoles
and the test flight program power and control equipment ... "
p. G-31 Figure 1. Lines enclosing Data Format Generator should k_.
solid.
p. G-10Z Last line substitute "4500" for "45"
p. G-If3 In Section 4.4.Z, change "Z5 per cent" to "750 per cent"
p. G-184 Section 4.5, substitute "6.5 feet" for "six feet"
p. G-311 Fifth line, change "30 per cent" to "Z0 per cent"
p. G-398 Section 4.2 should b_gin with "The hoist b"_am is ..."
p. G-419 Second line "4 optic.alalignment targets" instead of 8. Same
correction top of p. G-421.
p. G-4Z5 Section 4.9.2, substitute "Z0 per cent" for "50 per cent"
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Volume 7. i969 Flisht Test Spacecraft and OSE
p. 90 First line should read "Launch pad equipment consists of
the ground power and RF consoles and ... "
p. 107 Last line, change Volume 5 to Volume 6.
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